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Scary Stories and the Limited Liability




Legal commentators, policy-makers, and the media argue that the current
structures of environmental, bankruptcy, and corporate law permit firms to
strategically use bankruptcy to inappropriately displace hundreds of millions
of dollars of environmental liability onto taxpayers. However, the proposed
solution to this supposed problem-reforming bankruptcy, environmental,
and/or corporate law-is draconian, and may cause dramatic and unintended
consequences. Moreover, these demands for reform are occurring in a
complete absence of data about whether and to what extent inappropriate
strategic use of bankruptcy in this manner actually occurs.
We conducted an empirical analysis of Chapter 11 bankruptcies filed in
2004 and closed by mid-2006 to try to determine the extent to which
environmental liabilities drive bankruptcy filings, with an eye to examining the
following questions. First, how many firms in the data set reported
environmental violations, liabilities, or other obligations? Second, of these
firms, in how many instances did the environmental issues play a role in the
bankruptcy filing? Third, of the firms in which environmental matters caused
the bankruptcy filing, in how many cases did the debtor end up shifting the cost
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** Professor of Business Law, Stephen M. Ross School of Business at the University of
Michigan.
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of the environmental cleanup to the taxpayer? Fourth, even if environmental
obligations did not play a role in the decision to file for bankruptcy, did the
debtor avoid paying for environmental remediation either by invoking the
Bankruptcy Code's abandonment power or its right to discharge? Finally, is
there any evidence that parent corporations are using subsidiaries as a
mechanism to siphon off assets, thereby leaving a bankrupt subsidiary with
environmental liabilities but no assets with which to satisfy them?
Our findings suggest that the strategic use of Chapter 11 to avoid
environmental obligations is an uncommon phenomenon. We conclude with
suggestions about how to improve the reporting of environmental issues in
bankruptcy, and also with a cautionary note about reforming bankruptcy,
environmental, or corporate law based on anecdotal, rather than empirical,
evidence.
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"Scary stories make for bad policy."'
I. Introduction
A recent high-profile bankruptcy case, that of American Smelting and
Refining Co. (Asarco), has attracted a lot of media attention2 and has generated
a number of heated demands for reform of bankruptcy law, environmental law,
1. The quotation paraphrases a quote by Elizabeth Warren. We were unable to locate the
original quotation, and Professor Warren, when asked, remembered the quote but also could not
remember the source of the original quotation. See E-mail from Elizabeth Warren, Professor,
Harvard Law Sch., to Lynda Oswald, Professor, Univ. of Mich. Ross Sch. of Bus. (Aug. 16,
2007, 17:59:00 EST) (on file with authors).
2. See, e.g., Les Blumenthal, Asarco Leaves Legal Heartburn, NEWS TRIB. (Tacoma,
Wash.), Mar. 20,2006, at Al; Marie Leone, Environmentally Bankrupt? Companies That File
for Bankruptcy Protection Should Be Held to Account for Their Cleanup Responsibilities, Say
Critics, CFO.coM, http://www.cfo.com/printable/article.cffi/4370356/c_2984351?f=options
(last visited Feb. 25, 2008) (describing the views of environmentalist critics of the Bankruptcy
Code) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review); Joel Millman, Asarco Bankruptcy
Leaves Many Towns with Cleanup Mess, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2006, at B 1; Marilyn Berlin
Snell, Going for Broke: How a Copper Giant Plans to Make the Public Pay for Its Toxic Mess,
SIERRA, http://www.sierraclub.org/sierra/200605/goingforbroke/page1.asp (last visited Mar. 3,
2008) (describing the environmental consequences of filing for bankruptcy) (on file with
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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corporate law, or perhaps all three.3 It is true that environmental, corporate,
and bankruptcy law do intersect in a complex and often unpredictable
manner, and that some cases-Asarco being a particularly prominent and
visible example-at least at first glance suggest that firms may engage in
apparently Machiavellian conduct that allows them to displace hundreds of
millions of dollars of environmental liability onto taxpayers. Critics contend
that the current structures of bankruptcy, corporate, and environmental law
allow a firm to protect its assets by creating a subsidiary that carries the
firm's environmental liabilities but has insufficient assets with which to pay
those liabilities.4 The subsidiary then declares bankruptcy, leaving the
taxpayers with the environmental cleanup bill and the parent corporation's
assets untouched.5 The solution, critics argue, is to redraft bankruptcy and
environmental law and perhaps to revisit corporate law notions of limited
liability as well, to prevent businesses from engaging in such deceptive and
scheming behavior.6
However, the proposed solution-redrafting bankruptcy, environmental,
and/or corporate law-is draconian, and may cause dramatic and unintended
consequences. Before we engage in wholesale revision of long-settled legal
doctrines, we ought to determine whether a problem really exists and what
the extent of that problem might be. Unfortunately, however, the debate on
this topic has been driven so far by "scary stories" but very little substantive
data.
Asarco has become the poster-child for reform in the
bankruptcy/environmental arena. On its face, the Asarco case presents
3. See Ronald G. Aronovsky & Lynn D. Fuller, Liability of Parent Corporations for
Hazardous Substance Releases Under CER CLA, 24 U.S.F. L. REv. 421, 422 (1990) (suggesting
and outlining the application of a standard for corporate liability that would both protect the
objectives of the doctrine of limited liability and be consistent with the language of the
Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA)); Debra
L. Baker, Bankruptcy-The Last EnvironmentalLoophole, 34 S. TEX. L. REV. 379, 406 (1993)
(calling on Congress to balance the competing objectives of the Bankruptcy Code and
environmental laws); Kathryn Heidt, Products Liability, Mass Torts and Environmental
Obligations in Bankruptcy: Suggestionsfor Reform, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 117, 142-49
(1995) (suggesting specific reforms for the bankruptcy code, including reforms to help deal with
environmental obligations); Karyn S. Bergmann, Bankruptcy, LimitedLiability and CERCLA:
Closing the Loophole andParting the Veil 4 (Univ. of Maryland Sch. of Law Pub. Law & Legal
Theory Accepted and Working Research Paper Series No. 2004-02), available at
http://ssm.com/abstract=503143 (proposing an integrated approach to revising the Bankruptcy
Code and CERLCA).
4. See Bergmann, supra note 3, at 3 (describing how corporations evade environmental
cleanup liabilities).
5. Id.
6. Supra note 3 and accompanying text.
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deplorable facts.7 Asarco filed for bankruptcy protection in August, 2005.8
As a result of its former copper mining and refining operations, Asarco was
associated with at least nineteen Superfund sites around the country, with
estimated environmental liabilities ranging between $500 million and $1
billion.9 Asarco's potential environmental liabilities are not limited to federal
Superfund sites, however; it also faces substantial state environmental
liabilities' 0 and civil suits." Asarco's president at the time of the bankruptcy
filing cited the environmental liabilities of the company as a leading cause for
the company's Chapter 11 filing.'
2
What ignites the ire of the public and media is the perception that Asarco
has engaged in a shell game, shifting valuable assets to an affiliated corporation
and leaving behind a bankrupt husk with huge liabilities and no assets. The
perception arises out of the circumstances following the buy-out of Asarco by a
Mexican metals conglomerate, Grupo Mexico, in 1999.13 Shortly after the
purchase, Grupo Mexico attempted to sell Asarco's most valuable asset, a
majority share in a lucrative Peruvian mining operation, to another Grupo
Mexico subsidiary, American Mining Corporation.' 4 The sale was initially
blocked by the U.S. Department of Justice, which argued that the sale was a
fraudulent transfer of valuable assets at below-market prices, a result that would
leave Asarco with few assets to fund the cleanup of its contaminated sites.
15
Eventually, the Department of Justice and Asarco agreed that Asarco could sell
7. See infra notes 8-12 and accompanying text (describing the facts of Asarco).
8. Max Jarman, Asarco Files for Chapter 11: Copper Company Blames Strike, EPA
Claims, ARiz. REPUBLIC, Aug. 11, 2005, at ID.
9. Snell, supra note 2, at 1.
10. For example, faced with a $900,000 fine imposed by Montana's Department of
Environmental Quality for illegal handling of toxic materials at its closed East Helena smelter,
Asarco negotiated a reduced fine of $179,924 in February 2005, and agreed to clean up the site.
Asarco's filing for bankruptcy six months later stayed payment of the settlement, however, and
put the state environmental agency in line for payment behind a long list of other creditors.
Millman, supra note 2, at B1.
11. See Snell, supra note 2 ("When Asarco filed for bankruptcy, more than 10 civil
enforcement cases were pending against it.").
12. See Jarman, supra note 8 ("[Asarco]'s enormous environmental liabilities stenming
from a century of mining and smelting activities also weighed heavily in the decision [to file for
bankruptcy]."). Asarco's then-president listed the following factors, in order, as the cause of
Asarco's bankruptcy filing: (1) environmental liabilities of up to $1 billion; (2) asbestos
liabilities of up to $900 million; (3) a credit downgrade from Standards & Poor's Financial
Rating Service to CCC; and (4) a labor strike. See Thomas Stauffer, Joseph Barrios & Andrea
Kelly, Asarco Seeks Bankruptcy Protection, ARIz. DAILY STAR, Aug. 11, 2005, at Al.
13. Millman, supra note 2, at B 1.
14. Leone, supra note 2.
15. Id.
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the assets for $765 million; Asarco agreed to set up a trust fund of $ 100 million
for cleanup of contaminated sites.'
6
Since then, the Asarco bankruptcy case has continued to wend its way
through the legal system 17 and cleanup of the firm's polluted sites remains
uncertain. What does seem likely is that U.S. taxpayers will end up picking up
a large part of the bill for cleanup, as Asarco simply lacks the resources needed
to fully satisfy its environmental liabilities. It is that shortfall that has led to
cries for legal reform.
What is not known, however, is whether the Asarco situation is typical or
atypical. Are firms routinely siphoning off assets of their subsidiaries, leaving
behind bankrupt shells unable to satisfy their environmental liabilities?
Commentators have suggested that the strategy is common, arguing that
bankruptcy provides the "last loophole" for escaping environmental liabilities, 8
or asserting that corporations have routinely avoided environmental liabilities
by declaring bankruptcy.' 9
In fact, however, there are no data to indicate the true extent of this
problem, only unsupported assertions and anecdotal "evidence." When the
Government Accountability Office (GAO) investigated this issue for Congress
in a 2005 report (GAO Report),20 the GAO noted the data deficiencies in
evaluating the interface between environmental law and bankruptcy law. The
report stated:
While national bankruptcy data show that more than 231,000 businesses
operating in the United States filed for bankruptcy in fiscal years 1998
through 2003, the extent to which these businesses had existing
16. Elizabeth Malkin, Company News: Asarco Settles with Justice Dept. on Sale and
Pollution, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 4, 2003, at Cl. At the time, "Wall Street analysts [said] the final
cleanup costs could reach as much as $700 million." Id. Estimated costs now are as high as $1
billion. See Leone, supra note 2 ("[T]he tab will run between $500 million and $1 billion.").
17. For information on the bankruptcy, see Asarco, LLC Restructuring-Information
Website, http://www.asarcoreorg.com (last visited Nov. 17, 2007) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review), and Asarco Bankruptcy News, Aug. 11, 2005, http://bankrupt.
com/asarco.txt (last visited Nov. 17,2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
18. E.g., Baker, supra note 3, at 381.
19. See, e.g., Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 422 (stating that "[m]any of these
corporations have sought refuge in bankruptcy"); Bergmann, supra note 3, at 2 ("Many violators
have avoided their environmental obligations in bankruptcy by either discharge of
environmental claims or abandonment of contaminated property.").
20. GENERAL ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, ENVIRONMENTAL LIABILITIES: EPA SHOULD Do
MORE TO ENSURE THAT LIABLE PARTIES MEET THEIR CLEANUP OBUGATIONS (2005), available at
http://www.gao.gov/highlights/d05658high.pdf [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
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environmental liabilities is not known because neither the federal
government nor other sources collect this information.21
The EPA told the GAO that it did not track information on its review of
bankruptcy cases, including whether environmental liabilities are involved in
such cases, because of the large number of bankruptcy notices it receives and
the limited resources that it has to track this information. 22 The GAO noted
that, as a result, the data on business bankruptcies involving federal
environmental liabilities was limited to data on the bankruptcy cases that the
Department of Justice pursued in court on behalf of the EPA or other federal
agencies.2 a The Justice Department initiated 136 cases of this type between
1998 and 2003.24 The GAO concluded that "EPA's efforts to identify
bankruptcies that may warrant pursuit in bankruptcy court are hampered by the
lack of timely, complete, and reliable information on the many thousands of
businesses filing for bankruptcy each year.
2 5
We set out to examine the question of whether firms are indeed
inappropriately using bankruptcy as a way to escape environmental liabilities
on any sort of pervasive, wide-scale basis. We acknowledge up front the
inherent limitations of any such study. These limitations are occasioned by the
complexity of statutory and common law rules regarding environmental
obligations and by the utter lack of data in the area. Environmental liabilities
can arise at both the state and federal levels, can involve both statutory
violations and common law actions, and can result in imposition of a host of
obligations for the environmental defendant, including penalties,
reimbursement of cleanup costs, and/or mandates for remedial action. Thus,
environmental obligations can manifest themselves in various ways and in
multiple jurisdictions simultaneously, making the tracking of these obligations
for any given company challenging. In addition, because the EPA and the
Department of Justice have not tracked data on bankruptcy cases involving
environmental matters in any manner, it is necessary to comb through
individual bankruptcy filings one by one to find cases posing environmental
issues. As a result, any effort to address this absence of data is necessarily but a
first step in what will ultimately be a lengthy and multi-pronged analysis. By
taking this first step, however, we begin to shed light on the actual nature and




25. Id. at 4-5.
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extent of the use of bankruptcy as a tool to inappropriately avoid environmental
liability.
We set out to define a narrow but manageable set of data--Chapter 11
business bankruptcy cases for calendar year 2004-with an eye to examining
the following questions. First, how many firms in the data set reported
environmental violations, liabilities, or other obligations? Second, of these
firms, in how many instances did the environmental issues play a role in the
bankruptcy filing? Third, of the firms in which environmental matters caused,
even in part, the bankruptcy filing, in how many cases did the debtor end up
shifting the cost of the environmental cleanup to the taxpayer? Fourth, even if
environmental obligations did not play a role in the decision to file for
bankruptcy, did the debtor avoid paying for environmental remediation either
by invoking the Bankruptcy Code's abandonment power or the right to
discharge? Finally, is there any evidence that parent corporations effectively
shift the cost of environmental cleanup to the taxpayers by creating subsidiaries
with insufficient assets to pay for their environmental obligations?
Our findings suggest that Asarco is an atypical case and that the strategic
use of Chapter 11 to avoid environmental obligations is an uncommon
phenomenon. In only 3.3% of the Chapter 11 business bankruptcy cases in our
data set did debtors report an environmental obligation or violation that
possibly was pending at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Moreover, in more
than ninety-nine percent of the cases in our data set, environmental violations
and cleanup obligations played virtually no role in the decision to file for
bankruptcy. In addition, the concern that debtors use bankruptcy to abandon
contaminated property proved without merit in the context of Chapter 11. In
only one case-less than one tenth of one percent of the total number of cases
in the data set-did the debtor successfully invoke the Bankruptcy Code's
abandonment power.26 We did find two cases in which debtors had massive
environmental liabilities; in only one, however, did the debtor confirm a plan of
reorganization and, thus, discharge a significant portion of its environmental
debt, thereby effectively shifting the costs of cleanup to the taxpayer.2 7 Finally,
we were unable to substantiate the claim that parent corporations rely on
bankruptcy to shield them from the costs of environmental remediation by
creating subsidiaries that carry and ultimately discharge in bankruptcy
significant environmental liabilities.
We begin the Article with an overview, in Part II, of environmental,
corporate, and bankruptcy law to set the stage for the analysis that follows. Part
26. Infra Part IV.D.2.
27. Infra Part IV.D.3.
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III explains the methodology we employed to create the data set, and provides a
project overview, a description of the research design, and a description of how
cases were identified for inclusion in the data set. In Part IV, we discuss our
findings. Part IV.A summarizes the results of our research. In Part IV.B, we
discuss "false positives"-those cases with environmental disclosures but no
pending environmental issues at the time of the bankruptcy filing. In Part IV.C,
we discuss in some detail the five cases in our data set in which the debtor
reported that its environmental obligations played a role in the decision to file
for Chapter 11. Part IV.D examines the "loophole" issues of abandonment and
the bankruptcy discharge in light of the Chapter 11 cases in the data set.
Finally, in Part V, we conclude with two suggestions about how to improve the
reporting of environmental issues in bankruptcy, and also with a cautionary
note about reforming bankruptcy, environmental, or corporate law based on
anecdotal, rather than empirical, evidence.
1. Background: An Overview of Environmental, Corporate, and
Bankruptcy Law
Environmental issues in bankruptcy cases pose extremely interesting but
often difficult legal and policy issues because they appear at a crowded
intersection of three areas of the law: corporate, environmental, and
bankruptcy. Overlapping levels of jurisdiction add to this complexity.
Bankruptcy law is exclusively federal law. Corporate law doctrine arises under
state law. Environmental regulation, by contrast, is found at both the state and
federal levels. The net result is an intricate interweaving of legal doctrine and
standards in the environmental and bankruptcy law arena that leads to thorny
analyses and convoluted outcomes.
The interplay between bankruptcy law and environmental statutes is
complex, at best, and has created numerous analytical problems for the courts.28
As the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit noted:
28. See, e.g., In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 974 F.2d 775,777 (7th Cir.
1992) ("The interface of bankruptcy laws and environmental laws has perplexed courts since the
passage of [CERCLA]."); Penn Terra Ltd. v. Dep't of Envtl. Res., 733 F.2d 267, 269 (3d Cir.
1984) (describing complex analytical problems). As the Third Circuit recognized, the conflict is
heightened when a state environmental law is involved in a bankruptcy case:
On the one hand, the federally created bankruptcy policy requires that assets of a
debtor be preserved and protected, so that in time they may be equitably distributed
to all creditors without unfair prejudice. On the other hand, the environmental
policies of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania require those within its jurisdiction
to preserve and protect natural resources and to rectify damage to the environment
which they have caused. The potential conflict between these two policies is
65 WASH. &LEE L. REV 451 (2008)
The interface of environmental cleanup laws and federal bankruptcy
statutes is never tidy; jurisprudentially, it is somewhat grubby. [CERCLA]
and similar state laws... seek to protect public health and the environment
by facilitating the cleanup of environmental contamination and imposing
costs on the parties responsible for the pollution. The Bankruptcy Reform
Act of 1978 ... and its predecessors were designed to give a debtor a fresh
start by discharging as many of its debts as possible. The tension between
these fundamental aspects of our national policy is profound.29
The problem is that the goals of environmental and bankruptcy law-and
corporate law as well-are often in conflict. The purpose of environmental
remedial statutes, such as CERCLA and RCRA,3 ° is to promote cleanup of past
contamination by those most responsible for the contamination in the first
place-the oft-cited "polluter pays" principle.3  The primary goal of
bankruptcy law, on the other hand, is to provide the debtor with a "fresh
start. 3 2 In furtherance of this goal, bankruptcy law seeks to equitably distribute
the debtor's assets among all creditors, which means that environmental
liabilities may not be fully paid by a bankrupt party.33 As a result, the "fresh
start" of bankruptcy can trump the "polluter pays" principle of environmental
law. Added to this complex mix is the principle of limited liability underlying
traditional state corporate law doctrine. While limited liability helps encourage
investment in business activities, 34 thus promoting economic activity and
wealth creation, limited liability principles can also enable firms to escape
presented in this case, in which the Commonwealth has attempted to force a
company which has petitioned in bankruptcy to correct violations of state
antipollution laws, even though this action would have the effect of depleting assets
which would otherwise be available to repay debts owed to general creditors.
Id.
29. In re Chi., Milwaukee, St. Paul & Pac. R.R. Co., 3 F.3d 200, 201 (7th Cir. 1993).
30. See infra Part II.A (discussing the statutes).
31. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 58; see also Dedham Water Co. v. Cumberland Farms
Dairy, Inc., 805 F.2d 1074, 1081 (1st Cir. 1986) (stating that Congress intended CERCLA to
provide EPA with effective means of responding to problems of hazardous waste and to ensure
that those responsible for hazardous waste problems pay for the harm created).
32. Williams v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 236 U.S. 549, 554-55 (1915). The Court stated:
It is the purpose of the Bankruptcy Act to convert the assets of the bankrupt into
cash for distribution among creditors and then to relieve the honest debtor from the
weight of oppressive indebtedness and permit him to start afresh free from the
obligations and responsibilities consequent upon business misfortunes.
Id. (citations omitted).
33. See Heidt, supra note 3, at 121-22 (discussing the bankruptcy system's equal
treatment for similar creditors).
34. See infra Part II.B (explaining the economic incentives).
SCAR Y STORIES
environmental and other liabilities through careful corporate structuring.35
This problem arguably is heightened when firms couple strategic corporate
structuring with the debt relief of bankruptcy.
We explore the pertinent aspects of these three areas of the law in the
following subparts.
A. Overview of Environmental Law Regulatory Schemes
The plethora of environmental regulation at both the state and federal
levels makes it difficult to get a handle on the extent to which firms escape or
try to escape environmental liabilities (appropriately or inappropriately)
through bankruptcy. Although federal environmental laws have received the
most attention from scholars who have examined the intersection between
bankruptcy and environmental law, there is a substantial body of state
environmental regulation, as well as extensive common law tort actions, all of
which can generate liabilities of a magnitude that could easily affect the
financial health of a firm. Tracking all of these levels of liability exposure in
specific bankruptcy filings is extremely difficult.
Most case law involving the interface of environmental and bankruptcy
law involves the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation
and Liability Act of 198036 (CERCLA). 37 However, while the staggering
35. As explained in the GAO Report:
a subsidiary that is engaged in a business that is at risk of incurring substantial
liability, such as mining or chemical manufacturing, can protect its assets by
transferring the most valuable ones-such as equipment and patents-to a related
entity, such as the parent or other subsidiary engaged in less risky endeavors. The
high-risk subsidiary can continue to use the transferred assets, as appropriate, by
leasing or renting them. It has become common practice for experts in asset
protection to recommend that corporations protect their assets in this way.... Ifa
liability arises, under the limited liability principle, the high-risk subsidiary's
remaining assets may be reached-but generally not those of the parent corporation
or other subsidiaries to which assets were transferred.
GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 21-22.
36. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA), Pub. L. No. 96-510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 26
U.S.C. and 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000), amended by the Superfund Amendments and
Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA), Pub. L. No. 99-499, 100 Stat. 1613). CERCLA is often
referred to as "Superfund," a term more properly used in reference to a hazardous waste trust
fund designated for cleanup actions. The discussion of CERCLA and its provisions in this
Article is necessarily limited. For a more complete discussion, see Ingrid Michelsen Hillinger &
Michael G. Hillinger, Environmental Affairs in Bankruptcy: 2004, 12 Am. BANKR. INST. L.
REv. 331, 334-58 (2004).
37. See, e.g., Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 36, at 334 ("Most environmental-
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expense associated with CERCLA's goal of cleaning up contaminated sites38
does create a natural linkage between the statute and bankruptcy filings by
firms, there are no data to indicate how many bankruptcy filings actually
involve CERCLA liabilities as opposed to other types of federal or state
environmental liabilities. Anecdotally, we may well suspect that CERCLA is
a primary source of environmental liability in bankruptcy, but empirically we
have no data to support or disprove that supposition.
CERCLA is a remedial statute. It was enacted by Congress in an
attempt to address the growing environmental issues posed by past hazardous
waste disposal. 39 Well-publicized environmental incidents, including Love
Canal in New York40 and the James River kepone contamination in
Virginia,4' illustrated to Congress the need for remedial legislation designed
to address the environmental problems posed by hazardous waste produced
and abandoned in the past. Congress's goal in enacting CERCLA was to
ensure that the parties responsible for hazardous waste contamination bore
the costs of its cleanup.42 As a result, liability under CERCLA is deliberately
broad:43 liability is retroactive, 44 joint and several, 45 and strict.46 Liable
bankruptcy case law involves CERCLA.").
38. Infra notes 64-65 and accompanying text.
39. See infra notes 40-42 (describing legislative history).
40. See, e.g., 126 CONG. REc. 30,931 (1980), reprinted in 1 SENATE COMM. ONENV'T&
PUBLIC WORKS, 97TH CONG., 2D SESS., A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF THE COMPREHENSIVE
ENVIRONMENTAL RESPONSE, COMPENSATION AND LIABILITY ACT OF 1980 (SUPERFUND), at 684
(1983) [hereinafter A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY] (remarks of Sen. Randolph, co-sponsor of
CERCLA) (advocating the passage of CERCLA and describing instances of chemical
contamination, including the Love Canal and the James River); S. REP. No. 96-848, at 7-10
(1980), reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, supra, at 315-17 (same).
41. See S. REP. No. 96-848, supra note 40, at 7, reprinted in 1 A LEGISLATIVE HISTORY,
supra note 40, at 314.
42. H.R. REP. No. 99-253, pt. 3, at 15 (1985), as reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038,
3038 (noting that Congress's goals in enacting CERCLA were "(1) to provide for clean-up if a
hazardous substance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and (2) to
hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups").
43. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 21 (1989) (Brennan, J., plurality
opinion) ("The remedy that Congress felt it needed in CERCLA is sweeping: everyone who is
potentially responsible for hazardous-waste contamination may be forced to contribute to the
costs of clean-up.").
44. See United States v. Ne. Pharm. & Chem. Co., 810 F.2d 726, 732-33 (8th Cir. 1986)
("Although CERCLA does not expressly provide for retroactivity, it is manifestly clear that
Congress intended CERCLA to have retroactive effect.").
45. Although the statute does not specifically provide for joint and several liability, the
courts have determined that such liability is appropriate in cases of indivisible harm. E.g.,
O'Neil v. Picillo, 883 F.2d 176, 178-79 (1st Cir. 1989).
46. E.g., Tanglewood E. Homeowners v. Charles-Thomas, Inc., 849 F.2d 1568, 1572 (5th
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parties under CERCLA are responsible for both cleanup costs and damages. 47
In addition, the categories of potentially responsible parties (PRPs) under
CERCLA are also deliberately broad, encompassing: (1) the current owners
and operators of a site or area where hazardous waste is located; (2) the past
owners or operators of such sites; (3) persons who arranged for the disposal or
treatment of hazardous substances ("generators"); and (4) transporters of
hazardous waste.48
The EPA ranks contaminated sites in order of severity of contamination
and threat to human health, and places the worst of these sites on a list known
as the National Priorities List (NPL).49 Under section 104 of CERCLA, the
EPA may start a removal action or a remedial action in response to a release or
threatened release of hazardous substances. 50 A removal action is a short-term,
relatively inexpensive cleanup action undertaken to protect public health and
welfare. 51 A remedial action is a long-term, permanent action designed to
address the contamination,5 2 and Superfund-fmanced remedial actions may only
be undertaken at NPL sites.
53
Under section 106 (a) of CERCLA, the EPA may order PRPs to clean up a
site,54 or may directly remediate the site and seek reimbursement from the
Cir. 1988); New York v. Shore Realty Corp., 759 F.2d 1032, 1042 (2d Cir. 1985).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a) (2000).
48. Id.
49. For more information about the NPL site listing process, see U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency,
National Priorities List, NPL Site Listing Process, http://www.epa.gov/superfuind/
sites/npl/npl-hrs.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
50. 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a)(1).
51. Id. § 9601(23).
52. Id. § 9601(24). The EPA describes the Superfund cleanup process on its website:
The Superfund cleanup process begins with site discovery or notification to EPA of
possible releases of hazardous substances. Sites are discovered by various parties,
including citizens, State agencies, and EPA Regional offices. Once discovered,
sites are entered into the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Liability and
Response Information System (CERCLIS), EPA's computerized inventory of
potential hazardous substance release sites.... Some sites may be cleaned up under
other authorities. EPA then evaluates the potential for a release of hazardous
substances from the site through these steps in the Superfund cleanup process.
U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund, Cleanup Process, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/
cleanup/index.htm (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law
Review).
53. See 40 C.F.R. § 300.425(b)(1) (2007) ("Only those releases included on the NPL shall
be considered eligible for Fund-financed remedial action.").
54. See 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (2000) (authorizing the President to "require the Attorney
General of the United States to secure such relief as may be necessary to abate" an imminent and
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PRPs." De minimis parties (i.e., those that played a minor role in the
contamination of the site) may avoid joint and several liability for the entire
cost of cleanup by settling with the EPA.56 Parties that do not qualify as de
minimis, however, are liable for the entire costs of remediation,57 including the
orphan shares of those PRPs that may no longer be in existence at the time of
cleanup.
Where a site poses an imminent hazard to public health, the EPA may
undertake a removal action and/or remediate the NPL site.58 Funds for
remedial actions may come from the Hazardous Waste Superfund
("Superfund"). 59 The Superfund is a trust fund created through a tax on crude
oil and certain chemicals and an environmental tax on corporations. 60 The
authority for these taxes expired in 1995, and Congress has not renewed the
taxes. 61 Although the Superfund continues to receive revenues from recovery
of cleanup costs from liable parties, interest on the trust balance, fines, and
penalties, most of the Superfund revenue since fiscal year 2000 has come from
general revenue fund appropriations.62 Superfund revenue has not kept pace
with the growth in the number of NPL sites. As of July 31, 2007, there were
1,243 Final Sites and sixty-one Proposed Sites on the NPL.63 According to the
GAO Report, cleanup costs for the majority of sites would average $12 million
substantial endangerment to the public health or welfare, or the environment).
55. Id. § 9604(a). CERCLA also permits PRPs that have incurred response and
remediation costs to file suit for contribution from other PRPs. Id. § 9113(f)(1).
56. 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
57. See 42 U.S.C. § 9622(g)(5) (2000) (declaring that while settlement with de minimis
parties does not discharge the liability of any other potentially responsible parties, it does reduce
the potential liability of others by the amount of the settlement).
58. Id. § 9604(a).
59. 42 U.S.C. § 9611(a) (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
60. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfund Reform, Glossary http://www.epa.
gov/superfund/programs/reforms/glossary.htm#s (last visited Mar. 5, 2008) ("Superfund
consists of funds from taxes imposed upon the petroleum and chemical industries, an
environmental tax on corporations, and from general tax revenues .. ") (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
61. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, EPA New England Press Releases, Superfund: Setting
the Record Straight, http://www.epa.gov/regionO1/pr/2003/oct/031005.html (last visited Jan. 12,
2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
62. Letter from John D. Stephenson, Dir., Nat'l Res. & Env't, U.S. Gen. Accounting
Office, to James M. Jeffords, U.S. Senator, Superfund Program: Breakdown ofAppropriations
Data, at 2 (May 14,2004), available at http://www.gao.gov/new.items/d04787r.pdf(last visited
Apr. 1, 2008).
63. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, National Priorities List, NPL Site Totals by Status and
Milestone, http://www.epa.gov/superfund/sites/query/queryhtm/npltotal.htm (last visited Aug.
15, 2007) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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per site.64 At the 142 "megasites," however, the average cost of cleanup per site
was estimated to be $140 million.65
Finally, under section 107 of CERCLA, private parties, states, and the
federal government have the right to seek reimbursement of cleanup costs from
66responsible parties. In addition, under section 106, the EPA may request an
injunction to prevent parties from further releasing hazardous waste.67
In contrast to CERCLA, the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of
1976 (RCRA)68 provides a statutory scheme for monitoring solid wastes and
their disposal from "cradle to grave., 69 While CERCLA is retrospective,
addressing cleanup of past contamination, RCRA is largely prospective,
addressing contamination at operating facilities, and providing for prevention of
future contamination by ensuring that hazardous waste facilities are closed
properly and safely and are monitored after closure so as to protect human
health and the environment. 70  The EPA has authorized every state to
administer all or part of RCRA's statutory program, thus creating a joint
71federal/state partnership in this arena.
RCRA requires owners and operators of facilities used to treat, store, or
dispose of hazardous waste to obtain operating permits and to prepare closure
plans and cost estimates for necessary closure activities, such as removing or
securing wastes or decontaminating equipment.72 In addition, section 7003 of
RCRA authorizes the EPA to bring suit against persons who have in the past
handled, stored, treated, transported, or disposed of solid or hazardous waste or
who are presently contributing to such activities, where such activities
constitute an imminent and substantial endangerment to human health or the
64. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 8.
65. Id. at 8-9.
66. 42 U.S.C. § 9607 (2000).
67. Id. § 9606(a).
68. 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-6992k (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
69. H.R. REP. No. 96-1016, pt. 1, at 17 (1980), as reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6119,
6120 (RCRA provides "a prospective cradle-to-grave regulatory regime governing the
movement of hazardous waste in our society").
70. See 40 C.F.R. § 264.228 (2007) (governing the closure and post-closure of hazardous
waste).
71. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, State Authorization, RCRA State Authorization, http://
www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/state (last visited Jan. 12, 2007) (on file with the Washington
and Lee Law Review).
72. 42 U.S.C. § 6925(a) (2000).
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environment. 73 Section 7003 also allows the EPA to issue administrative orders
requiring abatement of an imminent hazard.74
RCRA was enacted in 1976, four years before CERCLA. Although the
EPA tends to turn to CERCLA more now for hazardous site cleanup, RCRA is
still a "potent enforcement tool,"75 and can be used eitherjointly with CERCLA
or in instances where CERCLA is inapplicable. Because CERCLA applies to
"hazardous substances" and RCRA to "hazardous wastes"-categories that are
not necessarily coterminous-the decision as to which statutory provision to
use is often driven by the type of material at issue.76 Like CERCLA, RCRA
imposes broad liability that is strict, 77 joint and several78 (unless the harm is
divisible),7 9 and retroactive.80
RCRA's corrective action program addresses contamination at operating
industrial facilities; thus, unlike CERCLA sites, RCRA sites usually have
viable operators and ongoing operations.8' Under RCRA, such facilities can be
required to clean up contamination occurring on their sites.8 2 The EPA
estimates that 3,746 sites will be identified by the end of 2008 as needing
corrective action.83 Cleanup costs can be extensive in the RCRA arena as well.
73. Id. § 6973(a).
74. Id. § 6973(c).
75. 1 DAVID R. BERZ ET AL., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW IN REAL ESTATE AND BUSINESS
TRANSACTIONS § 2.01[l] (2006).
76. Id. § 2.01[2].
77. The statute does not explicitly impose a strict liability standard, but the legislative
history indicates congressional intent to create liability "without fault." See H.R. REP. No. 198,
at 48 (1984), as reprinted in 1984 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5576, 5607 ("The amendments clearly provide
that anyone who has contributed or is contributing to the creation, existence, or maintenance of
an imminent and substantial endangerment is subject to the equitable authority of Section 7003,
without regard to negligence." (emphasis added)). The courts have imposed a strict liability
standard in § 7003 cases as a result. See United States v. Aceto Agric. Chems. Corp., 872 F.2d
1373, 1377 (8th Cir. 1989) (citing a string of cases so holding).
78. See, e.g., United States v. Valentine, 856 F. Supp. 627, 633-34 (D. Wyo. 1994).
79. See BERZ ET AL., supra note 75, § 2.04[2] [b].
80. See, e.g., United States v. Price, 523 F. Supp. 1055, 1071 (D.N.J. 1981), aff'd, 688
F.2d 204 (3d Cir. 1982) (finding that while RCRA does not reach disposal practices that
occurred prior to enactment, it does apply to "the present imminent hazard posed by the
continuing disposal (i.e., leaking) of contaminants into the groundwater").
81. See 42 U.S.C. § 6925 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004) (requiring owners and operators of
facilities to obtain permits).
82. See id. § 6928 (permitting the issuance of administrative compliance orders and civil
and criminal penalties for violations).
83. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Corrective Action, Facility Information, http://www.
epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/ca/facility.htm#2020 (last visited Aug. 15, 2007) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
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A 2002 EPA study estimated that between two and sixteen percent of the
nine hundred facilities then known would have total cleanup costs
exceeding $50 million each.84
Although RCRA and CERCLA are the two most prominent
environmental statutes addressed by commentators in the bankruptcy area,
other federal environmental statutes, such as the Clean Air Act 85 and the
Clean Water Act 86 also create environmental liability for businesses, as do
various state statutes and common law theories of tort or contract. Over
eighty percent of the states, for example, have a state "superfund" law that
they use to impose cleanup liability in instances not reached by CERCLA,
although most of them impose a less severe standard of liability than that
found under the federal CERCLA.87
It is impossible to cover the full range of environmental regulation in
this Article. The important point, for our purposes, is to realize that the
scope of liability for environmental matters under state and federal law is
extensive. For example, debtors may not be aware that they face
environmental liability until an event triggers outside notice from
regulators or injured plaintiffs.88 Moreover, a number of different entities,
including the federal EPA, its state equivalents, or even private parties,
such as neighboring property owners, workers, or other third parties
harmed by the environmental wrongdoings of a debtor, have enforcement
rights under various environmental statutes.
84. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 11.
85. 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000 & Supp. IV 2004).
86. The Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000), is
commonly called the Clean Water Act. Other major federal environmental statutes include the
Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2692 (2000), the Rivers and Harbors
Appropriation Act of 1899, 33 U.S.C. §§ 401-467, the Endangered Species Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 1531-1544 (2000), and the Federal Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C.
§§ 136-136y (2000).
87. For a summary of these state statutes, see BERZ ET AL., supra note 75, § 4.02. This
source lists the following states as having no state equivalent to CERCLA and as relying
primarily upon the federal statute instead: Colorado, Kentucky, Mississippi, Nebraska, Nevada,
New Mexico, North Dakota, Oklahoma, and Wyoming. Id. § 4.02[2].
88. A firm may unwittingly create liability for itself. For example, a company may hire a
licensed waste hauler to legally dispose of its waste. If the waste hauler illegally disposes of the
waste, the firm that hired the waste hauler is also responsible.
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B. Corporate Law's Limited Liability Provisions
Traditional corporate law doctrine provides for limited liability. The
goal of limited liability rules is to encourage investment by limiting the
financial exposure of investors to the amount of capital that they invested.89
In the words of the Fifth Circuit: "Under the doctrine of limited liability,
the owner of a corporation is not liable for the corporation's debts. Creditors of
the corporation have recourse only against the corporation itself, not against its
parent company or shareholders." 90 It is on this assumption that "'large
undertakings are rested, vast enterprises are launched, and huge sums of capital
attracted. "'91
Thus, the corporation is regarded as an entity "separate and distinct" from
its shareholders, 92 and the shareholders typically are not liable for the debts and
liabilities of the corporation beyond their contribution to capital.93 This limited
liability extends not only to individual shareholders, but also to corporations
that own shares in other corporations.94 Affiliated corporations are generally
regarded as separate and distinct legal entities. 95 Even a parent corporation,
89. It is hornbook law that shareholders are, in effect, merely investors in the corporation
in which they own stock. See, e.g., United States v. Jon-T Chems., Inc., 768 F.2d 686,690 (5th
Cir. 1985) (stating that owners are not liable for corporation debts).
90. Id.
91. Id. (quoting Anderson v. Abbott, 321 U.S. 349, 362 (1944)).
92. 1 WILLIAM FLETCHER, FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
14, at 463 (rev. perm. ed. 1990); see also HARRY G. HENN & JOHN R. ALEXANDER, LAW OF
CORPORATIONS 127 (3d ed. 1983) ("For most purposes, [a corporation] is a person separate and
apart from the persons who compose it.").
93. E.g., Krivo Indus. Supply Co. v. Nat'l Distillers & Chem. Corp., 483 F.2d 1098, 1102
(5th Cir. 1973), modified per curiam, 490 F.2d 916 (5th Cir. 1974). Several theoretical
advantages have been advanced in support of limited liability. These include: minimizing risk
exposure of absentee investors; encouraging very large scale enterprises and portfolio
diversification; minimizing agency costs; maintaining efficiency of the capital market; and
minimizing creditors' collection costs as well as the costs of contracting around liability. See,
e.g., PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS: TORT, CONTRACT AND OTHER
COMMON LAW PROBLEMS IN THE SUBSTANTIVE LAW OF PARENT AND SUBSIDIARY CORPORATIONS
§ 4.02 (1987); Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, Limited Liability and the
Corporation, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 89-97 (1985); Richard Posner, The Rights of Creditors of
Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 502-13 (1976).
94. See generally HENN & ALEXANDER, supra note 92, at 355.
95. See id. ("The parent corporation and its subsidiary are treated as separate and distinct
legal persons even though the parent owns all the shares in the subsidiary and the two
enterprises have identical directors and officers."); see also id. at 347 ("The prevailing rule is
that where corporate formalities are substantially observed, initial financing reasonably
adequate, and the corporation not formed to evade an existing obligation or a statute or to cheat
or to defraud, even a controlling shareholder enjoys limited liability.").
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which by definition can exercise control over its subsidiary, is protected from
liability for its subsidiary's debts by the rule of limited liability, absent fraud or
other abuse of the corporate form.
There are many legal mechanisms by which business entities can achieve
limited liability. The most commonly known, of course, is the corporation,97
but limited liability can also be achieved through other mechanisms, such as a
limited liability company (LLC)98 or a limited partnership (LP),99 as well as
entities formed for specific purposes, such as a professional corporation (PC)' 00
or a limited liability partnership (LLP).'0 ' As a result of the growing variety of
approaches to limited liability provided by state law, business entities have a
wide range of choices to consider when deciding how best to structure activities
that may generate environmental liabilities.
Although it is legitimate to use limited liability entities as a mechanism to
protect assets, it is generally illegal to transfer assets to an affiliated entity or
otherwise in an effort to defraud creditors. At the federal level, the Bankruptcy
Code permits invalidation of a transfer if it occurred within two years before the
bankruptcy filing, if the transfer was made with the intent to defraud creditors
96. Generally, the separate existence of the subsidiary or other affiliated corporation will
be recognized unless:
(a) The business transactions, property, employees, bank and other accounts and
records of the corporation are intermingled;
(b) The formalities of separate corporate procedures for each corporation are not
observed (where the directors and officers of each corporation are common,
separate meetings and delineation of the respective capacities in which the common
directors and officers are acting should be observed);
(c) The corporation is inadequately financed as a separate unit from the point of
view of meeting its normal obligations foreseeable in a business of its size and
character, because of either initial inadequate financing or having its earnings
drained off so as to keep it in a condition of financial dependency;
(d) The respective enterprises are not held out to the public as separate enterprises;
(e) The policies of the corporation are not directed to its own interests primarily but
rather to those of the other corporation.
Wehner v. Syntex Agribus., Inc., 616 F. Supp. 27, 30 (E.D. Mo. 1985) (quoting HENN &
ALEXANDER, supra note 92, at 355-56).
97. For a discussion of the basic characteristics of the corporate form, see generally MARK
R. LEE & LEONARD GROSS, ORGANIZING CORPORATE AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§ 1.04[7] (6th ed. 2000).
98. Id. § 1.04[6].
99. Id. § 1.04[5].
100. Id. § 5.02[5].
101. Id. § 1.04[4]; see generally Robert R. Keatinge et al., LimitedLiability Partnerships:
The Next Step in the Evolution of the Unincorporated Business Organization, 51 BUS. LAW. 147
(1995).
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or if, under specified circumstances, the debtor received "less than a reasonably
equivalent value in exchange for such transfer."' 0 2 At the state level, almost all
states have enacted the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act, which has similar
provisions permitting creditors to invalidate certain fraudulent transfers within
four years of their occurrence.1
0 3
C. Chapter 11 Basics °4
Typically, a Chapter 11 case begins when the debtor files a voluntary
petition; 0 5 doing so creates the bankruptcy estate. The estate is "a separate
judicial entity" from the debtor'0 6 and, with certain exceptions, consists of"all
legal or equitable interests of the debtor in property as of the commencement of
the case." 1 07 The filing of a petition also operates as a stay of most pre-petition
litigation and collection activities against the debtor, also known in a Chapter
11 case as the debtor-in-possession (DW).
0 8
102. 11 U.S.C. § 548(a)(1)(B)(i) (2000).
103. UNIF. FRAUDULENT TRANSFER ACT (2004), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/
archives/ulc/fnact99/1980s/ufta84.htm (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
Forty-four states have adopted the Uniform Act, and the Act was introduced in New York in
2008. Unif. Law Comm'rs, A Few Facts About the Uniform Fraudulent Transfer Act,
http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformactfactsheets/uniformacts-fs-ufta.asp (last visited Apr. 1,
2008) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
104. We only address Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases in this Article. But, a limited liability
debtor also may file for bankruptcy under Chapter 7, which is commonly known as the
liquidation chapter. It is not correct, however, to assume that liquidation is limited to Chapter 7.
A limited liability debtor may either reorganize or liquidate inside Chapter 11. See Elizabeth
Warren & Jay Westbrook, Remembering Chapter 7, AM. BANKR. INST. J., May 2004, at 22, 22
(explaining how small businesses increasingly are reorganizing and liquidating under Chapter
11).
105. 11 U.S.C. § 301 (2000 & Supp. V 2005). Official Form 1 is the voluntary petition.
Official Form 1, reprinted in BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND FoRMS 657 (2007) [hereinafter
Official Form 1]. A debtor's creditors, however, may force the debtor into bankruptcy by filing
an involuntary petition. 11 U.S.C. § 303 (2000). Two of the ninety-one debtors in our sample
of cases with environmental liabilities ended up in bankruptcy because their creditors had filed
involuntary petitions for relief See, e.g., Chapter 7 Involuntary Petition, In re Knowlton
Specialty Papers, Inc., No. 04-11565 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Mar. 12, 2004); Chapter 11 Involuntary
Petition, In re Ivyport Logistical Servs., Inc., No. 04-07016 (Bankr. D.P.R. July 2, 2004). The
Knowlton case began with an involuntary Chapter 7 petition; the case subsequently converted to
Chapter 11. Order to Convert Case to Chapter 11, In re Knowlton Specialty Papers, Inc., No.
04-11565 (Bankr. N.D.N.Y. Mar. 29, 2004) (Docket No. 16).
106. Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 36, at 370.
107. I1 U.S.C. § 541(a)(I)(2000).
108. See id. § 1101(1) (stating that "'debtor-in-possession' means debtor"). With limited
exceptions, the debtor-in-possession has the same rights, powers, and duties as a trustee. Id.
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While most people associate Chapter 11 with business reorganization,
individuals may file for relief under Chapter 11.109 Moreover, not all business
debtors emerge from bankruptcy as reorganized entities. While liquidation
typically occurs under Chapter 7, § 1123 of the Bankruptcy Code allows
debtors to use Chapter 11 to liquidate.' 0 Regardless of whether the debtor
intends to reorganize or to liquidate, however, it must file a plan.
The debtor's plan is its proposal for how it intends to pay its creditors. It
is a proposal because creditors have the right to vote to accept or reject the plan
if the plan impairs or alters their legal, equitable, or contractual rights."' In
order to obtain confirmation of a consensual plan under § 1129(a) of the
Bankruptcy Code, each class of creditors either must be unimpaired by the plan
or have voted to accept it.1 2 Thus, the Bankruptcy Code gives large creditors
leverage in Chapter 11. Suppose the debtor proposes to pay its unsecured
creditors twenty-five percent of the amount of their claims in cash on the plan's
effective date. If the debtor has ten unsecured creditors holding claims totaling
$1 million and all ten creditors vote on the plan, then at least six of those
creditors must vote to approve the plan and their aggregate claims must equal
or exceed $666,667.113 If one of those unsecured creditors holds a large claim,
for example for $350,000, that creditor's vote is necessary, although not
sufficient, for acceptance of the plan by the class of unsecured creditors."
14
Therefore, the debtor may need to negotiate with its creditors in order to draft
an acceptable plan.
§ 1107(a).
109. See Toibb v. Radloff, 501 U.S. 157, 166 (1991) ("The plain language of the
Bankruptcy Code permits individual debtors not engaged in business to file for relief under
Chapter 11.").
110. See 11 U.S.C. § 1123(a)(5)(D) (stating that a plan may provide for the "sale of all or
any part of the property of the estate"); see also id. § 1123(b)(4) (stating that a plan may
"provide for the sale of all or substantially all of the property of the estate"). For a discussion of
liquidating plans, which are becoming more common under Chapter 11, see Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 104, at 22.
111. See 11 U.S.C. § 1124(1) (stating that claims or interests are impaired under a plan
unless the plan "leaves unaltered the legal, equitable, and contractual rights to which such claim
or interest entitles the holder of such claim or interest").
112. Id. § 1129(a)(8).
113. See id. § 1126(c) (stating that a class accepts the plan if"at least two-thirds in amount
and more than one-half in number of the allowed [voting] claims" vote to accept).
114. If an impaired class of creditors does not accept the plan, the bankruptcy court still
may confirm it under § 1129(b)-the cram-down provision. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2000 &
Supp. V 2005).
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The goal of plan confirmation for the debtor is the discharge of its pre-
confirmation debts. 1  Suppose, once again, that the confirmed plan provides for
payment to the unsecured creditors of $0.25 on the dollar. Creditor Xholds an
unsecured claim for $100,000. If the reorganized debtor pays Creditor X
$25,000, then Creditor X may not pursue the debtor post-confirmation for the
remaining $75,000, even ifCreditorXvoted against the plan of reorganization." 
6
Only those holding allowed claims, however, are entitled to vote on the
plan.1 7 The Bankruptcy Code defines a claim as either a "right to payment" or a
"right to an equitable remedy for breach of performance if such breach gives rise
to a right to payment. ""8 Thus, pre-petition orders to stop polluting likely do not
qualify as claims. 19 Moreover, confirmation of the debtor's plan discharges only
"debts," which the Bankruptcy Code defines as "liability on a claim."'20 Thus, an
environmental agency that obtained an injunction against the debtor's pre-petition
polluting activities could not vote on the debtor's plan.121 Nevertheless, the pre-
petition order would remain in effect post-confirmation. The confirmed plan
would not discharge the anti-pollution injunction because the injunction did not
qualify as a debt and the agency did not hold a claim in the Chapter 11 case.
1. Who Pays?
Some commentators contend that bankruptcy has become a safe-haven for
polluters. 22 The argument is that polluters invoke bankruptcy's protection in
115. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1) (2000) (stating that the confirmation of a plan "discharges
the debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation"). The debtor does not
obtain a discharge with a liquidating plan. Id. § 114 1(d)(3). With a liquidating plan, however,
the debtor goes out of business; therefore, for limited liability entities there is no post-
confirmation entity to pursue.
116. See id. § 1141 (d)(1)(A)(iii) (stating that the confirmation of a plan "discharges the
debtor from any debt that arose before the date of such confirmation" regardless of whether the
holder of the claim accepts the plan).
117. See id. § 1126(a) (stating that a holder of a claim may choose to accept or reject the
plan). If a creditor files a proof of claim, that claim is allowed unless a party in interest, such as
the debtor, objects. Id. § 502(a).
118. 11U.S.C. § 101(5)(2000&Supp. V2005).
119. See Kathryn R. Heidt, Environmental Obligations in Bankruptcy: A Fundamental
Framework, 44 FLA. L. REv. 153, 167-69 (1992) (arguing that a pre-petition order is not a
claim; therefore, it is not a debt and is not dischargeable).
120. 11 U.S.C. § 101(12) (2000 & Supp. V 2005).
121. See infra Part IV.C. 1.d (discussing the Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Gopher
State Ethanol, LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 1)).
122. See, e.g., Aronovsky & Fuller, supra note 3, at 422 (stating that many corporations
liable under CERCLA "have sought refuge in bankruptcy"); Bergmann, supra note 3, at 2
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order to avoid their environmental obligations and emerge from Chapter 1 1
"leaner and meaner."12 3 Commentators contend that the abandonment power
and the ability of debtors to discharge debts in bankruptcy create a loophole
that polluters exploit to circumvent their environmental obligations.
124
a. Abandonment
Section 554 of the Bankruptcy Code provides that either the trustee or a
party in interest "may abandon any property of the estate that is burdensome to
the estate or that is of inconsequential value and benefit to the estate.'
25
Consider the example of a debtor that has filed for liquidation under Chapter
7.126 Suppose the debtor owns real property worth $1 million, but the cleanup
costs associated with the land are estimated at $3 million. The trustee in the
Chapter 7 case must "manage and operate the property ... according to the
requirements of the valid laws of the State in which such property is
(contending that "[m]any violators have avoided their environmental obligations in
bankruptcy").
123. Snell, supra note 2.
124. See Bergmann, supra note 3, at 12-19 (discussing the loophole). We do not discuss
the automatic stay in this Article for two reasons. First, unlike the debtor's power to abandon
property or to discharge pre-confirmation claims, the automatic stay does not afford the debtor
the power to permanently shift the costs of environmental remediation from private to public
coffers; it merely delays payment. Second, § 362(b)(4) of the Bankruptcy Code contains an
important exception to the stay for the exercise by a governmental unit of its police or regulatory
powers. 11 U.S.C. § 362(b)(4) (2000). For a more detailed discussion of the impact of the
automatic stay on a debtor's environmental obligations, see 9 NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW &
PRACTICE § 178:18 (William L. Norton, Jr. & William L. Norton III eds., 3d ed. 2008) and
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 36, at 377-79.
125. 11 U.S.C. § 554(a)-(b) (2000). In Midlantic National Bank v. New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection, 474 U.S. 494 (1986), the Supreme Court held that "a
trustee may not abandon property in contravention of a state statute or regulation that is
reasonably designed to protect the public health or safety from identified hazards." Id. at 507
(citation omitted). In its infamous footnote 9, the Court qualified its holding by stating that
"[t]he abandonment power is not to be fettered by laws or regulations not reasonably calculated
to protect the public health or safety from imminent and identifiable harm." Id. at 507 n.9.
Commentators uniformly agree that Midlantic "created more confusion than clarity." Brent
Bolea, Bankruptcy Abandonment Power and Environmental Liability, 106 CoM. L.J. 83, 101
(2001); see also Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 36, at 363 (noting that "[b]y any standard, the
Court's 'holding' is elastic"). For a detailed discussion of the variety of approaches taken by the
lower federal courts to the abandonment question, see id. at 361-71.
126. See Joel Gross, Bankruptcy, in 2 ENVIRONMENTAL LAW PRACTICE GUIDE 10-1, 10-38
§ 10.14 (Michael B. Gerrard ed., 2007) (explaining that "[a]bandonment issues have almost
always come up in the context of Chapter 7 trustees" (citation omitted)).
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situated." 117 Most courts have interpreted this language as imposing on the
trustee an obligation either "to remediate the property or accord administrative
expense priority to the party who fulfills the trustee's obligations."'128 But, if
the trustee undertakes the cleanup, the estate bears the costs of remediation.
Moreover, administrative expenses are priority claims; in a business liquidation
case under Chapter 7, they are second in line, after the secured creditors, for
payment from the estate.
129
Substantial costs for environmental remediation, therefore, eat away at any
potential recovery for general unsecured creditors, who are located at the
bottom of the payment priority ladder. As a result, the Chapter 7 trustee may
file a motion to abandon the property as burdensome to the estate. 130 Doing so
removes the polluted property from the debtor's bankruptcy estate.'
31
Moreover, any claim by an environmental agency for projected cleanup costs, if
allowed, would have unsecured, nonpriority status, not administrative priority
status. 132 Therefore, abandonment of contaminated property makes more
money available in the estate to pay creditors holding claims other than those
for environmental remediation.
The problem, however, is that a business debtor uses Chapter 7 to go out
of business. Thus, after the bankruptcy case, there is no entity to pursue to
clean up the contaminated property. For this reason, some commentators
consider the abandonment power to be a loophole through which debtors pass
in order to avoid their cleanup obligations under state and federal
environmental laws.
133
But, does abandonment work in Chapter 11? 134  It is important to
remember that property abandoned from the estate typically reverts to the
127. 28 U.S.C. § 959(b) (2000).
128. Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 36, at 369.
129. See 11 U.S.C. § 507(a)(2)(Supp.V2005). A domestic support obligation has priority
over the payment of administrative expenses, but is not an issue in a business liquidation case.
Id. § 507(a)(1). The payment priority ladder in bankruptcy is as follows: (1) secured creditors;
(2) unsecured, priority creditors, such as holders of administrative expense claims; and
(3) unsecured, nonpriority creditors.
130. See Bolea, supra note 125, at 87 (noting that "property contaminated with toxic waste
is burdensome to the estate when environmental liabilities outweigh the value of the property
without such liabilities").
131. Whether the estate sheds all liability for remediation costs depends on whether
abandonment means that the bankruptcy "estate is deemed never to have owned the property."
Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 36, at 370.
132. Id.at371.
133. Bergmann, supra note 3, at 12.
134. For a good discussion of the issues of abandonment in the context of Chapter 11, see
Joel M. Gross, The Effect of Bankruptcy on Obligations to Clean Up Contaminated Properties:
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debtor. 35 In a reorganization case, the debtor emerges from bankruptcy and
still has possession and control of that contaminated property. Therefore,
abandonment does not necessarily free the reorganized debtor from continued
liability post-confirmation for environmental remediation.1
3 6
The result differs if the debtor liquidates its business inside Chapter 11.137
As in a Chapter 7 case, the debtor goes out of business; therefore, there is no
reorganized entity to pursue for the costs of environmental remediation. If the
debtor disposes of substantially all of its assets through its Chapter 11
liquidating plan, then the prior abandonment of the contaminated property may
effectively shift the costs of environmental remediation to the taxpayer.138
This distinction between reorganization and liquidation inside Chapter 11
is not always made in the commentary on the abandonment power, 139 but it is
an important one to bear in mind. While debtors increasingly are using Chapter
11 to liquidate, 140 the existing empirical data indicate that the majority of
confirmed Chapter 11 plans are still plans of reorganization.' 4' That explains
why the abandonment power has been a tool almost exclusively employed by
Chapter 7 trustees.142 For this reason, we did not expect the abandonment
power to play a significant role in our sample of Chapter 1 1 cases.
Recent Developments and Open Issues Two Decades After Kovacs and Midlantic, in NORTON
ANNUAL SURVEY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 1, 23-25 (William L. Norton, Jr. ed., 2003), available at
http://www.arnoldporter.com/pubs/files/Effect_ BankruptcyContaminatedProperties.pdf (last
visited Apr. 1, 2008).
135. Bolea, supra note 125, at 88; see also Gross, supra note 134, at 23 (explaining that
while it "does seem strange," abandoned property in Chapter 11 would move from the debtor-in-
possession to the debtor).
136. Bolea, supra note 125, at 88; Gross, supra note 134, at 24.
137. For a discussion of liquidating plans, see generally John C. Anderson & Peter G.
Wright, Liquidating Plans of Reorganization, 56 AM. BANKR. L.J. 29 (1982), and Warren &
Westbrook, supra note 104.
138. Cf Bolea, supra note 125, at 88 (discussing the effect of abandonment in a Chapter 7
liquidation case).
139. See generally Bergmann, supra note 3.
140. See Warren & Westbrook, supra note 104, at 22 (stating that a "substantial percentage
of confirmed Chapter 11 cases have liquidation plans").
141. See ELIZABETH WARREN & JAY WESTBROOK, THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS
412 (5th ed. 2005) (stating that data from the Business Bankruptcy Project "show that 20
percent or more of the confirmed plans in Chapter 11 cases are liquidating plans").
142. See Gross, supra note 126, at 10-38 § 10.14.
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b. The Discharge
Suppose the debtor operates a plant that discharges hazardous waste into a
local lake. 143 The state environmental agency obtains an order enjoining the
debtor from further polluting the lake and expends funds to clean up the
polluted waters. The debtor brings its plant into compliance with state law and
stops discharging pollutants into the lake, but it files for bankruptcy under
Chapter 11 before the state agency can recoup the costs of cleanup. What
happens to the state's recovery of its response costs? 144
In order to recoup its cleanup costs in full, the state agency would have to
argue that the costs are not claims and, therefore, are not dischargeable in the
debtor's bankruptcy case. But this argument will fail because the agency is
seeking only the payment of a monetary obligation from the debtor.145 Thus,
the state agency has a claim in the debtor's Chapter 11 case; that claim likely
has unsecured, nonpriority status. 14 6 If the debtor's plan provides for only
partial payment to the unsecured creditors and the bankruptcy court confirms
the plan, then the state agency cannot pursue the debtor post-confirmation for
the difference between the full costs of cleanup and what the agency received
under the terms of the Chapter 11 plan.
An agency's efforts to collect fines or penalties imposed pre-petition for
violation of environmental rules or regulations meet a similar fate in Chapter
11.147 Such fines or penalties typically are unsecured, nonpriority claims.
Wfiile § 523(a)(7) excepts from discharge a debt "to the extent such debt is for
a fine, penalty or forfeiture payable to and for the benefit of a governmental
unit," 148 its language only applies to "an individual debtor.' 49 Moreover,
unlike the exception from discharge contained in § 1328 for criminal fines and
143. We are indebted to Professor Heidt's excellent and eminently readable analysis about
the types of environmental obligations that constitute claims in bankruptcy. See generally
Heidt, supra note 119, at 153.
144. See generally id. at 167-69.
145. See Ohio v. Kovacs, 469 U.S. 274,283 (1985) (holding that debtor's obligation was a
claim that was dischargeable in bankruptcy, because the State of Ohio sought only the payment
of money from the debtor).
146. The cleanup costs would not qualify as administrative expenses because the state
incurred them pre-petition.
147. Gross, supra note 126, at 10-34 § 10.11[3] ("The dischargethat corporationsreceive
in Chapter 11 cases is not subject to specific statutory exceptions."). Butsee Statement of Claim
at 2 paras. 3 & 5, In re Alternative Fuels, L.C., No. 04-21822 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 31,
2005) (Docket No. 62) (contending that civil fines and penalties are not dischargeable under 11
U.S.C. § 523(a)(7)).
148. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(7) (2000).
149. Id.
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restitution in individual reorganization cases under Chapter 13, there is no
similar language specifically excepting corporate fines or penalties from
discharge in Chapter 11. 5°
IX. Methodology
A. Project Overview
In its 2005 report to Congress,' 5 ' the GAO criticized the EPA's record
with regard to holding business firms financially responsible for their
environmental cleanup obligations.152 In that report, the GAO commented on
the almost total absence of data about the number of business firms with
environmental liabilities that had sought bankruptcy protection. 53  To
address this information vacuum, we designed a research project using
PACER, an electronic case service operated by the Administrative Office of
the U.S. Courts that provides case information and dockets for cases filed in
federal court, including the bankruptcy courts.
154
B. Research Design
We obtained our data by conducting judicial district searches district-by-
district on PACER. Every judicial district has its own PACER page, which
contains a toolbar across the top listing five menu options, one of which is
"Reports." Under "Reports" is an option called "Cases." For bankruptcy
cases, a PACER user can conduct case searches employing numerous criteria,
such as trustee name, bankruptcy Chapter (e.g., Chapter 7 versus Chapter 11)
or type of case (e.g., bankruptcy case versus adversary proceeding).
We limited our PACER searches to Chapter 11 cases filed in 2004 that
closed by the middle of 2006. Our interest in locating business bankruptcy
filings meant that we had to search either for Chapter 7 or Chapter 11 cases.
150. 11 U.S.C. § 1328(a)(3) (2000 & Supp. 2007); seealso Susan R. DeSimone, The Price
of Doing Business: Environmental Criminal Fines and the Administrative Expense Solution, 17
EMORY BANKR. DEV. J. 489, 507 (2001) (noting that Chapter 11 does not contain express
language regarding civil or criminal fines).
151. See supra notes 20-25 and accompanying text (describing the GAO Report).
152. GAO REPORT, supra note 20.
153. Id.
154. PACER is an acronym for Public Access to Court Electronic Records. The web
address is http://pacer.psc.uscourts.gov.
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We selected Chapter 11 for two reasons. First, the GAO Report indicated
that "[m]ost bankruptcy claims EPA pursues in court are Chapter 11
reorganizations."' 155  Second, PACER charges a fee for access to the
documents on its system. 156 The sheer number of annual Chapter 7 filings
made a Chapter 7 project prohibitively expensive and time consuming.17
We selected 2004 as our search year. In order to avoid monitoring the
progress of multiple open cases in ninety-two judicial districts, we decided to
limit the searches to closed cases. The mid-2006 closing date was a function
of the time period during which we began searching in the PACER database.
Due to the rolling nature of the search process, the search date for each
district varied. We conducted the earliest searches in June 2006, but did not
complete some of the later searches until September 2006.
Thus, our search criteria consisted of the following: (1) Chapter 11
bankruptcy cases, (2) filed between January 1,2004, and December 31, 2004,
and (3) closed at the time of the search, which was sometime in mid-2006.
1 58
Unlike Lexis or Westlaw, PACER does not contain centralized libraries of
data that are searchable by key words or phrases. As a result, we conducted the
same basic search in ninety-two of the ninety-four judicial districts in the
United States federal court system.
1 59
155. GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 16.
156. Users must register with the PACER Service Center in order to obtain a login and
password. PACER charges $.08 per page for every docket viewed or printed; for most services
on PACER the user is charged up to a maximum of 30 pages. Thus, the fee for a 30-page
document and the fee for a 100-page document are identical-$2.40.
157. In 2004, there were 1,137,958 Chapter 7 filings, but only 10,132 Chapter 11 filings,
of which 9,186 were business filings. See Table F-2: Business and Nonbusiness Bankruptcy
Cases Commenced, By Chapter of the Bankruptcy Code During the Twelve Month Period
Ended Dec. 31, 2004, http://www.uscourts.gov/bnkrpctystats/bankruptf2tabledec2004.pdf
(last visited Apr. 1, 2008) [hereinafter 2004 Bankruptcy Filings].
158. There are several cases in the database that did not close by the middle of 2006 and
that, in fact, are still open. Some open cases are included in the search results because the case
was part ofajointly administered case in which the majority of the affiliated debtors' cases had
closed by mid-2006. See, e.g., In re BrainPlay.com, Inc., No. 04-10131 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 14,
2004) (providing one of three open cases in the seventy debtor cases jointly administered under
the KB Toys, Inc. Chapter 11 filing). In some jointly administered cases, the open case is the
lead case, and the docket in that lead case contains the documents necessary to determine either
the presence of environmental liability or how the debtor dealt with environmental issues
disclosed on the Statement of Financial Affairs. See, e.g., In re KB Toys, Inc., No. 04-10120
(Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 14, 2004) (Docket Nos. 473-501, 503-543) (providing access to the lead
case docket and to the Statement of Financial Affairs for seventy affiliated debtors). In ajointly
administered case, the affiliated debtors' cases may close after confirmation, but the lead case
may remain open to address various issues, such as objections to claims.
159. We did not conduct bankruptcy case filing searches for Guam or the North Mariana
Islands. In fact, there were no business Chapter 11 cases filed in Guam or the North Mariana
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We then eliminated individual debtors and general partnerships from each
district's search results, counting only debtors engaged in business as limited
liability entities, e.g., corporations and limited partnerships. 160 The resulting
database contains 5,550 Chapter 11 business cases filed in calendar year 2004
and closed by the middle of 2006.161
Islands during 2004. See 2004 Bankruptcy Filings, supra note 157. In addition, PACER does
not provide access to bankruptcy court data for the North Mariana Islands.
160. We eliminated general partnerships from our database because they are not limited
liability entities. Moreover, "[t]he discharge of a partnership under section[ ] 1141 ... does
not... discharge a general partner of the partnership." Thomas B. Anderson, Jr. et al.,
Partnership and Partner Bankruptcies, COLLIER BANKRUPTCY PRACTICE GUIDE 20-1, 20-31
20.09 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommers eds., 2007). Of course, the general partner in a
limited partnership may be an individual and, hence, subject to unlimited liability post-
bankruptcy. Often, however, the general partner in a limited partnership is itself a limited
liability entity, which means that the general partner does not have the exposure to
environmental liabilities after bankruptcy that one might otherwise expect. Hence, we generally
left limited partnerships in our data pool unless we had evidence that the general partner was not
a limited liability entity. We included both limited liability partnerships and limited liability
limited partnerships in our data, but they comprised less than one-tenth of one percent of the
5,550 cases in the database.
161. See infra Table I, Column B Totals. We encountered an unexplained anomaly during
our PACER searches. We limited our searches to cases filed in 2004 and closed by mid-2006.
Some of the 2004 cases remained open past the middle of 2006; therefore, we anticipated a
difference between the number of cases we found in each district and the actual number of
Chapter 11 business filings by district for calendar year 2004. The disparity between found and
filed cases varied so significantly by district, however, that we redid the searches in several
districts. In these districts, we also conducted open case searches to determine whether open
cases might account for the disparity in the number of cases found versus the number of cases
filed. To our surprise, the number of cases that we obtained-both open and closed-using
PACER's search engine did not correspond with the actual filings within the districts in which
we conducted spot checks. For example, there were twelve Chapter 11 filings in the District of
Alaska in 2004, one of which was an individual debtor case. See 2004 Bankruptcy Filings,
supra note 157. Our search, conducted on July 10, 2007, found a total of five cases, four of
which were closed. See Cases Report for 7/10/2007, U.S. Bankruptcy Court, District of Alaska
(on file with authors). When we contacted the PACER Service Center, a customer service
representative repeated the search and also obtained only five cases. We encountered similar
discrepancies in other judicial districts. See, e.g., Cases Report for 7/9/2007, U.S. Bankruptcy
Court, Middle District of Alabama (showing a total of six cases, both open and closed, when
there actually were fourteen Chapter II cases filed in 2004 in the district as shown in 2004
Bankruptcy filings) (on file with authors); Cases Report for 7/10/2007, U.S. Bankruptcy Court,
District of Puerto Rico (showing a total of 113 cases, both open and closed, when there were
137 Chapter 11 filings in 2004) (on file with authors). It appears, therefore, that PACER's case
search engine does not provide access to a sizeable minority of Chapter 11 bankruptcy case
filings.
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C. Counting Cases
For each of these 5,550 cases, we searched the case docket on PACER for
Official Form 7, commonly known as the Statement of Financial Affairs (SFA),
which every debtor must file in its bankruptcy case. 62 In September 2000, the
Judicial Conference of the United States amended the SFA 163 to require debtors
to disclose in Question 17 all potential and actual environmental hazards,
including pending and completed judicial and administrative proceedings.' 64 In
order to arrive at accurate statistics about the percentage of debtors that disclose
environmental issues in Question 17 of the SFA, however, we had to make
adjustments to our pool of cases.
1. Adjustments to Search Results Totals
Column C of Table I provides the adjustments made by district to our
initial search results. 165 We made several types of adjustments to the raw
number of cases.
First, in some jointly administered cases, we found only a consolidated
SFA, instead of a separately filed SFA, for each debtor in the procedurally
162. Official Form 7, reprinted in BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND FORMS 713 (2007)
[hereinafter Official Form 7 (2007)]. All debtors filing for bankruptcy must complete Questions
1-18 of Official Form 7. Id. Debtors in business also must complete Questions 19-25 of the
form. Id. In a voluntary case, the debtor must file its schedules and statements either with its
petition or within fifteen days of filing the petition. FED. R. BANKR. P. 1007(c).
163. See COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY app. pt. 2-4 (Alan N. Resnick & Henry J. Sommer eds.,
15th ed. 2007) (providing the revised form).
164. Question 17 has three subparts. Part (a) requires the debtor to "[l]ist the name and
address of every site for which the debtor has received notice in writing by a governmental unit
that it may be liable or potentially liable under or in violation of an Environmental Law."
Official Form 7 (2007), supra note 162, at 719. Question 17(b) requires the debtor to disclose
the name and address of each "site for which the debtor provided notice to a governmental unit
of a release of Hazardous Material." Id. Finally, part (c) of Question 17 mandates disclosure of
"all judicial or administrative proceedings, including settlements or orders, under any
Environmental Law with respect to which the debtor is or was a party." Id. Official Form 7
defines "Environmental Law" broadly as "any federal, state or local statute or regulation
regulating pollution, contamination, releases of hazardous or toxic substances, wastes or
materials into the air, land, soil, surface water, groundwater, or other medium, including, but not
limited to, statutes or regulations regulating the cleanup of these substances, wastes, or
material." Id. The phrase "hazardous material" also has a broad reach, "mean[ing] anything
defined as a hazardous waste, hazardous substance, toxic substance, hazardous material,
pollutant, or contaminant or similar term under an Environmental Law." Id.
165. See infra Table I, Column C.
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consolidated case. 166 In two cases, that consolidated SFA failed to disclose to
which of the debtors in the jointly administered case Question 17 pertained. 1
67
In these two cases only, we treated the individually filed Chapter 11 petitions as
a single Chapter 11 case. The Footstar case provides a dramatic illustration of
the problem. 1
68
On March 2, 2004, Footstar, Inc. and 2,528 of the firm's "direct and
indirect subsidiaries" filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.169 The
next day, on March 3, the court granted Footstar's motion for joint
administration of the bankruptcy cases. 17  Footstar, Inc. subsequently filed a
consolidated SFA for itself and its affiliated entities, listing in Question 17 the
Dover, New Hampshire Municipal Landfill, which is a Superfund site.
171
Footstar, however, failed to identify which of the 2,529 debtors bore
166. The Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure permit the procedural consolidation orjoint
administration of one or more cases involving affiliated debtors that are pending before the same
bankruptcy court. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 1015(b). Procedural consolidation differs from substantive
consolidation. Procedurally consolidated cases often share "a single case file and docket in the court
clerk's office and combination notices for many motions, but the assets and liabilities of each debtor
remain distinct." Mary Elizabeth Kors,AlteredEgos: Deciphering Substantive Consolidation, 59 U.
Prrr. L. REv. 381, 381 n. 1 (1998) (citations omitted). Substantive consolidation, on the other hand,
effects "a merger of two or more legally distinct (albeit affiliated) entities into a single debtor with a
common pool of assets and a common body of liabilities." Id. at 381. While the corporate entities
retain their status as separate legal entities once they emerge from bankruptcy, inside the bankruptcy
case the affiliated debtors are treated as a single debtor with the assets and liabilities of each affiliated
debtor becoming the assets and liabilities of the consolidated debtor. Id.
167. Statement of Financial Affairs at 7, In re Haynes Int'l, Inc., No. 04-05364 (Bankr. S.D. Ind.
Apr. 28, 2004) (Docket No. 183) (filed with consolidated schedules); Statement ofFinancial Affairs at
6, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2004) (Docket No. 894).
168. Chapter I I Voluntary Petition at exhibit A, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Mar. 2, 2004) (Docket No. 1).
169. Id. The debtor said that there were 2,524 affiliated debtors, in addition to Footstar, Inc.; yet,
Exhibit A to the bankruptcy court's order granting the debtors' motion for joint administration lists a
total of 2,529 debtors, including Footstar, Inc. See Order Pursuant to Rule 1015(b) of the Federal
Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure Directing Joint Administration of Chapter 11 Cases at exhibit A, In re
Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 3, 2004) (Docket No. 37) [hereinafter Footstar
Joint Administration].
170. See Footstar Joint Administration, supra note 169. On September30,2005, the bankruptcy
court for the Southern District of New York granted Footstar's motion for substantive consolidation.
See Order Pursuant to Sections 105, 363 & 1112(b) of the Bankruptcy Code & Bankruptcy Rules
1017 & 9014 Granting Substantive Consolidation at 1, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30,2005) (Docket No. 2839). The court's order also authorized the debtors to dismiss
the bankruptcy cases of the affiliated Footstar entities. See id. As of March 2008, Footstar, Inc.'s
Chapter 11 case remained open.
171. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, Superfind Info. Sys., Superfund Site Info.,
http://cfpub.epa.gov/supercpad/cursites/srchsites.cfm (last visited Aug. 15,2007) (search active sites by
typing in either 'NHD980520191" for EPA ID, or "Dover Municipal Landfill" for Site Name) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
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responsibility for the Dover landfill site. Counting the Dover disclosure on the
consolidated SFA as 2,529 affirmative responses to Question 17 would
seriously skew the total number of Chapter 11 debtors disclosing some form of
environmental liability. Therefore, we counted all 2,529 Footstar cases as a
single Chapter 11 filing.
Second, the raw bankruptcy filing totals include both serial and duplicate
filings by the same debtor or, in involuntary cases, the same creditor. For
example, on March 2, 2004, C Denver, LLC, filed for relief under Chapter 11
in the District of Colorado. 172 Less than a month later, the bankruptcy court
dismissed the case. 73 About a month after the dismissal, C Denver once again
filed for relief under Chapter 11174 and, once again, the bankruptcy court
dismissed the case.1
75
Debtors also file duplicate voluntary petitions. For example, on January
12, 2004, Blue Grass Manufacturing Company of Lexington, Inc. filed two
voluntary petitions seeking relief under Chapter 11 in the bankruptcy court for
the Eastern District of Kentucky. 176 On January 14, 2004, the bankruptcy court
granted the debtor's motion to dismiss its second-filed Chapter 11 case.'
77
Counting sequential or duplicate bankruptcy filings by the same debtor (or
creditor) 178 as separate cases distorts, albeit minimally given the small
172. Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re C Denver, LLC, No. 04-13679 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar.
2, 2004) (Docket No. 2).
173. Order Dismissing Case, In re C Denver, LLC, No. 04-13679 (Bankr. D. Colo. Mar. 31,
2004) (Docket No. 20).
174. Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re C Denver, LLC, No. 04-19314 (Bankr. D. Colo. May
3, 2004) (Docket No. 2).
175. Order Dismissing Case, In re C Denver, LLC, No. 04-19314 (Bankr. D. Colo. June 3, 2004)
(Docket No. 37).
176. Chapter 1 1 Voluntary Petition, In re Blue Grass Mfg. Co. ofLexington, Inc., No. 04-50071
(Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 12,2004) (Docket No. 1); Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Blue Grass Mfg.
Co. of Lexington, Inc., No. 04-50072 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 12, 2004) (Docket No. 1).
177. Order Dismissing Case No. 04-50072 and Refunding Filing Fee, In re Blue Grass Mfg. Co.
of Lexington, Inc., No. 04-50072 (Bankr. E.D. Ky. Jan. 14,2004) (Docket No. 5).
178. Some creditors also fail to heed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the initial involuntary
petition against the debtor and decide to re-file. On July 27, 2004, Quality Streamline Management
Services, LLC (QSMS) filed an involuntary petition against GF Foods, Inc. in the bankruptcy court for
the District of Arizona. See Chapter 11 Involuntary Petition, In re GF Foods, Inc., No. 04-13156
(Bankr. D. Ariz. July 27, 2004) (Docket No. 1). The bankruptcy court dismissed the case on August
13, 2004, for failing to pay the filing fee. See Order Dismissing Case, In re GF Foods, Inc., No. 04-
13156 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Aug. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 3). Two months later, QSMS filed a second
involuntary petition against GF Foods, Inc. See Chapter 11 Involuntary Petition, In re GF Foods, Inc.,
No. 04-18136 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Oct. 15, 2004) (Docket No. 1). This time, the bankruptcy court not
only dismissed the involuntary petition, it also imposed sanctions of $63,541 on QSMS. See Order
Dismissing Case, In re GF Foods, Inc., No. 04-18136 (Bankr. D. Ariz. Nov. 4, 2004) (DocketNo. 16);
Order Granting Motion for Sanctions at 2 para. B, In re GF Foods, Inc., No. 04-18136 (Bankr. D. Ariz.
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percentage of cases in which serial or double filing occurs, the actual number of
debtors seeking bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.
Third, in a few instances, our search produced cases that had been filed in
2004 but consolidated with cases filed in earlier calendar years. For example,
the Oakwood debtors-five related business entities-filed for relief under
Chapter 11 on March 5, 2004.179 About sixteen months earlier, in November
2002, fifteen other affiliated entities-the Oakwood Homes (OH) debtors-also
had filed for bankruptcy protection under Chapter 11.180 On March 10, 2004,
the bankruptcy court granted the Oakwood debtors' motion to procedurally
consolidate the Oakwood debtors' cases with the OH debtors' cases,81 and
three weeks later, the bankruptcy court confirmed the OH debtors' joint
consolidated plan of reorganization. 82 Thus, we treated the 2004 Oakwood
debtors as part of the 2002 case and did not count their bankruptcy filings in the
search results for 2004. We reached a similar conclusion with regard to two
Chapter 11 cases filed in 2004 in Oregon that had been procedurally
consolidated with the Chapter 11 cases of four related entities that had filed for
bankruptcy protection in late 2003.183 The impact of this decision was minimal,
eliminating a total of only seven cases from the search results for calendar year
Dec. 27, 2004) (Docket No. 31).
179. The five affiliated debtors in the 2004 cases were Oakwood Financial Corporation,
Oakwood Investment Corporation, Oakwood Servicing Holdings Co., LLC, Oakwood Advance
Receivables Company 1I, LLC, and Oakwood Tranche C Servicing Advance Receivables Company,
LLC. See Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition at sched. 1, In re Oakwood Fin. Corp., No. 04-10743 (Bankr.
D. Del. Mar. 5, 2004) (Docket No. 1) [hereinafter Oakwood Petition].
180. Oakwood Homes Corp. was the lead case for the 2002 filings. See In re Oakwood Homes
Corp., No. 02-13396 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 15, 2002). For a list of the affiliated debtors in the 2002
case, see Oakwood Petition, supra note 179, at sched. 1.
181. Order (A) Granting Relief in Connection with the Commencement of Chapter 11 Cases by
the SPE Debtors & (B) Incorporating the SPE Debtors into the Disclosure Statement & Plan as Small
Business Debtors, In re Oakwood Fin. Corp., No. 04-10743 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 10, 2004) (Docket
No. 6).
182. Findings ofFact&ConclusionsofLawRelatingto&OrderUnder I IU.S.C. §§ I1 29(a)&
(b) Confirming Second Amended Joint Consolidated Plan of Reorganization of Oakwood Homes
Corp. & its Affiliated Debtors & Debtors in Possession, In re Oakwood Homes Corp., No. 02-13396
(Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 31, 2004) (Docket No. 3937). Two of the five 2004 debtors, however, were not
listed in the footnote to the bankruptcy court's confirmation order as one ofthe debtor entities to which
the confirmed plan applied. Id. at 1 n. 1.
183. See Supplemental Order Directing the Joint Administration of Chapter 11 Cases, In reNw.
Aluminum Co., No. 04-42061 (Bankr. D. Or. Nov. 15, 2004) (Docket No. 16) (directing joint
administration for Northwest Aluminum Company and Northwest Aluminum Specialties, Inc.).
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2004,'84 including one case in which the debtor had responded affirmatively to
Question 17.185
Finally, we made adjustments to the original search results totals for cases
transferred either within a judicial district 86 or from one judicial district to
another. 8 7 A transferred case involves the same debtor; thus, counting the
originally filed and the transferred case as two cases distorts the true number of
Chapter 11 filings for 2004.
Thus, the figures in Column D of Table I include, with limited exceptions,
Chapter 11 business cases filed between January 1, 2004 and December 31,
2004, and closed sometime between June and September 2006. The exceptions
involve jointly administered cases in which either the lead or an affiliated
debtor case remained open into 2007, even though the majority of the jointly
administered cases had closed out by mid-2006. As Column D of Table I
indicates, after adjustments, the data set included a total of 2,911 cases.18 8 The
significant drop in number of cases from Column B to Column D in Table I is
largely attributable to counting the 2,529 individual Footstar cases as a single
bankruptcy filing.1
89
2. Old SFAs, No SFAs, and Inaccessible SFAs
One purpose of our research project was to determine the percentage of
Chapter 11 debtors that disclosed environmental liabilities in Question 17. In a
number of the bankruptcy cases examined, however, we could not determine
whether the firm actually had environmental liabilities, due to three types of
problems that we encountered.
184. The alternative-counting the 2002 and 2003 cases in with the 2004 cases--would have
added nineteen cases to the search results for calendar year 2004.
185. Statement ofFinancial Affairs at 10-12, In reNw. Aluminum Co., No. 04-42061 (Bankr. D.
Or. Nov. 24, 2004) (Docket No. 19) (filed with schedules).
186. See, e.g., Chapter I I Voluntary Petition, In re Bryan Animal Clinic, P.C., No. 04-83566
(Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 6,2004) (Docket No. 1); Order Transferring Case to Judge Cohen, In re Bryan
Animal Clinic, P.C., No. 04-83566 (Bankr. N.D. Ala. Aug. 6, 2004) (Docket No. 5).
187. See Findings of Fact & Conclusions of Law Transferring Venue of Related Chapter 11
Case: "In re Stallion USA, LLC, case No. 04-BK-8167" from the Middle District of Florida-Tampa
Division to the Central District of California-San Fernando Valley Division, In re Stallion USA LLC,
No. 04-08167 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Aug. 9, 2004) (Docket No. 38).
188. Infra Table I, Column D.
189. See supra notes 168-71 and accompanying text (describing the reasoning behind counting
the Footstar case as one filing).
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First, some debtors filed the old, rather than the new, SFA. 90 Question 17
on the old SFA asked the debtor to disclose information about individuals or
firms that had audited, supervised, or had possession of the debtor's account
books and records, as well as entities to which the debtor had provided
financial statements.191 The old SFA contained no environmental information
question.' 92 As Column C of Table II indicates, in many districts not a single
debtor used the old SFA. But, in other districts, a surprising number of debtors
filed the old SFA, given that the Judicial Conference of the United States had
amended the SFA to include disclosure on environmental liabilities more than
two and one-half years before the earliest-filed case among our calendar year
2004 search results.
93
Second, in a number of cases, the bankruptcy case closed, often after the
court had dismissed the debtor's petition but before the debtor had filed its
SFA. 194 Of course, in some cases, the debtor's failure to file the required
schedules and SFA precipitated, in part, the case dismissal. 195 Column D of
190. See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs, In re Interstate 95 Distrib., Inc., No. 04-24513
(Bankr. D. Md. June 30, 2004) (Docket No. 12); Statement of Financial Affairs, In re LJKK Olde
Europe LLC, No. 04-00123 (Bankr. E.D. Wash. Mar. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 17); Statement of
Financial Affairs, In re 2080 Manneheim, Inc., No. 04-12228 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 29,2004) (Docket
No. 1) (filed with petition); Statement of Financial Affairs, In re D.E. Mgmt., Inc., No. 04-25408
(Bankr. D. Utah May 12, 2004) (Docket No. 10) (filed with schedules).
191. Official Form 7, reprinted in BANKRuPTcY CODE, RULES AND FORMS 964, 970 (2001)
[hereinafter Official Form 7 (2001)]. Question 19 on the new SFA is the counterpart to the books,
records, and financial statements question from the old SFA. Official Form 7 (2007), supra note 162,
at 720-21.
192. See generally Official Form 7 (2001), supra note 191, at 964-73.
193. See supra notes 163-64 and accompanying text (describing the revised form). In Maryland,
approximately twenty percent of the debtors filed the old, rather than the new, SFA. See infra Table II,
Columns A & B.
194. See, e.g., Docket, In reNEW Energy, LLC, No. 04-22387 (Bankr. D. Wyo. Dec. 13,2004);
Docket, In re Brake Stuff, Inc., No. 04-46133 (Bankr. D. Mass. Nov. 2,2004); Docket, In re McEwen
Eng'g & Mining, Consultant, Inc., No. 04-41531 (Bankr. W.D. Ky. July 27, 2004); Docket, In re
Envtl. Land Tech., Ltd., No. 04-00525 (Bankr. D.D.C. Mar. 30, 2004). In a few cases, the bankruptcy
court granted the debtor a waiver of its obligation to file schedules or the statement of financial affairs.
See, e.g., Order (I) Granting Debtors Additional Time to File Schedules & Statements &
(II) Permanently Waiving the Requirement to File Schedules & Statements upon Confirmation of the
Debtors' Plan, In re Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., No. 04-13388 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 24, 2005)
(Docket No. 215).
195. See, e.g., U.S. Trustee's Motion to Dismiss at 1 para. 2, In re Kramer Crop Serv. Trust, No.
04-00105 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa Feb. 4,2004) (Docket No. 11) ("Debtor did not file the schedules and
statement of financial affairs required by Bankruptcy Rule 1007(b)(1)."); U.S. Trustee's Report on
Deficiencies Regarding Administration at 1 para. 3a, In re Charlie's Chicken of Tulsa, LLC, No. 04-
13942 (Bankr. N.D. Okla. Sept. 28, 2004) (Docket No. 69) (noting that debtor had failed to file its
SFA).
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Table II provides the number of cases per district in which the debtor did not
file an SFA.
Finally, in ten of the ninety-two judicial districts in which we conducted
searches, we could not access the SFA because PACER did not provide
electronic links to either some or all of the documents listed on the case
dockets. 196 Included in this no-access category are a few isolated cases in
which the debtor filed an SFA but we could not read Question 17 because the
SFA was filed under seal 197 or because relevant pages were missing from the
copy of the SFA available on PACER. 198 Column E of Table II provides the
district-by-district totals of cases in which the SFA was not accessible.
In conclusion, we had useable data for 74% of the cases-2,167 cases of
the 2,911 cases from the adjusted total in Column D of Table I. Column F of
Table II provides a district-by-district total of the cases with useable
information from Question 17 of the SFA.
IV Findings
A. Overview
In ninety-one cases, 199 the debtor disclosed in its bankruptcy filings some
196. Infra Table II, Column E. The districts with limited orno access to case documents are the
following: (1) Northern District of Alabama; (2) Southem District of Florida; (3) Middle District of
Georgia; (4) Central District of Illinois; (5) Eastern District of Michigan; (6) Southern District of
Mississippi; (7) Eastern District of Tennessee; (8) Middle District ofTennessee; (9) Western District of
Virginia; and (10) the District for the Virgin Islands.
197. See Order Authorizing Debtors to File Redacted Copies of Those Portions of Their
Schedules G, Certain Portions of Other Schedules & Statements of Financial Affairs Referencing the
Identity of Their Clients at 2 para. C, In re Admin. Employer Group, Inc., No. 04-16088 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. June 2, 2004) (Docket No. 30) (allowing the filing under seal of the SFA).
198. See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs, In re Sunco Equip. Co., No. 04-12399 (Bankr.
C.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 2004) (Docket No. 26) (skipping from Question 16 to 17(c)); Statement of
Financial Affairs, In re DBR Inc., No. 04-11795 (Bankr. D. Kan. May 7,2004) (Docket No. 77) (filed
with schedules) (skipping from Question 16 to Question 21(b)).
199. We found ninety-eight cases, but in five the debtor either was a general partnership or was
solely owned by a general partnership. See generally supra note 160. See also Chapter 11 Voluntary
Petition, In re MBK P'ship, No. 04-69814 (Bankr. D. Or. Dec. 17, 2004) (Docket No. 2) (general
partnership); Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Fumas County Farms, No. 04-81489 (Bankr. D.
Neb. May 3,2004) (Docket No. 1) (general partnership). The Furnas County Farms bankruptcycase
involved five related entities, of which four had environmental issues-Fumas County Farms, the
general partnership, and three corporations or limited liability companies that were solely owned by the
general partnership. See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs at 8, In re 7-11 Pork Food, Inc., No. 04-
81490 (Bankr. D. Neb. May 18, 2004) (Docket No. 48) (filed with schedules) (wholly owned by
Fumas County Farms, a general partnership). In another two cases that we deleted from our database,
the general partner of the limited partnership was an individual, not another limited liability entity. See
SCARY STORIES
type of environmental issue.20 0 The number of cases in which environmental
issues played a role in the debtor's bankruptcy case, however, is even smaller.
First, in twenty cases, the debtor clearly had no pending environmental
issues at the time of the bankruptcy filing. We discuss these false positive cases
below in Part IV.B. Second, in only five of 2,167 cases, or two-tenths of one
percent of the cases, did the debtor's environmental liabilities play a role in its
decision to file for relief under Chapter 11. We address these five cases in Part
Iv.C.
Statement of Financial Affairs at Q.21(a), In re Lake Ariel Assocs., Ltd., No. 04-16073 (Bankr. E.D.
Pa. May 21, 2004) (Docket No. 19) (listing Hardie Beloff as sole general partner with 97% interest in
the partnership); Action by Written Consent of the Sole General Partner of Lake Ariel Assocs., Ltd., In
re Lake Ariel Assocs., Ltd., No. 04-16073 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. Apr. 30,2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with
petition) (authorizing bankruptcy filing); Statement of Financial Affairs at 9, In re Mecklenburg Mill
Assocs., LP, No. 04-30212 (Bankr. W.D.N.C. Feb. 20,2004) (Docket No. 18) (listing two individuals
as "original general partners" and as holding a total of one percent of the partnership's interest).
Deleting these cases from the data set does not affect our conclusions. For example, if we include
general partnerships and those few excluded limited partnerships in the data set, then debtors with
environmental matters disclosed on Question 17 comprise 4.5% of the total cases. Ifwe exclude them,
then debtors with disclosed environmental issues comprise 4.2% of the cases in the data set.
200. Infra Table III, Column B. In ninety of these ninety-one environmental cases, the debtor
responded affirmatively to some or all of Question 17. See infra notes 437, 439 (discussing the
Alternative Fuels case, for which we did not have access to the SFA). In In re Mr. Green Jade,
Inc., while the debtor answered "none" to Question 17, it indicated on Exhibit C to the voluntary
petition that there were "gas tanks under main building." Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, at exhibit C,
In re Mr. Green Jade, Inc., No. 04-50389-399 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Aug. 17, 2004) (Docket No. 2).
Exhibit C to the petition requires the debtor to disclose any "dangerous condition" with regard to either
real or personal property that "poses or is alleged to pose a threat of imminent and identifiable harm to
the public health or safety." Official Form 1, supra note 105, at 662. For most debtors, we did not
examine Exhibit C, which is appended to the debtor's petition. While other debtors also may have
attached Exhibit C to their petitions yet answered "no" to Question 17 of the SFA, we do not believe
that the number of debtors doing so is significant. First, it is quite unlikely that a debtor would indicate
the presence of an environmental hazard that posed an imminent threat to public health or safety
without also disclosing that matter under Question 17 of the SFA. Second, our results demonstrate that
the SFA is a far more reliable indicator of environmental issues than Exhibit C. In only one case did
the debtor respond affirmatively to Question 17 and also append Exhibit C to its petition. See Chapter
11 Voluntary Petition, at exhibit C, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277
(Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 29, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (disclosing the presence of26,000 tons of tire shred and
220 tons of whole tires that might pose harm to public health or safety if an uncontrolled fire occurred
at the debtor's facility). In In re Amjust LLC, the debtor clearly misunderstood Question 17; it put its
meat processing facility under "Site Name" but answered "none" for governmental unit, date ofnotice,
and environmental law under Question 17(a). See Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 17(a), In re
Amjust LLC, No. 04-24829 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Nov. 18,2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition).
But, the debtor attached Exhibit C to its petition, in which it expressed concern about the possible
migration of petrochemicals from an adjoining contaminated Exxon station. See Chapter I I Voluntary
Petition at exhibit C, In re Amjust LLC, No. 04-24829 (Bankr. W.D. Wash. Nov. 18,2004) (Docket
No. 1) (disclosing potential environmental obligations).
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Finally, in Part IV.D, we consider those forty-one cases that had a
potential environmental issue at the time of bankruptcy filing and that emerged
from Chapter 11 with a confirmed plan. We examined these forty-one cases to
determine the impact of the abandonment power and the ability of the debtor to
discharge environmental liabilities under Chapter 11. We found only one
debtor that successfully abandoned contaminated property in its Chapter 11
case. This finding suggests that concerns about misuse of the abandonment
power, at least in the context of Chapter 11, are without merit. By comparison,
the power to discharge environmental liability played a more important role in
the cases in our data set than did the abandonment power. But, even assuming
the worst-case scenario in which every single debtor with a confirmed plan
discharged some or all of its environmental debts in its bankruptcy case, in only
forty-one of 2,167 cases, or 1.9% of the cases, were environmental liabilities
discharged as a result of the Chapter 11 proceeding. Consequently, it appears
that the strategic use of Chapter 11 by debtors to circumvent their
environmental obligations is an uncommon phenomenon.
B. False Positives
In ninety-one cases, debtors disclosed some form of environmental issue in
their bankruptcy filings. This number, however, is misleading because in
twenty of those ninety-one cases, the debtor, in effect, had no environmental
concerns at the time of the bankruptcy filing. In the remaining seventy-one
cases, or approximately 3.3% of the cases in our data set, the debtor disclosed
an environmental notice, violation, or liability that possibly was still pending at
the time of the bankruptcy filing ("the environmental cases").
20 1
In six cases, the debtor obviously misread the language of Question 17, as
shown in Table III, Column C.20 2 For example, in 162-164 Skillman Street
201. We use the word "possibly" because in some cases it appeared that the debtor may have
resolved the environmental issue pre-petition although the debtor did not expressly so state that
fact on the SFA. Cf infra note 213 (providing examples of cases in which the debtor resolved
environmental obligations prior to litigation).
202. See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs at 5, In re Womack Contractors, Inc., No. 04-
74734 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 1,2004) (Docket No. 48) (filed with schedules) (providing only a
site name and address under Question 17(a) with no name for the governmental unit and no
indication of any environmental violation, notice, or liability). We included four other debtors
in this category of an obvious misreading, largely because we could not ascertain whether an
environmental violation had or had not occurred. For example, in Online, Inc., the debtor listed
an August 2003 notice from the Center for Devices and Radiological Health with "21 CFR
Subpart B" as the relevant environmental law. See Statement of Financial Affairs at Q.1 7(a), In
re Online, Inc., No. 04-72474 (Bankr. N.D. I11. June 14, 2004) (Docket No. 15). Without the
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Corp. ,203 the debtor, in his handwritten SFA, circled "none" for Question 17(a),
but drew a circle and arrow pointing to a barely legible reference to the City of
New York Department of Environmental Protection,204 based on the debtor's
liability for water taxes totaling $1,136.205 The debtor in Prestwick Services,
Inc.2°6 listed, under Question 17(b), what appeared to be an insurance
certificate issued by a private financial firm's small business lending unit;
Question 17(b), however, mandates disclosure of debtor notices to
governmental entities, not to private firms. 207
We included in this group of six debtors those that answered Question
17(b) affirmatively, even though the notice provided did not indicate a release
of hazardous material. 20 8 For example, the debtor in In re MJ Research, Inc.,
noted under Question 17(b) that on May 10, 2001, it had "filed a Uniform
Hazardous Waste Manifest" with both the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection and the Arkansas Department of Environmental
C.F.R. section number, we could not determine what regulation the debtor had violated.
Chapter 21 of the CFR, however, deals with "Food and Drugs"; therefore, it is likely that the
debtor's disclosure did not deal with an environmental violation. In another three cases filed in
the Southern District of New York, the debtors-all related entities---each filed two copies of
their SFAs, checking "none," leaving blank, or putting a question mark next to Question 17 on
the first SFA, and stating, in a handwritten notation on the second SFA, that "only trustee
knows." See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs at 6 & Q.17, In re 196 Albany Ave. Realty
Corp., No. 04-26211 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2004) (Docket No. 11) (filed with schedules).
While the docket contained a notation that "[t]he Receiver may continue asbestos removal," we
could not determine if a government notice had triggered the asbestos removal. See generally
Docket, In re 196 Albany Ave. Realty Corp., No. 04-26211 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2004);
Docket, In re 1173 Bergen St. Realty Corp., No. 04-26213 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24, 2004);
Docket, In re 720 Livonia Ave. Realty Corp., No. 04-26215 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Nov. 24,2004).
203. In re 162-164 Skillman St. Corp., No. 04-23601 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Sept. 23, 2004).
204. Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 17, in re 162-164 Skillman Street Corp., No. 04-
23601 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2004) (Docket No. 11) (filed with schedules).
205. See List of Creditors Holding 20 Largest Unsecured Claims, In re 162-164 Skillman
St. Corp., No. 04-23601 (Bankr. E.D.N.Y. Oct. 19, 2004) (Docket No. 11) (filed with
schedules).
206. In re Prestwick Servs., Inc., No. 04-33943 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. April 21, 2004).
207. Statement of Financial Affairs, In re Prestwick Servs., Inc., No. 04-33943 (Bankr.
N.D. Tex. Apr. 21, 2004) (Docket No. 8) (filed with schedules).
208. See supra note 164 (describing the language of Question 17(b)); see also Statement of
Financial Affairs at 6, In re King's Auto Body, Inc., No. 04-50815 (Bankr. D. Nev. Apr. 19,
2004) (Docket No. 12) (listing under Question 17(b) undated "drum waste notice" to the Nevada
EPA); First Amendment to Debtor's Schedules & Statement of Financial Affairs at 2, In re
Thompson Printing Co., Inc., No. 04-17330 (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 10, 2004) (Docket No. 19)
(noting that "Debtor had three (3) substantially and three (3) partially full drums" of hazardous
waste that it had to dispose of in compliance with New Jersey law, but not indicating any release
of hazardous materials in violation of New Jersey law).
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Quality.20 9 But, a Uniform Hazardous Waste Manifest is simply an EPA form
used to track shipments of hazardous waste. 2  Filing the manifest is an
administrative act that carries no connotation of an environmental violation.
Moreover, in another fourteen cases,21t the debtor, prior to its bankruptcy
filing, either had remedied its failure to comply with applicable environmental
laws 212 or had settled an administrative or judicial proceeding instituted against
209. Statement of Financial Affairs at 13, In re MJ Research, Inc., No. 04-50861 (Bankr.
D. Nev. May 7, 2004) (Docket No. 247).
210. See U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency, The Hazardous Waste Manifest System,
http://www.epa.gov/epaoswer/hazwaste/gener/manifest (last visited Aug. 16,2007) (noting that
the Manifest System is used to track hazardous waste from generator's site to the site of
disposition) (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review).
211. In some cases, we could not determine the status of the environmental matter
disclosed on the SFA, because the debtor failed to provide complete or clear information about
the environmental agency, law, or violation. Therefore, we included in Table III only those
cases in which the debtor gave the status of the environmental issue or administrative or judicial
proceeding as settled, resolved, or dismissed.
212. See Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 17(a), In re Apartment Hunters, Inc., No. 03-
08989 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. May 23, 2003) (Docket No. 29) (indicating in letter from
Environmental Protection Commission as attachment to SFA in prior 2003 bankruptcy case that
the debtor's response to Warning Notice was "satisfactory" and that "Warning Notice [was] now
closed"); Statement of Financial Affairs for Perryville Energy Partners, LLC at 8, In re
Perryville Energy Holdings, LLC, No. 04-80109 (Bankr. W.D. La. Feb. 20, 2004) (Docket No.
94) (stating that affiliated debtor Perryville Energy Partners' August 2000 oil and water spill,
and October 2001 turbine lube oil spill had been "contained"); Statement of Financial Affairs at
31, In re KB Toys, Inc., No. 04-10120 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 15, 2004) (Docket No. 481) (noting
that there was "[n]o further evidence of release or contamination" after affiliated debtor KB
Toys of New Jersey's 1998 "remediation and clean up of heating and fuel oil spilled during
property's prior use as a farm"); Statement of Financial Affairs at 6, In re Florida Select Citrus,
Inc., No. 04-11050 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. Oct. 29, 2004) (Docket No. 41) (noting that debtor was
"tnow in compliance" after having received notice in July 2004 from the Florida Department of
Environmental Protection of its "noncompliance with reporting requirements prior to 7/2004");
Statement of Financial Affairs-Amended at 5, In re Conmaco/Rector L.P., No. 04-11248
(Bankr. E.D. La. Apr. 20, 2004) (Docket No. 148) (stating that "no further action was
warranted" with regard to exposed block of asbestos, and noting a 2001 OSHA violation with
regard to improper ventilation for painters); Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 17(a), In re
Utex Indus., Inc., No. 04-34427 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 23,2004) (Docket No. 87) (stating that
hazardous waste violations had been "corrected and violation[s] considered resolved" with
receipt of February 2001 and June 2002 letters from Texas Commission on Environmental
Quality); Statement of Financial Affairs-Amended at 5, In re Amber Mgmt. Corp., No. 04-
19916 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. July 30,2004) (Docket No. 11) (indicating "[p]roblem remedied" with
regard to June 2001 notice of asbestos on pipe in basement); Statement of Financial Affairs at 5,
In re Good Nite Inn Las Vegas, LLC, No. 04-18019 (Bankr. D. Nev. Sept. 22, 2004) (Docket
No. 127) (stating that problem necessitating June 2002 abatement notice had been corrected the
same month "prior to current ownership"); Statement of Financial Affairs at 10- 11, In re Tiro
Acquisition, LLC, No. 04-12938 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 16, 2004) (Docket No. 10 l) (stating that
affiliated debtor Tiro Industries' August 2000 twenty-gallon spill of Phyton-27 fungicide had
been "fully contained (with no release to the environment)" and that Minnesota Department of
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it.2 13 Consequently, no outstanding environmental issues remained at the time
of filing. For example, in In re KB Toys of Massachusetts, Inc., the debtor filed
a Response Action Outcome Statement after cleaning up a 2001 spill of five to
214eight gallons of motor oil at its Berkshire Distribution Center. KB Toys
indicated that after the cleanup "[n]o further action [was] pending" with the
Massachusetts Department of Environmental Protection. 215 The debtor in In re
A-Bust Tool & Manufacturing Co. 216 disclosed that the Indiana Department of
Environmental Management (IDEM) had filed suit against the debtor in
2002.217 But, the case was dismissed before the debtor filed its Chapter 11
Agriculture had issued a "Case File Closure" letter in May 200 1, and asserting that all further
spills were duly reported and that no notices of violation had issued). Cf Joint Motion to
Approve Settlement Agreement and/or Dismiss Bankruptcy Cases at exhibit A, sched. 5.4, In re
Paradox Partners, LLC, No. 04-36279 (Bankr. D. Colo. June 17, 2005) (Docket No. 297)
(noting that affiliated debtor BDS International, LLC, had fully remediated diesel spill that
occurred in August 2003 and glycol spill that occurred in November 2003, but not indicating
whether debtor had completed remediation prior to or after filing the petition).
We included Ronjer Industries in this category because the debtor listed only one
environmental issue on its SFA and indicated that the matter had been resolved prior to the
bankruptcy filing. See Statement of Financial Affairs at 5, In re Ronjer Indus., Inc., No. 04-
10657 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (Docket No. 10) (indicating that the October 1993
notice concerning CERCLA, RCRA, and Clean Water Act had been "settled $3,101.28").
Nevertheless, in its disclosure statement, the debtor explained that the proceeds of the sale of its
main asset-a parcel of real property-were applied, in part, to pay for cleanup fees of $2,180.
Debtor's First Amended Disclosure Statement at III.B., In re Ronjer Indus., Inc., No. 04-10657
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 28, 2004) (Docket No. 42). Thus, while the debtor apparently had a
minor environmental cleanup obligation pending at the time of its bankruptcy filing, it did not
disclose that fact on its SFA. Notwithstanding the small cleanup obligation mentioned in the
disclosure statement, we concluded that Ronjer fit into the category of pre-petition remediation
cases. Cf infra note 392 and accompanying text (discussing the other pre-petition remediation
cases in the data set).
213. Infra Table III, Column D; see also Statement of Financial Affairs at Q.17(a), In re
Utex Indus., Inc., No. 04-34427 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 23, 2004) (Docket No. 87) (stating that
the "[flailure to [f]ile [a] [c]ompliance [c]ertificate [was] [r]esolved by payment of $1,500 fine
per agreed order"); Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 17(c), In re Kennedy Mfg. Co., No. 04-
30794 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio Mar. 12, 2004) (Docket No. 97) (answering only Question 17(c) and
summarily noting that March 1996 "docket number" had been "settled"); Statement of Financial
Affairs at 8, In re Perryville Energy Holdings, LLC, No. 04-80109 (Bankr. W.D. La. Feb. 20,
2004) (Docket No. 94) (stating that lawsuit involving affiliated debtor Perryville Energy
Partners, to which Louisiana Department of Environmental Quality was a party, that involved
"original construction permit issues" for community association had been "resolved").
214. Statement of Financial Affairs for KB Toys of Massachusetts, Inc. at Q. 17(b)-(c), In
re KB Toys, Inc., No. 04-10120 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 15, 2004) (Docket No. 481).
215. Id. atQ.17(c).
216. In re A-Bust Tool & Mfg. Co., No. 04-64206 (Bankr. N.D. Ind. Aug. 24, 2004)
(dismissing the Chapter 11 petition).
217. Statement of Financial Affairs at 6, In re A-Bust Tool & Mfg. Co., No. 04-64206
(Bankr. N.D. Ind. Sept. 23, 2004) (Docket No. 38).
65 WASH. &LEE L. REV. 451 (2008)
plan, and the IDEM suit was the debtor's sole environmental disclosure on the
SFA.218
The obvious question is why a debtor would reply affirmatively to
Question 17 when it had no pending environmental issues at the time that it
filed its bankruptcy petition. The answer lies in Question 17's phrasing.
First, Question 17 specifically contemplates the disclosure of even settled
environmental matters.219 Second, unlike other questions on the SFA, Question
17 places no time restrictions on its mandated disclosure. 220 Thus, several cases
in our sample include information about environmental issues that pre-dated the
debtor's bankruptcy filing by seven to ten years, or more. 221
The absence of a time restriction in Question 17 makes sense in certain
cases. After all, the remediation of environmental hazards and the debtor's
concomitant financial responsibility for cleanup easily might extend for a
decade or more for sites with significant pollution, such as a Superfund site.222
But, for smaller violations, such as a reporting issue, no continuing violation
may exist at the time of the bankruptcy filing because the debtor corrected the
problem pre-petition. Thus, the absence of a date restriction for Question 17,
coupled with the lack of a status reporting requirement for subparts (a) and (b),
results in over-inclusive disclosure. The downside of such over-inclusiveness
is that as the age of the environmental violation increases so does the possibility
223for vague or incomplete descriptions of the violation at issue.
218. Id. at 5-6; see also id. at 2-3 (listing collection and preference actions under Question
4, the SFA's question on suits and administrative proceedings).
219. See, e.g., Official Form 7 (2007), supra note 162, at 719 (requiring the debtor to
disclose the status or disposition of judicial and administrative proceedings).
220. For example, Question 4's inquiry about suits and administrative proceedings,
executions, garnishments, and attachments is limited to a one-year period preceding the filing of
the bankruptcy petition. Id. at 715; see also id. at 714-15 (requiring, under Question 2,
disclosure of income derived from sources other than employment or operation of a business for
two-year period preceding the bankruptcy filing, and mandating the disclosure under Question 3
of certain payments to creditors made within 90 days of the bankruptcy filing).
221. See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs, In re Ronjer Industries, No. 04-10657
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Feb. 18, 2004) (Docket No. 10) (noting, in its sole disclosure of
environmental liability on the SFA, an environmental issue related to an October 1993 notice
under CERCLA, RCRA, and the Clean Water Act for a York County, Pennsylvania site had
been settled for $3,101.28).
222. For Superfund National Priorities List sites, the cleanup "has often been a very
lengthy process-in many cases, it has taken 10 to 20 years." GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 7.
223. See Statement of Financial Affairs at Q.17(a), In re First San Diego Properties XX,
No. 04-05235 (Bankr. S.D. Cal. July 12, 2004) (Docket No. 10) (filed with schedules) (noting
that the County of San Diego had given notice in 1990 under an unknown environmental law
with regard to property located in San Diego, California); Statement of Financial Affairs, In re
Avado Brands, Inc., No. 04-31555 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 19, 2004) (Docket No. 311) (filed
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Thus, our search results initially included cases in which the debtor either
mistook the meaning of Question 17 or had resolved pre-petition the
environmental issue disclosed under Question 17. We narrowed that number
down to those cases in which an ongoing environmental issue potentially
existed at the time of the bankruptcy filing. Of the 2,167 cases with useable
data, only seventy-one, or approximately 3.3% of the cases, had a potential
environmental issue pending at the time of the Chapter 11 filing. In the vast
majority of these seventy-one cases, however, the environmental matter
disclosed on the SFA affected neither the decision to file for bankruptcy nor the
bankruptcy proceedings themselves.
C. The Impact of Environmental Liabilities on the Chapter II
Filing Decision
1. Introduction
In order to solicit votes on its plan of reorganization, a Chapter 11 debtor
must file a disclosure statement. 24 The disclosure statement often contains a
section in which the debtor describes the events leading up to the filing of the
Chapter 11 petition. As a result, from the disclosure statements, as well as from
motions to dismiss and the nature and size of the disclosed environmental
liabilities, we were able to determine, for most of the seventy-one
environmental cases, the reason for the debtor's Chapter 11 filing.225 In only
with schedules) (noting the debtor's May 18, 1993 notice to the Georgia Environmental
Protection Division with regard to one of debtor's restaurants in Madison, Georgia, without
providing any information about the nature of the environmental violation). On September 7,
2007, Avado Brands once again filed for relief under Chapter 11, only this time in the
bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware. See Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Avado
Brands, Inc., No. 07-11276 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 5, 2007) (Docket No. 1).
224. 11 U.S.C. § 1125(b) (2000) ("An acceptance or rejection of a plan may not be
solicited after the commencement of the case under this title from a holder of a claim...
[unless] there is transmitted to such holder... a written disclosure statement approved, after
notice and a hearing, by the court as containing adequate information.").
225. In six cases, we were unable to determine the reason for the debtor's bankruptcy
filing. In one case, we could not access most of the case documents on PACER. See infra notes
437, 439. In four cases, the debtor did not file a disclosure statement and the remaining
documents in the case provided insufficient information to determine with any certainty the
reason for the bankruptcy filing. But, in one case, In re Glady Fork Mining, Inc., the debtor did
file a disclosure statement; however, the disclosure statement was not helpful in determining the
reason for the filing because the debtor summarily stated that it did "not feel that a restatement
of it's [sic] history [was] significant to a voting in this Plan." Disclosure Statement at 6, In re
Glady Fork Mining, Inc. No. 04-01865 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. June 30, 2005) (Docket No. 101).
Although it was clear that the debtor had ongoing environmental problems, what was not clear
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five cases, however, did environmental liabilities play a role, either alone or
in conjunction with other factors, in the debtor's decision to file for
bankruptcy. 226 Thus, environmental liabilities or violations played a role in
the decision to file for Chapter 1 1 in less than one percent of the cases in our
data set.
As a group, these five firms were small- to medium-size entities with
asset values ranging from $591,000 to $27.8 million.227 None of the
businesses was publicly traded and none was a subsidiary. In fact, three of
the five firms had a sole stockholder or member.228 Finally, only three firms
was whether those problems played a role in the bankruptcy filing. For example, the West
Virginia Department of Environmental Protection filed a proof of claim in the case for
$196,571, of which $58,046 constituted "pre-petition civil penalties and permit fees." The
department sought administrative expense priority status for the remaining $138,525, claiming
the debtor owed it for "post-petition civil penalties and permit fees." Stephanie R.
Timmermeyer, Secretary of the West Virginia Department of Environmental Protection's Proofs
of Claim, Request for Administrative Expense Priority Status, & Notice of Outstanding,
Ongoing Environmental Violations Being Committed by the Debtor at 2, In re Glady Fork
Mining, Inc., No. 04-01865 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. Oct. 20, 2004) (Docket No. 55). In addition,
the debtor scheduled fines of $60,000 owed to the Mine Safety and Health Administration.
Schedule F at 2, In re Glady Fork Mining, Inc. No. 04-01865 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. June 7,2004)
(Docket No. 5). But, the debtor's total liabilities exceeded $5.5 million, of which more than
$3.5 million were unsecured priority debts for taxes and workers' compensation contributions.
See Summary of Schedules, In re Glady Fork Mining, Inc. No. 04-01865 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va.
June 7, 2004) (Docket No. 5); see also Schedule E at 1, In re Glady Fork Mining, Inc. No. 04-
01865 (Bankr. N.D. W.Va. June 7, 2004) (Docket No. 5). Thus, by comparison, the
environmental liabilities were small.
226. Six debtors mentioned environmental issues as a reason for their bankruptcy filing,
but one of those six debtors was MBK Partnership. See supra note 199 (explaining the deletion
of certain debtors from the data set). Including MBK in the analysis, however, would not have
changed our conclusions. The concerns about abandonment of contaminated property and
discharge of environmental liabilities played no role in the MBK bankruptcy because MBK did
not move to abandon polluted property in its case. Moreover, as a general partnership, the
owners of the firm would have remained liable for firm debts post-confirmation had MBK
confirmed a plan. In any case, MBK did not do so and, therefore, § 1141(d)(1)'s discharge
provisions simply did not apply to it. Finally, during its bankruptcy case, MBK settled "the
claims of the federal and state environmental agencies." Debtor's Motion for Order Dismissing
Chapter 11 Case at l, In re MBK P'ship, No. 04-69814 (Bankr. D. Or. Nov. 22, 2005) (Docket
No. 351).
227. See Summary of Schedules, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-
11277 (Bankr. D. Del. May 27, 2004) (Docket No. 68) (listing total assets of $27,820,827.25);
Summary of Schedules, In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-B-03344 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Feb. 12,
2004) (Docket No. 29) [hereinafter JVH Summary] (listing total assets of $590,957.17).
228. See Statement of Financial Affairs at 25, Q.21(b), In re Turbine Chrome Servs., Inc.,
No. 04-38465 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 14, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition) (listing
C.A. Parrish as "President-Owner" and "100%" shareholder); Statement of Financial Affairs-
Amended at 7, Q.21(b), In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-B-03344 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 11,
2004) (Docket No. 64) (listing Joseph J. Vanden Houten as president, director, and sole
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emerged from Chapter 11 with a confirmed plan. 229 A thumbnail sketch of
each debtor follows.
a. Technical Coatings Laboratory, LLC
The In re Technical Coatings Laboratory, LLC (TCL) case2 30 is one of the
few examples in our sample in which the debtor failed either to disclose under
Question 17 or to schedule a massive environmental liability as a debt in its
bankruptcy case.23' The firm, which manufactured "hot stamping foils,
specialty coated products, and specialty paints and resins,"232 filed its Chapter
11 petition on July 12, 2004.233 At the time of the bankruptcy filing, four
individuals and three firms held TCL's common equity,234 and the firm had
stockholder); Statement of Financial Affairs at 10, Q.21 (b), In re Gopher State Ethanol, LLC,
No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition) (listing the
chairman of the board, Bruce Hendry, as "100% Shareholder").
229. For a discussion of these three firms, see infra Part IV.C.1.b (discussing New
Heights); Part IV.C.I.d (discussing Gopher State); and Part IV.C.l.e (discussing Turbine
Chrome).
230. In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 12,2004)
(filing for Chapter 11 bankruptcy).
231. The debtor in In re American International Petroleum Corp., No. 04-21332 (Bankr.
W.D. La. Oct. 7, 2004), did the same thing. In re American International Petroleum Corp. is
not included in our sample, however, because the case remained open at the time of the writing
of this Article. In January 2004, the Florida Department of Environmental Protection (FDEP)
filed suit against American International Petroleum Corporation (AIPC) in Florida state court,
alleging violations of various state environmental laws at St. Mark's Refinery, which was owned
by AIPC. See Claim No. 62, Claims Register, In re Am. Int'l Refinery, Inc., No. 04-21331
(Bankr. W.D. La. Nov. 14, 2005) (noting FDEP suit against debtor). Pursuant to the bankruptcy
court'sjoint administration order, In re American International Refinery, Inc. was designated as
the lead case; therefore, most AIPC filings were made on the lead case docket. AIPC filed for
bankruptcy nine months later, but failed to list the FDEP lawsuit under either Question 4 (suits)
or Question 17 of the SFA. See Statement of Financial Affairs, In re Am. Int'l Petroleum Corp.,
No. 04-21332 (Bankr. W.D. La. Oct. 7, 2004) (Docket No. 6). Because AIPC failed to list the
FDEP on its creditor mailing matrix, the FDEP's claim for $15 million was filed late. See
Claim No. 62, supra. The bankruptcy court, however, allowed the claim. See Agreed Order, In
re Am. Int'l Refinery, Inc., No. 04-21331 (Bankr. W.D. La. Feb. 14, 2006) (Docket No. 352).
232. Disclosure Statement at 5, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr.
D. Conn. Sept. 15, 2004) (Docket No. 129) [hereinafter TCL Disclosure].
233. Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105
(Bankr. D. Conn. July 12, 2004) (Docket No. 4).
234. Statement of Financial Affairs at Q.21(a), In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No.
04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 103) (filed with schedules) [hereinafter
TCL SFA].
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assets of approximately $3.22 million. All of the assets were personal, not real,
property.
235
In its disclosure statement, TCL gave two reasons for its bankruptcy filing,
one of which was "extra-operating events, namely, [the need] to manage the
risks and potential liabilities associated with an underground tank leakage.,
236
In addition, under Question 17(a) of the SFA, TCL stated that the Connecticut
Department of Environmental Protection (CT DEP) had provided notice to the
debtor in early 2000 and later in mid-2003 of environmental issues related to
two properties located in Avon, Connecticut; the 2003 notice involved
Connecticut's hazardous waste regulations.237 Finally, TCL noted, under
Question 17(b), that it had notified CT DEP in October 2003, but offered no
information about the environmental law or violation that had triggered the
firm's notice.
238
On its schedules, TCL listed CT DEP as an unsecured, nonpriority
creditor in the amount of$ 100;239 this amount vastly underestimated CT DEP's
actual unsecured claim against the debtor. In early January 2005, CT DEP filed
a proof of claim in TCL's bankruptcy case for $213,072.50.240 The agency
described the monetary obligation as an unsecured, nonpriority claim based on
the debtor's violations of various Connecticut environmental laws and
regulations.24'
235. See generally Summary of Schedules, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-
22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Aug. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 103) (filed with SFA).
236. TCL Disclosure, supra note 232, at 6.
237. TCL SFA, supra note 234, at Q.17(a). The debtor put "Connecticut" under
environmental law with regard to the 2000 notice. See id.
238. See id. at Q.17(b) (finding that the debtor failed to provide any explanation of the
environmental issue or how it gained the attention of CT DEP).
239. See Schedule F at 17, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D.
Conn. Aug. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 103).
240. Claim No. 143, Claims Register, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105
(Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 7, 2005).
241. CT DEP stated that TCL "ha[d] violated, and continue[d] to violate, Connecticut's
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations, Regulations of Connecticut State Agencies
(R.C.S.A.) §§ 22a-449(c)-100 through 119 and 22a-449(c)-l 1, and Connecticut's Underground
Storage Tank System Management Regulations, R.C.S.A. §§ 22a-449(d)-l and 22a-449(d)-101
through 113." Id. add. at 1. In addition, CT DEP alleged that the debtor had violated "its New
Source Review Permit No. 004-0012-0025" and had "discharged to the waters of the State
without a permit in violation of Conn. Gen. Stat. § 22a-430." Id.
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242
Moreover, TCL failed to schedule the U.S. EPA as a creditor. Yet, on
January 7, 2005, the U.S. Attorney General, on behalf of the EPA, filed a proof
of claim for $64 million 243 in order to recover under CERCLA for
"environmental cleanup costs incurred and to be incurred by the United States"
for "contamination with hazardous substances of the Solvents Recovery Service
of New England Superfund Site ... located in Southington, Connecticut.",
244
According to the EPA, the basis of TCL's liability was its relationship to
Technical Coatings Laboratories, Inc. (TCLI). For a thirty-year period,
stretching from 1961 through 199 1, TCLI shipped hazardous waste that it had
generated at its Avon, Connecticut facility to the Southington Superfund site.24 5
The EPA contended that as the "legal successor to TCLI," TCL was liable for
cleanup costs at the Superfund site.
246
TCL also minimized the extent of its environmental liabilities in its
disclosure statement; it portrayed its environmental problems as limited to
leakage of toluene from underground tanks, which it argued was caused by
improper installation of the tanks in 1991.247 The debtor failed to mention not
only the Southington Superfund site, but also two notices of violation (NOV)
issued by the CT DEP post-petition but pre-disclosure statement. The first
NOV, issued July 27, 2004, enumerated thirty violations of Connecticut's
Hazardous Waste Management Regulations.24 8 On August 9, 2004, the CT
242. Even though the EPA did not appear on TCL's schedules, TCL listed the U.S.
Attorney General, Department of Justice, Environmental and Natural Resources Division,
Environmental Enforcement Section on its mailing matrix. See Label Matrix for Local
Noticing, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. July 12, 2004).
The creditor mailing matrix is one of the reports, in addition to the docket and the claims
register, that a user may access on PACER, by inputting the bankruptcy case number.
243. Proof of Claim of the United States on Behalf of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency at 3 para. 89, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D.
Conn. Jan. 3, 2005); Claim No. 141, Claims Register, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No.
04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Jan. 7, 2005) [hereinafter Claim No. 141].
244. Proof of Claim of the United States on Behalf of the United States Environmental
Protection Agency, supra note 243, at 1 paras. 1 & 2.
245. See id. at 2 para. 5 ("During the period from 1961 to 1991, TCLI sent hazardous
substances from its Avon facility to the SRSNE facility for treatment and/or disposal.").
246. Id. at 4 para. 11.
247. See TCL Disclosure, supra note 232, at 8-9 (stating underground tank leakage as the
only maj or environmental problem).
248. See Objection of Connecticut Department of Environmental Protection to Debtor's
Disclosure Statement Dated September 13, 2004, at 2, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No.
04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Oct. 21, 2004) (Docket No. 150) ("On July 27, 2004, CTDEP
issued the debtor a Notice of Violation. . . ."). The Notice of Violation is appended to this
court filing.
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DEP issued a second NOV, this time with regard to TCL's "air permit ... to
operate a catalytic oxidizer.249
Thus, although the debtor originally proposed a plan of reorganization, not
liquidation, it is unclear whether reorganization was ever feasible, given the
debtor's significant environmental liabilities and relatively modest assets.25'
For example, TCL clearly did not contemplate paying the EPA in its plan of
reorganization. It proposed to pay each unsecured creditor a pro rata share of
$435,000, or 7.5% of each claim, which meant that TCL estimated its total
unsecured claims at $5.8 million.252  Yet, the EPA's claim stated that
unreimbursed response costs already incurred at the Southington Superfund site
253were $7.5 million; it projected total response costs to be $64 million.
It is not surprising, then, that at some point during TCL's Chapter 11 case,
both the U.S. Trustee and CT DEP learned that TCL had either "partially or
completely shut-down [sic] its business operations, 254 and was functioning in
what the U.S. Trustee described as "silent liquidation mode., 255 Consequently,
256the U.S. Trustee moved to dismiss or convert TCL's Chapter 11 case. On
September 6, 2005, the bankruptcy court dismissed the debtor's case,257 no
249. See id. at 2, 4 (listing the violations).
250. See TCL Disclosure, supra note 232, at 34 para. V (describing the method for
implementing the plan).
251. At the time of its bankruptcy filing, the firm had assets slightly in excess of $3.2
million. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
252. See TCL Disclosure, supra note 232, at 19 para. 1V.C.2.ii. Seven and a half percent
of $5.8 million equals $435,000, which is the sum that TCL indicated was available for paying
the general unsecured creditors. Plan of Reorganization at 15 para. 3.2, In re Technical
Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 128).
253. Claim No. 141, supra note 243, at 3 paras. 8 & 9.
254. United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss the Debtor's Case at 2, para. 5, In re
Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. May 12, 2005) (Docket No.
330) [hereinafter TCL Dismissal Motion]; see also Motion of Connecticut Department of
Environmental Protection to Require Debtor to Remove Hazardous Waste at 2 para. 3, In re
Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 15, 2005) (Docket No.
287) [hereinafter CT DEP Hazardous Waste Motion] (noting that it had come to CT DEP's
"attention that the debtor had ceased its manufacturing operations and [was] in the process of
going out of business").
255. TCL Dismissal Motion, supra note 254, at 3 (emphasis added).
256. Id. The motion is denominated one to dismiss, but the U.S. Trustee argued in the
alternative throughout the motion, at times seeking dismissal and at other times advocating for
conversion to Chapter 7. Compare id. at 2 para. 9 (arguing that there was "no reason... to
convert the case to Chapter 7 since there would be nothing for a Chapter 7 trustee to administer
except for the sole benefit of the secured creditor"), with id. at 4 (stating that "the inability to
propose a viable plan of reorganization ... supports the conversion of this case to Chapter 7").
257. Order on United States Trustee's Motion to Dismiss Debtor's Case, In re Technical
Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Sept. 6, 2005) (Docket No. 410).
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doubt because the court's prior order granting the debtor's motion to sell
substantially all of its assets25s meant that no money "remain[ed] to pay
administrative expenses of a continuing Chapter 11 case ... or to pay priority
or general unsecured creditors.,
25 9
What happened, then, to CT DEP's and the EPA's claims for damages?
TCL owned no real property.260 The lease for its business premises from Old
Farms Associates, LLC expired in early February 2005 during TCL's
bankruptcy case.261 While both CT DEP and Old Farms filed motions asking
the court to allocate funds to address the hazardous waste issues on the
debtor's business premises prior to the closing of debtor's business, 262 the
docket in TCL's case indicates that the hearing on those motions was called
off 63 and that no order was issued addressing either motion. Moreover, no
assets remained to pay unsecured creditors, such as CT DEP or the EPA,
after the sale of TCL's personal property.26
But, because TCL did not emerge from bankruptcy with a confirmed
plan, both CT DEP's and the EPA's claims survived the bankruptcy case.
TCL, however, went out of business. It was formed in Delaware in 1999, but
the State of Delaware Division of Corporations lists its current status as
"forfeited-resigned," because it did not appoint a new agent after having filed
a certificate of resignation of the registered agent.265 Also, TCL, which had
258. Order Authorizing Sale of Property of the Estate Free & Clear of Liens & Other
Interests in Such Property Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 363(f) and Federal Rules of Bankruptcy
Procedure 6004 and 9014, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Corm.
July 21, 2005) (Docket No. 397).
259. United States Trustee's Objection to Debtor's Motion for an Order Authorizing Sale
of Property of the Estate Pursuant to 1I U.S.C. § 363(b) at I paras. 2 & 3, In re Technical
Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. June 17, 2005) (Docket No. 357)
[hereinafter Trustee Objection]. The U.S. Trustee contended that the court either should convert
or dismiss the case. Id. at para. 4.
260. See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
261. See Motion of Old Farms Assocs., LLC to Require Debtor to Allocate Funds for & to
Apply Funds for the Proper & Lawful Closure of the Underground Storage Tank System at 205
Old Farms Road, Avon Connecticut at 1 para. 1, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-
22105 (Bankr. D. Conn. Mar. 18, 2005) (Docket No. 294).
262. See id. at 3 paras. 8 & 9; CT DEP Hazardous Waste Motion, supra note 254, at 3-4
paras. 6 & 8.
263. See Docket, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn.
May 12, 2005) (indicating "Hearing Oft' on both CT DEP's and Old Farms's motions in docket
notation).
264. See Trustee Objection, supra note 259, at 1 paras. 1, 2, & 3 (expressing doubt as to
debtor's ability to satisfy claims of creditors).
265. See State of Del., Dep't of State Div. of Corps., Accessing Corporate Information,
http://www.corp.delaware.gov/directweb.shtml (last visited Apr. 1, 2008) [hereinafter Del.
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conducted business in Connecticut, sent a notice of resignation of agent to the
Connecticut Secretary of State on November 2, 2005.266 It is unlikely, then,
that either CT DEP or the EPA recovered any portion of their claims for
damages stemming from TCL's environmental violations.
b. New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC
On April 29, 2004, New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC (NHRP), which
operated a "tire waste-to-energy facility 2 67 in the Village of Ford Heights,
Illinois (Ford Heights facility), petitioned, once again, for relief under Chapter
11 in the bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware.268 A little over eight
years earlier, in March 1996, NHRP had filed its first Chapter I I petition.269
NHRP attributed its first Chapter 11 filing to amendments to the Illinois
Retail Rate Law, which "provided that Illinois utility companies... purchase
electricity produced from qualified facilities, including those combusting waste
tires, at rates in excess of market prices ... in exchange for certain tax credits
from the State of Illinois., 270 The 1996 amendments to the Retail Rate Law
"eliminated waste tire combustion facilities from the definition of facilities that
would qualify under the Retail Rate Law.",271 Therefore, ComEd, an NHRP
customer, notified NHRP that it no longer intended to pay the above-market
Corps. Website] (on file with the Washington and Lee Law Review). The State of Delaware
charges $10 per search to verify the status of a company registered in Delaware. Id. A copy of
TCL's status report is on file with the authors.
266. See State of Conn., Sec'y of State, Filing History, http://www.concord-
sots.ct.gov/CONCORD/InquiryServlet?eid=23&businesslD=0643913 (last visited Apr. 1, 2008)
(indicating that TCL had filed a notice of resignation of agent on November 2, 2005) (on file
with the Washington and Lee Law Review). Although listed as "active" on the Connecticut
Secretary of State's website, the firm has not filed an annual report since July 23, 2003. Id.
267. Disclosure Statement for First Amended Liquidating Plan of New Heights Recovery
& Power, LLC at 3, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del.
Sept. 23, 2004) (Docket No. 166) [hereinafter NHRP Disclosure].
268. Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-
11277 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 29, 2004) (Docket No. 1).
269. NHRP Disclosure, supra note 267, at 4 (stating that the debtor "filed a petition for
relief under Chapter 11 of the United States Bankruptcy Code on March 26, 1996"). At the time
of its first Chapter 11 filing, the debtor was known as CGE Ford Heights, LLC. Id. at 3. CGE
reorganized under its confirmed Chapter 11 plan and emerged from bankruptcy as New Heights
Recovery & Power, LLC. Id. at 4.
270. Id. at 4.
271. Id.
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rate for generated electricity.272 The losses caused by selling electricity at lower
rates resulted in the debtor's March 1996 Chapter 11 filing.273
The 1996 amendments to the Illinois Retail Rate Law, however, also
contributed indirectly to the filing of NHRP's 2004 Chapter 1 1 petition. 274 In
1998, the debtor emerged from its first bankruptcy with a confirmed plan, but it
still was involved in costly breach-of-contract litigation with ComEd.275 While
the ComEd case wended its way through the Illinois state court system, a high-
pressure turbine at the facility failed.276  The debtor lacked the funds ($2
million) to repair the turbine, due in part to the drain on its resources from the
continuing ComEd litigation.2 77 Therefore, NHRP stopped operations at the
Ford Heights facility.278  Doing so caused the tire shred inventory to
accumulate. 279 Therefore, in mid-April 2004, when the Village of Ford Heights
shut off the debtor's water supply due to its failure to pay its water bill, the
Village's Fire Department sent a shutdown notice to the firm; the lack of water
posed a serious hazard in the event that the tire shred inventory caught fire.28 °
At about the same time, the Illinois Environmental Protection Agency (IEPA)
also issued a notice of violation (NOV) to NHRP, detailing nine violations
related to the tire shred and tire inventory at the debtor's facility.2 8' In order to
get its water service reconnected and to avoid the disconnection of other
utilities--CornEd had threatened to turn off electric service due to nonpayment
of bills-the debtor filed for Chapter 11 at the end of April 2004.282
272. See id. ("Debtor was informed by its customer, CornEd, that CornEd would no longer
pay the higher rate.").
273. See id. ("Ford Heights was no longer able to operate the Facility without significant
losses.").
274. See id. at 6-8 (explaining the indirect effects of the amendments-inability to pay
utility bills leading to a shutdown notice-that led to bankruptcy).
275. Id. at 6-7. The parties had a twenty-year contract for the purchase of electricity at the
rate prescribed by the pre-amendment Retail Rate Law. See Motion in Aid of (A) Sale of
Substantially All the Assets of the Estate Pursuant to Confirmed First Amended Liquidating
Plan; (B) Final Distribution of Net Proceeds of Such Sale; & (C) Entry of a Final Decree at 2
para. 6, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del. Feb. 23,
2005) (Docket No. 235) [hereinafter NHRP Sale Motion].






282. Id. at 7-8.
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Six months later, on October 26, 2004, the bankruptcy court approved
NHRP's liquidating plan.283 NHRP's plan provided for the liquidation of all of
the firm's assets, the resignation of its current board and officers on the plan's
effective date, the creation of a four-person uncompensated board to oversee
the liquidation of the debtor's assets, and the winding up of the debtor's
business.284 After emerging from bankruptcy, NHRP, which was incorporated
in Delaware, filed a certificate of cancellation with the State of Delaware
Division of Corporations, thereby terminating its legal existence.285
The debtor's plan, however, specifically provided for full remediation of
the environmental issues identified by the IEPA in its April 2004 NOV.2 86
NHRP along with Grace Brothers, Ltd. and Casella Waste Systems, Inc., which
held substantial equity positions in NHRP,287 jointly proposed the firm's
liquidating plan.288 As the plan's proponents, they agreed to fund the plan by
contributing $1 million each on the plan's effective date, with some portion of
that contribution set aside to fulfill NHRP's environmental obligations at the
Ford Heights facility.289 The confirmed plan provided for the removal of "all
existing tires or tire shred" from the Ford Heights facility by December 31,
2004, and the segregation of a portion of the plan contribution to ensure
sufficient funding to bring the facility "into compliance with all relevant
environmental laws., 290  In exchange, so long as the debtor satisfied its
283. Order Confirming First Amended Liquidating Plan for New Heights Recovery &
Power, LLC, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del. Oct.
26, 2004) (Docket No. 193) [hereinafter NHRP Confirmation Order].
284. NHRP Disclosure, supra note 267, at 20-21.
285. Del. Corps. Website, supra note 265. A copy of the status report for NHRP is on file
with the authors.
286. See NHRP Disclosure, supra note 267, at 23 ("As part of the Plan, the Debtor has
proposed to cure any and all violations as set forth in the Compliance Commitment Proposal...
or as otherwise agreed between the Debtor and the IEPA.").
287. List of Equity Security Holders at 1, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No.
04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 29, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition). NH Investors,
LLC, c/o Casella Waste Systems, Inc., owned 7,963,500 shares and Grace Brothers, Ltd. held
another 3,574,000 shares. See id at 1. Grace Funding Partners LP held 3,955,500 shares; the
remaining 33 members of the firm had ownership interests ranging from 2,500 to 91,500 shares.
See id. at 1-4.
288. See First Amended Liquidating Plan for New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC at 1,
In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del. Sept. 22, 2004)
(Docket No. 164) [hereinafter NHRP Plan] (listing proponents of the plan).
289. Id. at 12-13.
290. NHRP Disclosure, supra note 267, at 10; see also NHRP Plan, supra note 288, at 15-
16. Neither the plan nor the disclosure statement specifically addressed the various notices,
listed in Question 17(a) of the SFA, issued by the Metropolitan Water Reclamation District of
Greater Chicago. See Statement of Financial Affairs at 11, Q.1 7(a), In re New Heights
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environmental obligations under the plan, the debtor, Grace Brothers, and
Casella each would obtain a broad release of liability for themselves and their
"officers, directors, employees, shareholders, affiliates, and agents.., from any
and all claims and causes of action of any kind or nature whatsoever, whether
known or unknown, by the IEPA for environmental matters on the Debtor's
facility in Ford Heights, Illinois.,
291
In its motion seeking, in part, entry of a final decree in its bankruptcy case,
NHRP represented to the court that the IEPA had "indicated to the Debtor that
the tire-shred at issue during the beginning of th[e] bankruptcy case had been
resolved to the IEPA's satisfaction."292 The bankruptcy court for the District of
Delaware granted the debtor's motion and entered a final decree in NHRP's
case on January 3, 2006.293 Therefore, even though NHRP filed for bankruptcy
due in part to its environmental problems, it apparently had remedied those
problems by the time that its bankruptcy case closed in early 2006.
c. JVH Trucking, Inc.
On January 29, 2004, JVH Trucking, Inc. filed its voluntary petition for
relief under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code in the bankruptcy court for the
Northern District of Illinois.294 JVH was a small hauling business, with assets
totaling approximately $59 1,000.295 Joseph J. Vanden Houten was the sole
shareholder, as well as the firm's president and a director.296
JVH filed for bankruptcy "to stay the actions of its secured creditors from
repossessing its rolling stock" or inventory of vehicles,297 but its financial
Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del. May 27,2004) (Docket No. 69) (listing
ten notices from July 19, 2000, through February 6, 2004, for issues such as excess zinc and
mercury). Apart from filing a proof of claim for $4,074.52 for "user charges," the district did
not otherwise participate in the NHRP bankruptcy case. See Claim No. 15, Claims Register, In
re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del. July 19, 2004)
(showing the district's filing for user charges).
291. NHRP Confirmation Order, supra note 283, at 4 para. 8.
292. NHRP Sale Motion, supra note 275, at 5 para. 16.
293. See Final Decree & Order Closing Chapter 11 Case of New Heights Recovery &
Power, LLC at 1, In re New Heights Recovery & Power, LLC, No. 04-11277 (Bankr. D. Del.
Jan. 3, 2006) (Docket No. 275).
294. Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-03344 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. Jan. 29, 2004) (Docket No. 1).
295. JVH Summary, supra note 227.
296. See Statement of Financial Affairs-Amended at 7, In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-
03344 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Mar. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 64).
297. Debtor's Second Amended Disclosure Statement at 6, In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No.
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problems dated back three and a half years to the fall of 2001. In its disclosure
statement, JVH stated that the tragic events of September 11, 2001 had led to a
"substantial downturn in [the] trucking business," resulting in loss of firm
revenue. 29  In March 2003, the State of Illinois sued both the firm and the
Village of Antioch, Illinois, for damages caused by JVH's release of "ferric
chloride solution into the [publicly owned treatment works at Antioch] and
ultimately into Sequoit Creek., 299 JVH corrected the damage done by the spill
prior to filing for bankruptcy; nonetheless, the firm remained liable for civil
penalties for violating Illinois environmental laws.300
During its bankruptcy case, JVH entered into a consent order with the
State of Illinois to pay civil penalties of $36,250 related to the spill, with
payment due when distributions were made under JVH's liquidating plan.30 1
The consent order called for JVH to pay $27,187.50 of the civil penalties to the
Illinois EPA, and $9,062.50 to the treasurer for Lake County, where Antioch is
located.30 2 The order also required JVH, in the event that it recovered costs
associated with the spill, to reimburse the Illinois EPA and the Illinois
Department of Natural Resources for response costs. 30 3 Finally, because JVH
intended to liquidate its business assets in Chapter 11, the consent order
provided that a "change in ownership, corporate status or operator [did not]
alter" the firm's obligations under the order.3°
JVH proposed a liquidating plan, and on June 15, 2004, the bankruptcy
court approved its motion to sell the inventory of vehicles used in its hauling
business.30 5 But, in late October 2004, the bankruptcy court denied approval of
JVH's disclosure statement.30 6 At the same time, the United States Trustee
04-03344 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 23, 2004) (Docket No. 158) [hereinafter JVH Disclosure].
298. Id. at 5. The debtor stated that the downturn occurred "[a]fter September 11, 2002."
Id. We assume that 2002 was a typographical error.
299. JVH Trucking, Inc.'s Motion to Approve the Consent Order at exhibit A, at 4 para. 2.
In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-03344 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. July 29, 2004) (Docket No. 152)
(hereinafter JVH Consent Order]. On August 16, 2004, the bankruptcy court granted the
debtor's motion. See Order Granting Motion to Approve Consent Decree, at 1, In re VH
Trucking, Inc., No. 04-03344 (Bankr. N.D. Ill. Aug. 16,2004) (Docket No. 154) ("The debtor is
authorized to execute and consummate the terms of the Consent Decree.").
300. JVH Disclosure, supra note 297, at 6.
301. JVH Consent Order, supra note 299, at 10-11 exhibit A para. VIII.A.I.a.
302. Id. at 11 exhibit A paras. VIII.A. 1.b & VII.A. 1.c.
303. See generally id. at 12-13 exhibit A paras. VIII.B.2 & VIII.B.3.
304. Id. at 9 exhibit A para. IV.B.
305. Order at 1, In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-03344 (Bankr. N.D. I11. June 16, 2004)
(Docket No. 143) (granting JVH Trucking's motion for sale of property).
306. Order, In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-03344 (Bankr. N.D. I11. Oct. 21, 2004)
(Docket No. 166).
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moved to dismiss or convert the Chapter 11 case.307 The U.S. Trustee argued
that there was a low probability of confirming a Chapter 11 plan, given the
amount of priority debt owed.308 In addition, JVH had failed to submit
operating reports and to timely pay the U.S. Trustee's quarterly fees.309 On
December 13, 2004, the bankruptcy court granted the U.S. Trustee's motion
and dismissed JVH's Chapter 11 case.310
So, what happened to the civil penalties that the State of Illinois claimed
that JVH owed? It is likely that the State of Illinois proved unable to collect the
$36,250 in civil penalties from JVH. The firm did not pay the penalties during
the bankruptcy case, because the parties' consent order contemplated payment
from distributions made pursuant to the liquidating plan,31' and a plan was not
confirmed. Moreover, JVH is no longer a corporation in good standing in the
State of Illinois. According to the Illinois Secretary of State's website, JVH
Trucking was involuntarily dissolved, effective February 2, 2004-three days
after JVH had petitioned for relief under Chapter 11.312
d. Gopher State Ethanol, LLC
Gopher State Ethanol, LLC (GSE) filed for relief under Chapter 11 in the
bankruptcy court for the District of Minnesota on August 11, 2004. 3 13 The firm
had one member, Bruce Hendry, who also served as the company's chairman of
the board.3 14 At the time of the bankruptcy filing, the firm's assets totaled a
little more than $12 million.
315
307. Notice of Motion and U.S. Trustee's Motion to Convert or Dismiss Case, In re JVH
Trucking, Inc., No. 04-03344 (Bankr. N.D. I11. Oct. 21, 2004) (Docket No. 168) [hereinafter
JVH Motion to Dismiss].
308. Id. at 1. According to the debtor's summary of schedules, unsecured, priority claims
constituted 37% of JVH's total liabilities-$470,000 of $1,260,712.81 in total liabilities. See
JVH Summary, supra note 227, at 1.
309. JVH Motion to Dismiss, supra note 307, at 1.
310. Order Dismissing Chapter 11, In re JVH Trucking, Inc., No. 04-03344 (Bankr. N.D.
Ill. Dec. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 186).
311. JVH Consent Order, supra note 299, at 10-11 exhibit A para. VIII.A.1.a.
312. See generally Corporation File Detail Report, CyberDrivelllinois, http://www.ilsos.
gov/corporatellc/CorporateLlcController (last visited July 26, 2007) (on file with the
Washington and Lee Law Review).
313. Chapter 1 1 Voluntary Petition, In re Gopher State Ethanol, LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D.
Minn. Aug. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 1).
314. Statement of Financial Affairs at 10, In re Gopher State Ethanol, LLC, No. 04-34706
(Bankr. D. Minn. Aug. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition) [hereinafter Gopher SFA].
315. Summary of Schedules, In re Gopher State Ethanol LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn.
Aug. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition).
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GSE listed the following four government entities under Question 17 of
the SFA: (1) the City of St. Paul; (2) Metropolitan Council Environmental
Services; (3) the Minnesota Pollution Control Agency (MPCA); and (4) the
U.S. EPA.3 16 The environmental issues included wastewater pretreatment
standards under the Clean Water Act; 317 air quality issues under the Clean Air
Act;318 releases related to air and storm water permits; 319 and air emissions,
pollution control, and odor mitigation320 problems related to operation of the
debtor's ethanol plant. With one exception, however, the debtor did not list
any of these four government entities on its schedules. The City of St. Paul was
listed on Schedule F as an unsecured, nonpriority creditor in the amount of $ 10
for "goods and services, '321 but that listing was unrelated to any environmental
claims that the City had against GSE.322 As a result, it appears that because the
government entities, with the exception of the City of St. Paul, were not
scheduled, the debtor did not list them on its creditor mailing matrix and,
therefore, none received formal notice of the debtor's bankruptcy case.
The fact that none of the government agencies appeared on GSE's
schedules suggests that the environmental issues listed under Question 17 of
the SFA did not involve monetary obligations. The debtor must list its secured,
unsecured priority, and unsecured nonpriority claims in Schedules D, E, and F,
respectively.323 But, if the government agencies did not have a claim against
the estate, then GSE did not have to schedule them.324 For example, on
316. Gopher SFA, supra note 314, at 7, Q.17(a)-(c).
317. Water Pollution Prevention and Control, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000); see Gopher SFA,
supra note 314, at 7 (listing 2004 notices from the Metropolitan Council Environmental
Services related to wastewater pretreatment standards).
318. Air Prevention and Control, 42 U.S.C. §§ 7401-7671 (2000); see also Gopher SFA,
supra note 314, at 7 (listing 2004 notice regarding air quality compliance inspection).
319. See Gopher SFA, supra note 314, at 7 (listing three notices by debtor to Minnesota
Pollution Control Agency in 2001 and 2002 related to ethanol, ammonia, and ethanol mash
releases).
320. See id. (listing a 2001 judicial proceeding by City of St. Paul against debtor for odor
and noise mitigation, and a 2002 lawsuit by U.S. EPA for air emissions and pollution control).
321. Schedule F at 4, In re Gopher State Ethanol LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn.
Aug. 11, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition).
322. The City's inclusion on the schedules is unrelated to the 2003 Stipulation and Order
that resolved the City's odor nuisance suit against GSE. See Debtor's First Amended Disclosure
Statement at 7 para. 2.1, In re Gopher State Ethanol LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn. June
22, 2005) (Docket No. 108) [hereinafter Gopher Disclosure Statement].
323. Official Form 6, reprinted in BANKRUPTCY CODE, RULES AND FORMs 685,695-703
(2007).
324. See supra notes 117-21 and accompanying text (discussing the Bankruptcy Code's
definition of a claim).
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September 29, 2003 the court entered a Stipulation and Order against GSE,
thereby resolving the City of St. Paul's odor nuisance suit against the debtor.325
That stipulation did not require GSE to pay damages or fines 326 and, thus, no
claim arose, as defined under the Bankruptcy Code.
Nonetheless, the City of St. Paul had an interest in GSE's bankruptcy,
because it disagreed with the debtor's representations to the court that the
debtor was in compliance with the 2003 Stipulation and Order.327 Likewise,
both the EPA and the MPCA may have had an interest in the debtor's
bankruptcy case. In 2001, the EPA and the MPCA entered into a consent
decree with GSE to settle an enforcement action related to emissions from the
debtor's ethanol plant; the parties amended that decree in 2003 .328 GSE
represented to the bankruptcy court that it was in compliance with the consent
decree; 329 if that were not the case, either the EPA or the MPCA may have
brought that matter to the bankruptcy court's attention. Moreover, unlike the
325. See Stipulation & Order, City of St. Paul v. Gopher State Ethanol, LLC, No. C 1-02-
9083 (Minn. Dist. Ct. Sept. 26, 2003), in Response of City of St. Paul to Motion for Order
Authorizing Post-Petition Financing & Use of Cash Collateral, In re Gopher State Ethanol LLC,
No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2005) (Docket No. 57).
326. See id. at 3-13 (outlining the steps that GSE was required to take to remedy the
situation; the remedy does not include any monetary payment).
327. Compare Notice of Hearing & Motion for Order Authorizing Post-Petition Financing
& Use of Cash Collateral at 3 para. 14, In re Gopher State Ethanol, LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr.
D. Minn. Dec. 20, 2004) (Docket No. 53) [hereinafter GSE Financing Motion] (stating that
"[d]ebtor had achieved complete compliance with the terms of the settlement with the City and
neighborhood interveners"), with Response of City of St. Paul to Motion for Order Authorizing
Post-Petition Financing & Use of Cash Collateral at 1 para. 2, In re Gopher State Ethanol, LLC,
No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn. Jan. 3, 2005) (Docket No. 57) (disputing "the statements
contained in paragraph 14 of the Motion regarding Debtor's compliance with various court
orders concerning emissions from the Debtor's ethanol plant").
328. Gopher Disclosure Statement, supra note 322, at 7. There is no entry on the docket
for the consent decree among GSE, the EPA, and the MPCA, no doubt because neither
government agency participated in the bankruptcy case. An unsigned and undated version of
the decree is online on the web page for the MPCA. See generally Amended Consent Decree,
United States v. Gopher State Ethanol, LLC, No. 02-CV-3793 (D. Minn. 2003), http://www.
pca.state.mn.us/hot/gopherstate/gopherstate-consentdecree-602470-vl.pdf [hereinafter Gopher
Consent Decree]. We contacted the Region 5 office of the EPA to inquire about the consent
decree. Cynthia King, regional counsel for the Region 5 Chicago office, left a message with our
research assistant stating that as a result of GSE's bankruptcy case the parties would have to
sign a stipulation to terminate the decree. See Telephone Message from Cynthia King, Regional
Counsel, U.S. EPA Region 5, to Kimberly A. Petta (Aug. 16, 2007) (notes on file with authors).
329. GSE Financing Motion, supra note 327, at 3 para. 14 (stating that GSE "had satisfied
the requirements of the EPA/MPCA consent decree, as amended"). While the City of St. Paul
challenged the debtor's statements, it did so in the context of the stipulation it had entered into
with GSE. See Gopher Consent Decree, supra note 328, at 1 (challenging GSE's statement that
it had complied with various court orders).
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St. Paul stipulation, the EPA and MPCA consent decree imposed a penalty of
$18,904 against GSE.330 While GSE may have paid the penalty pre-petition, if
it did not do so, then both the EPA and MPCA had a claim against the debtor's
estate.33" '
On November 10, 2005, the bankruptcy court confirmed GSE's plan of
reorganization,332 which contained two critical components: (1) the sale of
GSE's assets, with the exception of ethanol production rights and permits;
333
and (2) a subsequent merger of GS Acquisition, Inc., a wholly-owned
subsidiary of Granite Falls Energy, LLC, into GSE, with GSE as the surviving
entity.334 Granite Falls Energy formed GS Acquisition for the express purpose
of effectuating the merger,335 and prior to the plan's effective date, Granite
Falls "lease[d] to GS [Acquisition] the operating assets and business of its
ethanol facility., 336 Therefore, even though GSE sold both its real and personal
property, including its ethanol production equipment, during the bankruptcy
case, it remained in the ethanol production business post-confirmation, albeit as
a wholly-owned subsidiary of Granite Falls Energy, LLC.
e. Turbine Chrome Services, Inc.
On June 14, 2004, Turbine Chrome Services, Inc., (TCS) filed for
protection under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code.337 TCS was a small
330. Gopher Consent Decree, supra note 328, at 24-25 para. 33.
331. The penalty was due within 30 days of the entry of the decree. Id. In addition, the
consent decree provided for stipulated penalties, to be divided 50/50 by the EPA and the
MPCA, for continuing violations of the decree's emission standards and other requirements. Id.
at para. 37.
332. Order & Notice Confirming Plan & Fixing Time Limits, In re Gopher State Ethanol
LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn. Nov. 10, 2005) (Docket No. 124).
333. See Gopher Disclosure Statement, supra note 322, at 3 (explaining the sale of certain
GSE assets). Apparently, GSE's producer payments were the reason that Granite Falls was
interested in the merger. Minnesota created "producer payments" when the ethanol business
"was in its infancy as a way to induce farmers and others to invest in what was then viewed as a
risky venture." The Great Corn Rush: State Taxpayers Get a Share of Ethanol Production Bill,
STAR TRIBUNE, Sept. 24, 2006, at 19A. "Granite Falls Energy, a newer plant that didn't qualify
for state producer payments, merged with bankrupt Gopher State Ethanol of St. Paul in hopes of
collecting the defunct plant's payments, which were scheduled to last until 2010." Id.
334. Gopher Disclosure Statement, supra note 322, at 3.
335. See Debtor's Modified Plan of Reorganization at exhibit A at 1, In re Gopher State
Ethanol LLC, No. 04-34706 (Bankr. D. Minn. June 22, 2005) (Docket No. 109) (describing GS
Acquisition, Inc. as "a yet-to-be formed Minnesota company").
336. Id. at exhibit A at 8 para. 5.2.
337. See Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition, In re Turbine Chrome Servs., Inc., No. 04-38465
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operation-"an old fashioned 'job shop' machine shop"338-run by a husband-
and-wife team. At the time of the bankruptcy filing, it had assets slightly in
excess of $1.1 million339 and sixteen employees.34°
TCS previously had filed for Chapter 11 in 1997, apparently due to tax
obligations.3 41 The debtor emerged from bankruptcy in 1999 with a confirmed
plan.342 That plan failed, however, largely due to the cleanup costs associated
with a heavy metal spill that occurred in 2000 at the debtor's place of
business.343 Cleanup costs associated with the spill approached $500,000,
which "caused the Debtor to default on the payments provided for in th[e] plan
and to incur additional liability to the Internal Revenue Service.
344
In its 2004 bankruptcy case, the debtor had two environmental claimants,
only one of which was a governmental entity.345 The City of Houston held an
unsecured, nonpriority claim against the debtor for approximately $25,000
based on a 2002 Compromise and Settlement Agreement related to
environmental cleanup at the debtor's place of business.
346
On April 7, 2005, less than a year after petitioning for relief under Chapter
11, the bankruptcy court confirmed the debtor's plan of reorganization. 347 The
plan left intact the $666 per month payment schedule from the debtor's 2002
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. June 14, 2004) (Docket No. 1).
338. Original Disclosure Statement at 5, In re Turbine Chrome Servs., Inc., No. 04-38465
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 14,2004) (Docket No. 35) [hereinafter Turbine Disclosure Statement].
339. Summary of Schedules, In re Turbine Chrome Servs., Inc. No. 04-38465 (Bankr. S.D.
Tex. Dec. 14, 2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition).
340. Turbine Disclosure Statement, supra note 338, at 5.




345. The debtor also owed more than $373,000 to Eagle Construction & Environmental
Services, L.P., a private firm specializing in environmental remediation. See Agreed Order on
Motion for Relief From the Automatic Stay or, In the Alternative, for Adequate Protection at
para. 6, In re Turbine Chrome Servs., Inc., No. 04-38465 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Feb. 23, 2005)
(Docket No. 50). The debtor's plan provided for the payment in full of Eagle's secured claim
over a ten-year period of time at an annual compound interest rate of 8%. See Second Amended
Plan of Reorganization at 6 para. 4.1.3, In re Turbine Chrome Servs., Inc., No. 04-38465
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2005) (Docket No. 73) [hereinafter Turbine Plan].
346. See Claims Register, Claim No. 15, In re Turbine Chrome Servs., Inc., No. 04-38465
(Bankr. S.D. Tex. Dec. 7, 2004) [hereinafter Claim No. 15] (listing an unsecured claim for
$25,333.48 as filed by John Helms on behalf of the City of Houston); see also Turbine
Disclosure Statement, supra note 338, at 9 para. 9.3.7 (discussing the method of paying off the
Allowed Unsecured Claims).
347. Order Confirming Second Amended Chapter 11 Plan, In re Turbine Chrome Servs.,
Inc., No. 04-38465 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Apr. 7, 2005) (Docket No. 73).
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Compromise and Settlement Agreement with the City of Houston.34 8 As of the
writing of this Article, the debtor had not filed again for bankruptcy, either
under Chapter 1 1 or Chapter 7, at least in the Southern District of Texas.
349
2. What the Cases Tell Us
Five of the firms in our sample disclosed that environmental liabilities
played some role in their decision to file for relief under Chapter 11. But, did
the Bankruptcy Code provide these five debtors with the ability to shift the
costs of environmental remediation from firm coffers to the public purse? We
conclude that, by and large, the Bankruptcy Code did not do so. In three of the
five cases, the debtor either had resolved or settled its environmental problems
before the bankruptcy case closed, or promised to do so in its plan of
reorganization or liquidation. Therefore, the debtor assumed responsibility for
its environmental violations.
In both the New Heights Recovery and the Turbine Chrome bankruptcy
cases, the debtor emerged from Chapter 11 with a confirmed plan that fully
addressed the environmental violations that led, in part, to their bankruptcy
filings. In New Heights, the debtor's plan provided for remediation of the
violations related to the tire and tire-shred inventory at the debtor's plant.350 In
fact, by the time that the debtor's bankruptcy case had closed, the Illinois EPA
was satisfied that the "tire-shred at issue during the beginning of th[e]
bankruptcy case had been resolved. 351 In Turbine Chrome, the debtor
emerged from bankruptcy much as it had entered bankruptcy-agreeing to pay
more than $25,000 to the City of Houston for environmental cleanup costs.
352
While bankruptcy delayed payment on the principal balance owed to the City of
Houston, it did not reduce or eliminate the debtor's responsibility for that
payment.
JVH Trucking, on the other hand, did not confirm a Chapter 11 plan. But,
during its bankruptcy case, it entered into a consent decree with the State of
348. Compare Turbine Plan, supra note 345, at 7 para. 4.1.5, with Claim No. 15, supra
note 346, at exhibit A.
349. C.A. Parrish, the owner of TCS, and his wife, Elsie, who ran the business with him,
filed for relief under Chapter 13 on November 10, 2004. The bankruptcy court for the Southern
District of Texas confirmed their Chapter 13 plan on September 30, 2005. See In re Parrish,
No. 04-46168 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. Nov. 10, 2004).
350. See supra notes 267-85 and accompanying text (describing the facts of New Heights).
351. NHRP Sale Motion, supra note 275, at 5 para. 16.
352. See supra note 348 and accompanying text (noting that Turbine Chrome remained
responsible for a $666.66 per month payment schedule to the City of Houston after bankruptcy).
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Illinois to pay a civil penalty of $36,250 related to the firm's spill of ferric
chloride solution.353 While it appears that the firm dissolved before paying that
penalty, JVH had remedied the environmental damage done as a result of the
spill even before filing its petition for relief under Chapter 11.
354
In two cases-Technical Coatings Laboratory (TCL) and Gopher State
Ethanol (GSE)-the debtor's conduct proved more controversial. In TCL, the
debtor omitted significant potential environmental liabilities, totaling more than
$64 million, from its schedules.355 During its bankruptcy case, the debtor did
not reach a settlement with either the CT DEP or the EPA, and it appears that
neither agency collected any money from the debtor. During the bankruptcy
case, the court approved the debtor's motion to sell substantially all of its
assets; doing so left nothing for unsecured creditors, such as the environmental
agencies.356 With no assets and no continuing operations, the debtor could not
pay its environmental creditors, even after emerging from bankruptcy.
357
But, would CT DEP and the EPA have been in a different position had
TCL not petitioned for relief under Chapter 11? TCL could have dissolved its
business after having sold its personal property (or had the property
repossessed) outside of bankruptcy; the firm owned no real property.358 After
paying off its largest and only secured creditor--Citizens Bank of
Connecticut-$134,006 would have remained.359 Of course, the firm could
have used that money to remove the 800 drums of hazardous waste at its Avon,
Connecticut facility before closing down its operations, 360 but there is no
guarantee that TCL would have done so. In fact, even while under the
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court, the firm's owners apparently failed to
353. Supra notes 301-04 and accompanying text.
354. Supra note 300 and accompanying text.
355. See supra notes 239-49 and accompanying text (detailing the liability claims made by
the CT DEP and the EPA).
356. See supra notes 256-59 and accompanying text (noting that no assets remained to pay
the CT DEP and the EPA after the sale of TCL's personal property).
357. See supra notes 260-66 and accompanying text (describing the effect that TCL's
going out of business had on the EPA and CT DEP claims).
358. Schedule A, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn.
Aug. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 103).
359. Schedule D, In re Technical Coatings Lab., LLC, No. 04-22105 (Bankr. D. Conn.
Aug. 13, 2004) (Docket No. 103).
360. See CT DEP Hazardous Waste Motion, supra note 254, at 2 para. 3 (stating that
because debtor was going out of business it had to "perform 'generator closure' of its facility
pursuant to the Connecticut Hazardous Waste Management Regulations").
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comply with the requirements of Connecticut law with regard to closure of the
firm's facility.
361
More importantly, however, TCL did not emerge from Chapter 11 "leaner
and meaner" and ready to carry on with business as usual, having foisted onto
the taxpayer the costs of its environmental cleanup. The firm went out of
business.362 The impression created, however, is that the debtor got "away with
something. 3 63  Of course, when the debtor fails to schedule significant
environmental liabilities and uses Chapter 11 to liquidate without informing the
bankruptcy court or filing a plan of liquidation,364 that impression is reinforced.
But, the reality is that TCL had few unencumbered assets and potentially
massive environmental liability.165 Liquidation was likely, either inside or
outside of bankruptcy. Had TCL listed CT DEP or the EPA as creditors on its
schedules, the U.S. Trustee likely would have moved early in the case to
dismiss or convert, because reorganization was not feasible. In that event,
however, the result would have been much the same-no recovery for CT DEP
or the EPA, and the shifting of TCL's environmental cleanup costs to the
taxpayer.
What about the GSE bankruptcy case? Unlike TCL, GSE did emerge
from bankruptcy as a going concern, albeit as a wholly-owned subsidiary of
another company, Granite Falls Energy. While it is unclear whether GSE
avoided paying penalties owed to the EPA and the MPCA, the City of St. Paul
asserted that GSE had not complied with the terms of the parties' stipulation.
Should the debtor's failure to comply with the stipulation (or possibly the
consent decree) have precluded it from reorganizing under Chapter 11 ?
On the one hand, GSE's ethanol facility had polluted the air. Simply
because it had stopped polluting when it ceased operations does not mean that
it had not caused harm to the environment. On the other hand, however, the
reorganization likely stopped the continued pollution from GSE's plant. GSE
could not afford to make the minimum modifications to its ethanol facility
361. See id. at 2 para. 3 & at 3 para. 6 (noting that it had come to the attention of the
Connecticut DEP that Technical Coatings was going out of business, and that the agency's
attempts "to obtain firm assurances from the debtor that it [would] address the[] generator
closure items" had been "unsuccessful"); see also TCL Dismissal Motion, supra note 254, at 1-
2 paras. 5 & 7 (noting that while the debtor was shutting down operations, it had "not reported
this officially to the Court or the [U.S. Trustee]" and that "[t]he Court ha[d] not approved any
plan of liquidation [and] the debtor ha[d] not even filed a plan of reorganization which
contemplate[d] liquidation").
362. See supra notes 254-56 (describing the liquidation of TCL).
363. See Heidt, supra note 3, at 125.




mandated by the stipulation entered into with the City of St. Paul.3 6 6 GSE sold
its real and personal property during the bankruptcy case; a Minnesota brewery
purchased the real property while a Kansas limited liability company bought the
ethanol production equipment. Since a brewery purchased the real property,
it is likely that post-confirmation the facility no longer operated as an ethanol
production plant, and the malodorous and polluting emissions from GSE's
ethanol production ceased.368 Moreover, because GSE remained in the ethanol
production business, albeit as a wholly owned subsidiary of Granite Falls, it
still had to comply with the requirements of state and federal law with regard to
its operation of the Granite Falls' ethanol production facility.
Furthermore, GSE discharged no claim owed, at least to the City of St.
Paul, because it owed the city no damages, penalties, or fines.369 In addition,
GSE owed no compensatory damages to either the EPA or the MPCA. If either
agency had a claim for pre-petition penalties against the debtor, confirmation of
the debtor's plan would not necessarily relieve the debtor of its obligation to
pay that claim; discharge would depend on whether the agencies had notice of
the debtor's bankruptcy case. 37° But, if GSE owed no damages, fines, or
penalties to any of the environmental agencies or governmental units listed in
Question 17 of the SFA, then no debt was discharged in its bankruptcy case.
Therefore, we conclude that the outcome in GSE was a rational one. The
firm could not afford to bring its facility into compliance with the stipulation.
Liquidation of the firm, either in Chapter 7 or Chapter 11, was possible but
meant that the firm would go out of business. The reorganization preserved the
business while stopping the pollution. Moreover, apart from any possible
penalties owed to the EPA or the MPCA, GSE did not pass the costs of
environmental cleanup to the taxpayer.
D. The Bankruptcy "Loophole": Abandonment and Discharge
366. See Gopher Disclosure Statement, supra note 322, at 7 (noting that the settlement with
the City "required Debtor to take expensive remediation measures and make significant capital
improvements in its facility").
367. Id. at 9 para. 2.3.
368. There is no indication anywhere in the case about the status of the March 2004 notice
by the Metropolitan Council Environmental Services to the debtor regarding the wastewater
pretreatment standards. See Gopher SFA, supra note 314, at 7, Q.17(a).
369. See supra note 328 and accompanying text (describing the terms of the Gopher State
consent decree).
370. See 3 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY, supra note 163, 342.02 (describing the Bankruptcy
Code provision precluding debt discharge if a creditor had insufficient notice to file a proof of
claim or a complaint challenging dischargeability).
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1. Introduction
Of the seventy-one cases that possibly had ongoing environmental liability
at the time of the bankruptcy filing, forty-one emerged from bankruptcy with a
confirmed plan (the "confirmed-plan cases"). That number, however,
overstates the true level of plan confirmation because twenty of those forty-one
cases were part of four separate jointly administered cases with joint plans of
reorganization or liquidation. 371  Thus, for purposes of counting plan
confirmations, it is more accurate to say that twenty-five of the seventy-one
cases resulted in a confirmed Chapter 11 plan.372
For the ensuing discussion on abandonment and discharge, we examined
only the confirmed-plan cases. The reason for doing so is that a debtor in
Chapter 1 1 does not obtain a discharge if it fails to confirm a plan.
3 73
Moreover, abandonment really only works for confirmed liquidating plans in
Chapter 11. 374 It makes little sense, then, to analyze the impact of the discharge
or the abandonment power in the context of cases dismissed out of Chapter 11
prior to plan confirmation.
2. The Abandonment Power
Not surprisingly, our data indicate that abandonment of contaminated
property in Chapter 11 is an extremely rare event. In only four of the
confirmed-plan cases did the debtor file a motion for abandonment of property.
Moreover, in three of those four cases, the motions dealt with the abandonment
of uncontaminated personal property, as opposed to polluted real property.375
371. See Joint Plan of Reorganization of US Airways, Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors and
Debtors-in-Possession, In reUS Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819 (Bankr. E.D. Va. June 30,2005)
(Docket No. 2339) (covering two cases with environmental disclosures under Question 17);
Joint Prepackaged Plan of Reorganization of Clark Group, Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors, In re
Clark Group, Inc., No. 04-52536 (Bankr. E.D. Mo. Oct. 5,2004) (Docket No. 39) (covering two
cases with environmental disclosures under Question 17); Second Amended Plan, In re ONCO
Inv. Co., No. 04-10558 (Bankr. D. Del. July 30, 2004) (Docket No. 1422) (covering fourteen
cases with Question 17 disclosures); Debtors' Second Amended and Restated Joint Plan of
Reorganization, In re Int'l Wire Group, Inc., No. 04-11991 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 24, 2004)
(Docket No. 186) (covering two cases with Question 17 disclosures).
372. We arrived at this number by counting each jointly administered case with ajoint plan
as one case and, therefore, subtracted sixteen from forty-one.
373. See 11 U.S.C. § 1141(d)(1)(A) (2000) (stating that "the confirmation of a plan
discharges the debtor" from debts that arose prior to confirmation).
374. See supra Part II.C. l.a (describing abandonment of property).
375. See, e.g., Motion to Authorize (i) the Rejection of Certain Unexpired Real Property
Leases Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 365(a) & (ii) the Abandonment of Certain Personal
SCARY STORIES
Only in DB Companies376 did the debtor successfully abandon contaminated
real property.3 77 Interestingly enough, in the DB Companies case, it was the
parent corporation DB, not the subsidiaries, with the environmental
liabilities.378
Property Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. Section 554 at 2, In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-13810 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. Jan. 17, 2005) (Docket No. 1609) (seeking to abandon "miscellaneous furniture and
signage of inconsequential value" (internal citations omitted)); Motion to Reject (A) Approving
the Debtors' Rejection of Real Property Leases in Eden Prairie, Minnesota (Hops #76),
Colorado Springs, Colorado (Hops #20) & Clearwater, Florida (Hops #1) & (B) Approving
Abandonment of Personal Property Filed by Debtor In Possession Avado Brands, Inc. at 3 para.
6, In re Avado Brands, Inc., No. 04-31555 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Oct. 19,2004) (Docket No. 1099)
(seeking to abandon "trade fixtures or other personal property of de minimus [sic] value");
Motion for an Order Authorizing the Sale, Transfer or Abandonment of Certain Miscellaneous
Assets Free & Clear of All Liens, Claims & Encumbrances Pursuant to Sections 363 and 554(a)
of the Bankruptcy Code at 3 para. 6, exhibit A, In re KB Toys, Inc., No. 04-10120 (Bankr. D.
Del. July 2, 2004) (Docket No. 1180) (seeking "authority to sell, transfer or abandon (or donate
to charity)" furniture and computer equipment).
In In re Techneglas, Inc., the debtor proposed, as part of its plan of reorganization, to
transfer its real property, including its Columbus, Ohio facility, at which there were significant
environmental cleanup obligations, into a real estate entity. See The State of Ohio, Ohio
Environmental Protection Agency's Objection to Debtor's First Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization at 2, In re Techneglas, Inc., No. 04-63788 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Sept. 26, 2005)
(Docket No. 1246). The Ohio EPA objected to the debtor's plan, claiming that the plan
provided for the transfer of the real property and all its associated environmental liability to the
real estate entity, thereby leaving no party responsible for the environmental cleanup after sale
of the real property by the real estate entity. See id. The debtor countered that it "simply could
have moved to abandon the Columbus Facility" under § 554 of the Bankruptcy Code and that
"[the mere existence of contamination [did] not bar abandonment." Memorandum in Support
of First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization of the Debtors at 29, In re Techneglas, Inc., No.
04-63788 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Oct. 10, 2005) (Docket No. 1270). The debtor in Techneglas,
however, did not abandon the Columbus facility and the Ohio EPA withdrew its objection to
confirmation of the debtor's plan based on the debtor's representations that the environmental
conditions at the facility would be addressed. See Notice of Withdrawal of The State of Ohio,
Ohio Environmental Protection Agency's Objection to Debtor's First Amended Joint Plan of
Reorganization at 1-2, In re Techneglas, Inc., No. 04-63788 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio Oct. 5, 2005)
(Docket No. 1274).
376. In re DB Cos., No. 04-11618 (Bankr. D. Del. June 6, 2004).
377. DB Cos. was the lead case for the bankruptcy filings of five related entities. See Order
Granting Motion for Joint Administration ofCase Numbers 04-11617-04-11619; 04-11621-04-
11622, In re DB Cos., No. 04-11618 (Bankr. D. Del. June 3, 2004) (Docket No. 22).
378. Disclosure Statement at 1, In re DB Cos., No. 04-1618 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar. 8,2005)
(Docket No. 1292). Compare Statement of Financial Affairs at Q.17, In re DB Cos., No. 04-
11618 (Bankr. D. Del. July 24, 2004) (Docket No. 225) (nine pages of disclosure regarding
environmental matters), with Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 17, DB Motor Fuels, Inc., No.
04-11618 (Bankr. D. Del. July 23, 2004) (Docket No. 221) (checking "none" for Questions
17(a)-(c)).
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After confirmation of the debtors' joint liquidating plan,379 DB moved to
abandon real property located in Hanover, Massachusetts. 380 The firm had
operated a gas station on the site until 1998, but had "been unable to develop or
sell the Property since that time. 3 81 In 1997, DB reported a gas leak from an
underground storage tank on the property to the Massachusetts Department of
Environmental Protection (MADEP) and began remediation that ended with the
382filing of the bankruptcy case.
MADEP notified DB of its intent to object to the abandonment motion if
the debtor failed to "address the [MA]DEP's concerns relating to the
environmental contamination. 3 83 MADEP contended that the migration of
petroleum products from the debtor's gas station towards the city's wells
precluded abandonment of the property, because doing so posed "'imminent
and identifiable harm' to public health and safety. 384 While DB disagreed
with MADEP about the degree of harm caused by the 1997 gas leak, the firm
negotiated with the agency, and the parties reached a compromise entailing the
imposition of certain conditions to the abandonment of the gas station
property.
385
First, the joint debtors-DB and its subsidiaries-agreed to pay $61,000
into an expendable trust over which MADEP had spending control.386 Second,
they agreed that the abandonment order would provide for the retention by the
debtors of "legal power to convey title to the Property until December 31,
2007. '38 The reason for doing so was to alleviate concerns raised by MADEP
about the ability to transfer title post-abandonment to a purchaser of the real
379. The bankruptcy court for the District of Delaware confirmed the debtors' plan on
April 21, 2005. See Order Confirming First Amended Joint Liquidating Chapter 11 Plan of
Debtors and Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors, as Modified, In re DB Cos., No. 04-
11618 (Bankr. D. Del. Apr. 21, 2005) (Docket No. 1500).
380. See Debtors' Assented-To Motion to Abandon Certain Real Property, In re DB Cos.,
No. 04-11618 (Bankr. D. Del. June 20, 2006) (Docket No. 1968) [hereinafter Abandonment
Motion]. The Official Committee of Unsecured Creditors assented to the motion. See id. at 1.
381. Id.at2para.3.
382. Debtors' Motion for Approval of Compromise Regarding Abandonment of Property,
In re DB Cos., No. 04-11618 (Bankr. D. Del. Nov. 13, 2006) (Docket No. 2003) [hereinafter
Compromise Motion]. In their original motion, however, the debtors failed to mention the
presence of any environmental issue on the property to be abandoned. See generally
Abandonment Motion, supra note 380.
383. Compromise Motion, supra note 382, at 3 para. 4.
384. Id. (quoting Midlantic Nat'l Bank v, N.J. Dep't of Envtl. Prot., 474 U.S. 494,507 n.9
(1986)).
385. See id. (discussing the compromise between DB and MADEP).
386. Id. at 4 para. 5.
387. Id. at 4 para. 7.
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388property. In exchange, the abandonment order provided the debtors with a
broad release of, and discharge from, liability for environmental obligations
related to the real property.
389
Is DB Companies a case in which the debtors used the abandonment
power to shift the costs of environmental remediation onto the taxpayers of
Massachusetts? We could not make that determination from the documents
filed in the bankruptcy case. We do know that the debtors did not walk away
completely; they paid $61,000 into a trust fund to be managed by MADEP. It
is possible that this sum of money covered the costs of remediation at the
abandoned property. It also is possible that MADEP settled for less than the
full amount of remediation 390 knowing that in a liquidation case the prospect of
greater recovery was small.
But, even assuming that MADEP settled for less than the full costs of
remediation, our data demonstrate that debtors in Chapter 11 rarely invoke the
abandonment power to shed contaminated property. DB Companies is the only
example that we found, in a sample of 2,167 cases, of the debtor abandoning
polluted property and potentially reducing its liability for environmental
remediation. 391 Thus, based on our findings, we conclude that there is no need
to limit the use of the abandonment power in Chapter 11.
3. Discharge of Environmental Liabilities
Determining what happened to the varied environmental obligations in the
confirmed-plan cases proved to be a difficult task. In some cases, we were able
to determine precisely what occurred to the environmental obligation inside the
Chapter 11 case. Some debtors, such as New Heights Recovery & Power and
Turbine Chrome, provided in their plans of reorganization or liquidation for
cleanup of the environmental hazard 392 or payment in full of the pre-petition
388. Id.
389. See Consent Order Granting Debtors' Assented-To Motion to Abandon Certain Real
Property at 5, In re DB Cos., No. 04-11618 (Bankr. D. Del. Dec. 1, 2006) (Docket No. 2009)
(releasing DB from all obligations and liabilities to the Commonwealth of Massachusetts).
390. See Compromise Motion, supra note 382, at 5 para. 9 (stating that if the "Court were
to condition abandonment on compliance with a remediation and monitoring program
determined by the DEP, the costs could run into the hundreds of thousands of dollars").
391. One case out of 2,167 means that the abandonment power was used in only .046% of
Chapter 11 cases in our data set.
392. See supra Part IV.C. 1.b (summarizing New Heights's plan for remediation of all
environmental issues); see also Motion to Approve Second Amended Disclosure Statement &
Schedule Hearing to Confirm Plan of Reorganization at 30-31, In re Royal Hawaiian, No. 04-
0 1747 (Bankr. D. Haw. Feb. 23, 2005) (Docket No. 146) (stating that debtor sought to "install a
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environmental obligation.393 In other cases, such as In re Prime Interest,
Inc., 394 the obligation was not subject to discharge because it was nonmonetary
and, hence, did not constitute a claim. 395 But, in a number of cases, we could
not determine whether a claim existed or ascertain with certainty the amount of
any potentially dischargeable debt.396 The problem stems, in large part, from
the open-ended nature of the disclosures required under Question 17.
new 'rubber-lined' trap to eliminate ricochets and lead contamination at shooting club" and that
the plan proponent would "consummate the Plan even if a new 'gun trap' [were] required"); cf
Stipulation Between Reorganized Debtors, the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency & the
Indiana Department of Environmental Management Resolving Proof of Claim Numbers 514,
526, and 530 at 3 para. 2, In re Haynes Int'l, Inc., No. 04-05364 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Feb. 1, 2005)
(Docket No. 601) [hereinafter Haynes Stipulation] (stipulating that the environmental agencies
would withdraw their proofs of claim and that debtor would comply with its obligations under
RCRA).
393. See supra Part IV.C. l.e (describing Turbine Chrome's lingering obligation to pay the
City of Houston); cf Motion for an Order Approving Settlement Agreement with Indiana
Department of Environmental Management at 3-4, In re Haynes Int'l, No. 04-05364 (Bankr.
S.D. Ind. June 29, 2004) (Docket No. 331) (settling the agency's pre-petition claims by agreeing
to pay civil penalty of $75,000, to perform a "supplemental environmental project" costing
approximately $150,000, and to perform a "compliance stack test").
In the Haynes case, the debtor also disclosed on the SFA that it had received four notices
about discharge permits, the most recent occurring more than four years prior to its bankruptcy
filing, from the City of Kokomo Wastewater Treatment Plant. See Statement of Financial
Affairs at 7, In re Haynes Int'l, Inc., No. 04-05364 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Apr. 28, 2004) (Docket
No. 183). There was no other reference to the City of Kokomo Wastewater Treatment Plant in
the debtor's bankruptcy case. We assumed that the problem had been resolved based on the age
of the notices-ranging from four to six years prior to bankruptcy-and the fact that the City of
Kokomo received notice of the debtor's bankruptcy case. See Creditor Mailing Matrix, In re
Haynes Int'l, Inc., No. 04-05364 (Bankr. S.D. Ind. Mar. 29, 2004) (listing both "City of
Kokomo" and "City of Kokomo Wastewater Util" on mailing matrix).
394. See Schedule F at 3, In re Prime Interest, Inc., No. 04-10088 (Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 2,
2004) (Docket No. 1) (filed with petition) (listing the amount owed to the State of New Jersey
Department of Environmental Protection Division of Environmental Safety as $0 for "Notice
Purposes Only" related to Community Right to Know Survey); see also Haynes Stipulation,
supra note 392, at 2 para. D (stating that the debtor's "obligation to comply with the RCRA
permits... [was] a mandatory, nondischargeable injunctive obligation"); Statement of Financial
Affairs at Q. 17(a), In re Royal Hawaiian, No. 04-01747 (D. Haw. July 27, 2004) (Docket No.
32) (filed with schedules) (stating that the Hawaii Department of Health had issued a May 25,
2004 notice concerning Hawaii law governing the furnishing of information, and the entry and
inspection of premises for parties that generate, dispose of, transport, or handle hazardous
waste).
395. See supra notes 117-20 and accompanying text (noting that the Bankruptcy Code
defines claims in terms of right to payment).
396. In these cases, the debtor did not schedule the environmental agency, the agency did
not file a claim in the case (quite possibly because the agency did not receive notice of the
bankruptcy filing), and the debtor did not discuss the environmental issue in its disclosure
statement. Therefore, we had only the incomplete information provided in the debtor's SFA.
See, e.g., Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 17(b), In re Omni Landscaping, Inc., No. 04-
SCARY STORIES
Question 17 contains no time limitation.397 Therefore, a debtor might
disclose environmental violations that occurred in 1990, but that it remedied
prior to the bankruptcy filing. Compounding the problem is the fact that
neither Question 17(a) nor Question 17(b) requires the debtor to state the
current status of the environmental matter disclosed.398 Finding the relevant
environmental issues becomes significantly more difficult when the debtor
discloses every violation or notice for a multi-year period of time, regardless of
the nature or status of the environmental violation at issue. The result is that
the disclosures for large debtors with multiple environmental notices become
meaningless-the equivalent of dumping hundreds of boxes of materials on an
adversary in response to a discovery request.
13973 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Sept. 10, 2004) (Docket No. 6) (listing Mar. 22, 2002 notice from
Pennsylvania Department of Environmental Protection and providing only the abbreviated
citation "25 PA Code Chapter 245" under "environmental law"); Statement of Financial Affairs
of Camden Wire Co., Inc. at 7, In re Int'l Wire Group, Inc., No. 04-11991 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y.
May 25, 2004) (Docket No. 152) (listing September 21, 2003 notice from Environmental
Protection Agency Region 4 related to RCRA, but providing no information about the nature of
the notice nor the amount of any debt owed); Statement of Financial Affairs at Q. 1 7(b), In re
Tonawanda Island Marine Dev. Corp., No. 04-10994 (Bankr. W.D.N.Y. Feb. 17,2004) (Docket
No. 1) (filed with petition) (listing the Department of Environmental Conservation and Niagara
County Health Department with regard to an Apr. 1, 1999 notice, but leaving blank the space
for "environmental law" and providing no information about the nature of the notice nor the
amount of any debt owed).
In Footstar, the debtors listed the Dover Municipal Landfill Superfund site under Question
17(a) of the consolidated SFA and provided a 1992 docket number for a case in the federal
district court in New Hampshire. See Statement of Financial Affairs at 6, In re Footstar, Inc.,
No. 04-22350 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. June 30, 2004) (Docket No. 894). But, the debtors neither
scheduled the New Hampshire Department of Environmental Protection or the United States
EPA, the two government agencies listed under Question 17(a) of the debtors' consolidated
SFA, nor disclosed which of the 2,529 entities filing for bankruptcy bore responsibility for the
Dover site. See id. Moreover, the debtors' disclosure statement discussed neither the Dover
landfill site nor any other environmental issue. See Proposed Disclosure Statement for Debtors'
First Amended Joint Plan of Reorganization, In re Footstar, Inc., No. 04-22350 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. Oct. 28, 2005) (Docket No. 2890). Finally, while the docket for the 1992 Dover
landfill litigation is on PACER, none of the documents on the docket are accessible. See
Docket, United States v. Dover, No. 92-00407 (D.N.H. Aug. 7, 1992). We realize that one (or
more) of the 2,529 debtors in the consolidated Footstar bankruptcy case may be a successor-in-
interest to one (or more) of the named defendants in the 1992 litigation. But, we could not
make that determination based on the limited information provided in the Footstar bankruptcy
case.
397. See supra note 220 and accompanying text (describing how Question 17 places no
time restrictions on its mandated disclosure).
398. By contrast, Question 17(c) specifically requires the debtor to provide the "status or
disposition" of any environmental proceeding. See Official Form 7 (2007), supra note 162, at
719 (providing Official Form 7's formulation of Questions 17(a) and 17(b), requiring various
information but not current status).
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Consider the case of GEO Specialty Chemicals, Inc..399 GEO's Question
17 disclosures ran eight pages long and covered notices from and to at least
sixteen federal, state, and local environmental agencies over a ten-year period
of time.40 0  GEO provided detailed information about the relevant
environmental law in many cases. 401 As a result, we could determine the nature
of some violations and, hence, whether they might give rise to a claim in the
bankruptcy case. 402 But, for other disclosures, GEO provided a general and,
hence, meaningless reference to the name of the environmental statute, e.g.,
Clean Water Act.4° 3 Moreover, GEO scheduled its environmental creditors as
"unliquidated" and "disputed," either leaving blank the amount of the claim or
stating the amount as "unknown. Unless the environmental agency filed a
proof of claim in the case, as did the Louisiana Department of Environmental
Quality, we had no way of determining the contested amount, if any, at issue.40 5
Other documents in the bankruptcy case, such as the disclosure statement, also
failed to shed any light on which environmental matters remained pending on
the date of the petition.40 6
399. In re GEO Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 04-19148-MS (Bankr. D.N.J. Mar. 18, 2004).
400. Statement of Financial Affairs at 18-25, In re GEO Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 04-
19148 (Bankr. D.N.J. May 17, 2004) (Docket No. 245) [hereinafter GEO SFA]; see also
Statement of Financial Affairs at 33-48, In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819 (Bankr E.D. Va.
Oct. 27, 2004) (Docket No. 600) (listing notices from multiple state and federal agencies
covering a fifteen-year period from 1989 through 2004).
401. See, e.g., GEO SFA, supra note 400, at 19 (providing pinpoint citations to Code of
Federal Regulations).
402. For example, GEO listed "40 CFR § 265.52" as the environmental regulation with
regard to an August 26, 1999 notice from the Georgia Department of Environmental Protection.
See GEO SFA, supra note 400, at 19. Section 265.52 describes the required content for
contingency plans that hazardous waste facilities must maintain in the event of an unplanned
release of hazardous material. See Content of Contingency Plans, 40 C.F.R. § 265.52 (2006)
(providing specific requirements for contingency plans, including descriptions of actions
personnel must take to respond to a release of hazardous waste and a description of
arrangements made with local first-responders). The specific reference to the Code of Federal
Regulations allowed us to determine that the debtor likely remedied this violation pre-petition.
403. See, e.g., GEO SFA, supra note 400, at 19-24 (listing environmental laws such as
RCRA, CAA or Clean Water Act).
404. See infra notes 408-09 and accompanying text (explaining how a creditor's status as
unliquidated or disputed can impair its voting and distribution rights if such creditor does not
file a proof of claim).
405. See Claim No. 679, Claims Register at 85, In re GEO Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 04-
19148 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 2, 2004) (Docket No. 1275) (allowing unsecured claim for $9,111).
406. In its disclosure statement, GEO devoted only one page to, and provided a vague
discussion of, its environmental obligations. See Disclosure Statement with Respect to Third
Modified Joint Plan of Reorganization at 86-87, In re GEO Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 04-
19148 (Bankr. D.N.J. Nov. 22, 2004) (Docket No. 874). GEO did estimate its accrued
environmental liabilities at a little less than $2 million at the end of 2003. Id. at 87. Compared
520
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Moreover, in another fourteen of the confirmed-plan cases, we found
voluminous, vague, or seemingly dated disclosures under Question 17 coupled
with the debtor's scheduling of the environmental agencies' claims as
contingent, unliquidated, or disputed.40 7 Normally in a Chapter 11 case, a
scheduled creditor need not file a proof of claim to participate in the case.408
But, if the debtor schedules the debt as contingent, unliquidated, or disputed,
then the creditor must file a proof of claim or it will "not be treated as a creditor
with respect to such claim for the purposes of voting and distribution.,
40 9
We could not determine why the relevant agencies failed to file proofs of
claim. But, there are two possible explanations. One is that the agencies had
no claims against the estate, or that the amounts of their claims were
insignificant, thereby not meriting the time or resources necessary to pursue
with outstanding liabilities in excess of $245 million, however, GEO's environmental liabilities
were insignificant (less than 1% of total debt). See Summary of Schedules at 1, In re GEO
Specialty Chems., Inc., No. 04-19148 (Bankr. D.N.J. July 6, 2004) (Docket No. 427) (totaling
GEO's liabilities at $245,497,078.94).
407. Compare Statement of Financial Affairs at Q.17(b), In re Avado Brands, Inc., No. 04-
31555 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 19,2004) (Docket No. 311) (providing no information about the
nature of the 1993 notice to the Georgia Environmental Protection Division), with Schedule F at
exhibit F-8, In re Avado Brands, Inc., No. 04-31555 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. Mar. 19,2004) (Docket
No. 311) (listing Georgia Environmental Protection Division for zero dollars as contingent,
unliquidated, and disputed unsecured, nonpriority claim); compare Statement of Financial
Affairs at 7, Attachment 17(a), In re Fujita Corp. USA, No. 04-27072 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug.
12, 2004) (Docket No. 32) (listing phase 1 environmental site assessment as unknown for two
1993 local government notices and a May 2003 notice from California EPA/Department of
Toxic Substance Control), with Schedule F at 8, 12, In re Fujita Corp. USA, No. 04-27072
(Bankr. C.D. Cal. Aug. 12, 2004) (Docket No. 39) (scheduling agency claims as "0.00"
contingent, unliquidated, and disputed). In addition, twelve of the fourteen debtors in the
ONCO Investment Company consolidated bankruptcy case (ONCO) employed this strategy of
scheduling the vast majority of their environmental agency claims with no monetary amount and
as unliquidated and disputed. See also Schedule F at 15-16, 42-44, Schedules of Global Stone
Filler Products, Inc., Case No. 04-10565, In re ONCO Inv. Co., No. 04-10558 (Bankr. D. Del.
Apr. 24, 2004) (Docket No. 440) (scheduling the Georgia Department of Natural Resources, the
Mine Safety and Health Administration, the U.S. EPA's Office of Solid Waste, and the Virginia
Department of Environmental Quality as holding unliquidated and disputed claims).
The Michigan Department of Environmental Quality (MDEQ) was the only environmental
agency that filed a proof of claim in the ONCO case. It filed an unsecured, nonpriority claim for
$2,734,225, but later withdrew it. See Claim No. 548, Claims Register at 74, In re ONCO Inv.
Co., No. 04-10558 (Bankr. D. Del. Jan. 24, 2005) (Docket No. 2547); see also Notice of
Withdrawal of Proof of Claim at 1, In re ONCO Inv. Co., No. 04-10558 (Bankr. D. Del. Mar.
21, 2005) (Docket No. 2316).
408. See FED. R. BANKR. P. 3003(b) (1), (c)(2) (2007) (providing that unless a creditor's
claim is either unscheduled or scheduled as disputed, contingent, or unliquidated, the creditor
need not file a proof of claim).
409. Id. at 3003(c) (2).
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them.410 Another possibility is that problems with the agencies' databases
prevented them from identifying those cases in which proofs of claim should
have been filed.411 By not filing proofs of claim, however, the agencies lost
their right to recover anything from the estate and had any debts owed to them
discharged upon confirmation of the debtors' Chapter 11 plans.
Even assuming, however, that all forty-one4 12 confirmed-plan debtors
discharged some or all of their environmental liabilities inside Chapter 11, the
shedding of environmental liabilities through the bankruptcy discharge simply
is not a common problem. Our data set included 2,167 debtors; in only forty-
one cases did the debtor disclose an environmental obligation and emerge from
bankruptcy with a confirmed plan. We know that all forty-one debtors did not
discharge their environmental obligations in their Chapter 11 cases.4 13 But,
even if we assumed that all forty-one debtors had done so, then the discharge of
environmental debts occurred in less than 2% of the cases from our database of
2004 Chapter 11 filings.
Of course, the discharge issue has two components: (1) the frequency
with which debtors discharge environmental debts in Chapter 11, and (2) the
magnitude of those debts. Our data indicate that the discharge of
environmental obligations is an infrequent phenomenon in Chapter 11. But, in
at least one case-the consolidated US Airways filing-plan confirmation will
discharge a significant environmental claim.414
410. Cf EPA PARTICIPATION IN BANKRUPTCY CASES 1-6 (Sept. 30, 1997), available at
http://www.epa.gov/Compliance/resources/policies/cleanup/superfund/epapar-bankrt-mem.pdf
(setting forth factors for evaluating whether to pursue a claim in bankruptcy, including the size
and priority of the claim and the value of unencumbered assets in the bankruptcy estate).
411. See GAO REPORT, supra note 20, at 30 (describing "[d]ata qualityproblems in EPA's
Superfund database" and difficulties that the EPA has in "identifying from its program and
enforcement databases which companies have large liabilities").
412. We used forty-one cases for the denominator in this calculation, rather than twenty-
five, because we needed a figure representing the frequency of discharge, not the frequency of
plan confirmation. Cf supra notes 371-72 and accompanying text (explaining that although
there were forty-one cases with confirmed plans, in counting confirmed plans the number should
be decreased to twenty-five due to joint plans).
413. See supra notes 392-95 and accompanying text (providing examples of cases where
environmental obligations were not discharged).
414. In a few cases, the debt discharged was quite small. For example, in AlbanilDyestuff
Corp., the debtor reached a settlement with the EPA of an administrative action against the
debtor. See Motion of the Debtor for the Entry of an Order Approving Consent Agreement and
Final Order with the United States Environmental Protection Agency, In re Albanil Dyestuff
Corp., No. 04-18222 (Bankr. D.N.J. Sept. 30, 2004) (Docket No. 141) (requesting that the court
ratify the agreed-upon settlement). The settlement "provide[d] the EPA with an allowed,
unsecured non-priority claim in the amount of $15,000," id. at 3 para. 9, which the parties'
consent agreement designated a "civil penalty." Id. at exhibit A paras. 4 & 5. Under the terms
of the debtor's confirmed plan, the EPA would receive $2,250 over a two-year time period. See
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In order to understand what happened in USA irways, it is necessary to go
back to 2002, when US Airways and Piedmont Airlines, an affiliated debtor,
originally filed for relief under Chapter 11.415 In the 2002 bankruptcy case, the
Maryland Department of Environment (MDE) filed a proof of claim for
$10,450,000, based on violations of Maryland la416 The MDE and the
Maryland Aviation Administration (MAA) sought cleanup costs from US
Airways and Piedmont (the "debtors") for "significant environmental
contamination in and around" a fuel storage and transfer facility located at the
Baltimore/Washington International Airport (BWI).417 The debtors settled with
the MDE and the MAA, and the MDE agreed to withdraw its proof of claim
and not receive payment under the debtors' 2002 Chapter 11 plan in exchange
for not having its debt discharged by virtue of confirmation of that plan.418
US Airways and Piedmont once again filed for relief under Chapter 11 on
September 12, 2004.4 19 The MDE filed proofs of claim in the 2004 case for
$23,343,868; those claims had unsecured, nonpriority status.420 The debtors
objected to the MDE's claim, along with the claims of a number of other
governmental, tax, and environmental authorities, basing their objection on a
First Modified Plan of Reorganization at 13, In re Albanil Dyestuff Corp., No. 04-18222
(Bankr. D.N.J. Jan. 12, 2005) (Docket No. 202) (providing that general unsecured creditors
would receive 15% of their claim in three payments of 5% with the last payment occurring two
years from the effective date of the plan). Thus, confirmation of the Albanil plan discharged
approximately $13,000 of the EPA's allowed claim, assuming that penalties are dischargeable in
Chapter 11. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text.
415. See In re US Airways Group, Inc., No. 02-83984 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 11, 2002).
416. See Maryland Department of the Environment's Response to Debtors' Fourth
Omnibus Objection to Certain (I) Duplicative Claims and Amended Claims; (H) Equity Claims;
(III) No Liability Claims (Books and Records); (IV) Tax, Governmental, and Environmental
Claims; and (V) Modify Debtor and Amount Claims and Request for Hearing at exhibit B of
exhibit F, In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 30, 2005) (Docket No.
2993) [hereinafter Maryland's Response].
417. Id. at 3 para. B.
418. Id. at exhibit B of exhibit F, at paras. 1, 3.
419. See Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition at 1-2, In re US Airways, Inc. No. 04-13819
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2004) (Docket No. 1); Chapter 11 Voluntary Petition at 1-2, In re
Piedmont Airlines, Inc., No. 04-13822 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 12, 2004) (DocketNo. 1). Three
other related entities-US Airways Group, Inc., PSA Airlines, Inc., and Material Services
Company, Inc.-also filed for relief on the same day. Id. annex A. US Airways was the lead
case. See Order Granting Motion to Authorize Joint Administration of Cases Pursuant to
Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure 10 15(B) at para. 2, In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-
12819 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Sept. 13, 2004) (stating that the five filed cases shall be administered
jointly).
420. See Stipulation Resolving Proof of Claim Numbers 5063,5064,5066, and 5083 Filed
by or Transferred to Maryland Aviation Administration at 2, US Airways, Inc. No. 04-13819
(E.D. Va. Mar. 7, 2008) (Docket No. 4791) [hereinafter Stipulation].
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general statement that they did "not believe they owe[d] any liability" and that
the claimed amounts were "grossly overstated."42'
On November 7, 2007, the MDE transferred its claims against the debtors
to the MAA422 Four months later, on March 7, 2008, the MAA and the
debtors entered into a stipulation allowing a general unsecured claim by the
MAA against the debtors in the amount of $11.5 million.423 The parties also
agreed that the "Stipulation resolve[d] all remaining claims of MDE and MAA
against the Reorganized Debtors in these bankruptcy cases.,
424
The terms of the debtors' confirmed plan of reorganization provided for an
estimated recovery for unsecured creditors ranging between 3.1% and 17.4% of
each creditor's claim, with payment being made in shares of new common
stock of the reorganized debtors.425 Thus, US Airways and Piedmont
effectively shed environmental cleanup costs ranging between $9.5 million and
$11.1 million in bankruptcy, 426 thereby shifting those costs to the taxpayer. In
addition, the debtors deferred payment on their environmental obligations for at
least six years.
The US Airways case, then, is the scary story. The debtors filed for
bankruptcy twice within a two-year time period.427 They deferred payment of
their environmental obligations by negotiating a settlement with the MDE in
428their 2002 bankruptcy case. But, according to the MDE, they did not pay on
that settlement.429 Moreover, they once again filed for relief under Chapter 11
421. Debtors' Fourth Omnibus Objection to Certain (I) Duplicative Claims & Amended
Claims; (II)Equity Claims; (III)No Liability Claims (Books & Records); (IV)Tax,
Governmental, & Environmental Claims; & (V) Modify Debtor & Amount Claims at 8 para. 26,
In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819 (Bankr. E.D. Va. July 29, 2005) (Docket No. 2659).
422. See Stipulation, supra note 420, at 3.
423. See id. at 4 para. 4.
424. Id. at 4 para. 7.
425. See Second Amended Disclosure Statement with Respect to Joint Plan of
Reorganization of US Airways, Inc. & Its Affiliated Debtors & Debtors-in-Possession at vi, 74,
80-81, In re US Airways, Inc., No. 04-13819 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 7, 2005) (Docket No.
2755).
426. The discharge estimates are based on the $11.5 million claim amount to which the
parties stipulated in March 2008. If MDE's original cleanup estimate (as stated in its proofs of
claim) is accurate, then the debtors discharged between $19 million and $22.6 million in
cleanup costs. See Maryland's Response, supra note 416, at 4 para. II.A (stating that an outside
consultant's report "fully substantiates the $23,343,868.00 claims amount"). The outside
consultant is EA Engineering, Science, and Technology, Inc., and its website address is
http://www.eaest.com/.





only eighteen months after the order confirming their 2002 plan4 30 and less than
one month after their 2002 bankruptcy cases closed.431 Finally, after six years,
the debtors discharged, at a minimum, almost $9.5 million in environmental
cleanup costs.
Thus, while debtors do not normally end up discharging environmental
obligations inside Chapter 11, when they do so the debt discharged may prove
considerable. However, does an infrequent but large discharge of
environmental debt merit a major reform of bankruptcy or environmental law,
or of corporate law concepts of limited liability? We turn our attention to that
question next.
V. Conclusion
No system is perfect. There always will be debtors who use the legal
system in strategic ways in order to evade their obligations under both state and
federal environmental law. The issue is not whether debtors do so, but the
extent of the problem. As Professor Richard Epstein has stated:
First-best solutions are rarely, if ever, possible; thus the beginning of
wisdom is to seek rules that minimize the level of imperfections, not to
pretend that these do not exist .... Bad outcomes are therefore consistent
with good institutions, and we cannot discredit these institutions with
carefully selected illustrations of their failures. Counterexamples may be
brought to bear against any set of human institutions. The social question,
432however, is concerned with the extent of the fall from grace.
Our findings strongly suggest that the "fall from grace" is small. There are
bad outcomes, such as the Asarco or US Airways cases. But, our data suggest
that bad outcomes occur infrequently. This conclusion is not surprising, given
the fact that the vast majority of debtors report no pending environmental
obligations at the time that they file for Chapter 11. In addition, in more than
ninety-nine percent of the cases in our data set, environmental liabilities played
no role in the debtor's decision to file for bankruptcy.
Inside the Chapter 11 bankruptcy case, the picture is not much different.
Debtors rarely invoke the abandonment power. Some debtors do discharge part
430. Order Confirming Chapter 11 Plan, In re US Airways Group, Inc., No. 02-83984
(Bankr. E.D. Va. Mar. 18, 2003) (Docket No. 2986).
431. Order Granting Reorganized Debtors' Administrative Motion to Close Cases of
Affiliate Debtors, In re US Airways Group, Inc., No. 02-83984 (Bankr. E.D. Va. Aug. 20,2004)
(Docket No. 5174).
432. RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD 32 (1995) (emphasis
omitted).
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or all of their environmental debts in Chapter 11. But, our findings indicate
that the wholesale discharge of significant environmental liability is an
uncommon event. Finally, the data we examined simply do not support the
claim that the world of Chapter 11 is disproportionately populated by shell
subsidiary corporations with significant environmental liabilities.
We are not unmindful, however, of the pull of the dramatic story of abuse.
Nevertheless, legislative reform is not the answer. For example, amending the
Bankruptcy Code to accord administrative expense priority status to
environmental creditors may have unintended consequences by making it more
difficult for a debtor to obtain confirmation of its plan of reorganization. In
Chapter 11, administrative expenses must be paid in cash in full on the plan's
effective date.433 Therefore, if the administrative expense claim is significant,
e.g., large environmental remediation costs, the debtor may prove unable to
pay, thereby derailing the Chapter 11 case.4 34 Forcing the debtor into
liquidation, however, may not well serve the creditors, including any
environmental claimants. The firm may have more value as a going concern,
which redounds to the benefit of all creditors in the Chapter 11 case.435
Moreover, if a firm closes its doors, its employees are out of work with no jobs or
benefits, and the taxpayer, albeit indirectly, picks up the associated costs.
While we counsel against wholesale changes to bankruptcy, corporate, or
environmental law, we do have two modest suggestions. First, there is a gap in
the current bankruptcy notice scheme, as evidenced by the GSE Chapter 11 case.
Environmental agencies that are not "creditors," and hence not scheduled, may
not receive notice of the debtor's bankruptcy proceeding. Nonetheless, the
agencies may have a stake in the outcome of the debtor's case. Therefore, we
recommend that debtors be required to include on their creditor mailing matrix
any environmental entity with which the debtor has a consent decree, or a pending
or ongoing environmental dispute. Second, the Judicial Conference needs to
revise Questions 17(a) and (b) of the SFA. Currently, debtors are not required to
disclose the status or disposition of the environmental notices or violations
mentioned under subparts (a) or (b) of Question 17. For debtors with significant
regulatory oversight, the filing of a bankruptcy petition may elicit pages of
environmental notices or violations, many of which the debtor may have cured
pre-petition. Pages of notices or violations, some dating back a decade or more,
433. 11 U.S.C. § 1129(a)(9)(A) (2000).
434. See Hillinger & Hillinger, supra note 36, at 390 (noting that the grant of
"administrative expense priority to environmental obligations can upset the bankruptcy game
plan... [and] undermine a debtor's opportunity to reorganize").
435. See Heidt, supra note 3, at 125 ("[T]he present liquidation value of the [debtor's]
assets may be less than the going concern value.").
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ill-serve the needs of the creditors, the U.S. Trustee, and the bankruptcy court for
accurate and relevant information.
Finally, we recognize the limitations of our data. Our conclusions are based
on a subset of Chapter 11 cases--only those Chapter 11 cases filed in 2004 and
closed by the middle of 2006. Moreover, it appears that an anomaly with PACER
precluded us from retrieving all closed Chapter 11 cases that fit within our search
parameters.436 Nonetheless, there is no indication that the data retrieved are not
representative of the total set of Chapter 11 cases filed in 2004. Obviously, this
Article does not address every issue raised by the intersection of bankruptcy,
corporate, and environmental law. But, it does provide the beginning of a more
grounded approach to the discussion about the need for reform. Without any
empirical evidence demonstrating more widespread abuse, the calls for reform of
bankruptcy, environmental, or corporate law are based on nothing more than
scary stories.
436. See supra note 161 (explaining the problems involved with gathering cases from
PACER).
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Table I: Adjustments to Search Result Totals
-A- -B- -C- -D-
State and Original Adjustments Adjusted
District Total Total
Alabama: Middle 2 0 2
Alabama: Northern 34 3 31
Alabama: Southern 12 0 12
Alaska 4 0 4
Arkansas: Eastern 16 0 16
Arkansas: Western 10 0 10
Arizona 72 4 68
California: Central 113 1 112
California: Eastern 34 1 33
California: Northern 33 2 31
California: Southern 14 0 14
Colorado 39 2 37
Connecticut 21 1 20
Delaware 165 21 144
District of Columbia 7 0 7
Florida: Middle 91 4 87
Florida: Northern 11 0 11
Florida: Southern 68 1 67
Georgia: Middle 15 0 15
Georgia: Northern 92 3 89
Georgia: Southern 13 0 13
Hawaii 8 0 8
Idaho 7 0 7
Illinois: Central 4 0 4
Illinois: Northern 89 1 88
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-A- -B- -C- -D-
State and Original Adjustments Adjusted
District Total Total
Illinois: Southern 8 0 8
Indiana: Northern 12 0 12
Indiana: Southern 35 7 28
Iowa: Northern 2 0 2
Iowa: Southern 9 0 9
Kansas 13 0 13
Kentucky: Eastern 8 1 7
Kentucky: Western 22 2 20
Louisiana: Middle 10 0 10
Louisiana: Eastern 20 0 20
Louisiana: Western 13 4 9
Maine 8 0 8
Maryland 47 4 43
Massachusetts 35 0 35
Michigan: Eastern 114 9 105
Michigan: Western 10 0 10
Minnesota 82 3 79
Mississippi: Northern 3 0 3
Mississippi: Southern 11 1 10
Missouri: Eastern 25 0 25
Missouri: Western 15 0 15
Montana 9 1 8
Nebraska 8 0 8
Nevada 40 1 39
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-A- -B- -C- -D-
State and Original Adjustments Adjusted
District Total Total
New Hampshire 4 0 4
New Mexico 15 0 15
New Jersey 104 6 98
New York: Eastern 97 6 91
New York: Western 24 0 24
New York: Northern 8 0 8
New York: Southern 2,725 2,534 191
North Carolina: Eastern 30 0 30
North Carolina: Middle 6 0 6
North Carolina: Western 22 0 22
North Dakota 3 0 3
Ohio: Northern 25 3 22
Ohio: Southern 22 1 21
Oklahoma: Eastern 1 0 1
Oklahoma: Northern 4 0 4
Oklahoma: Western 9 0 9
Oregon 16 2 14
Pennsylvania: Eastern 80 2 78
Pennsylvania: Middle 13 0 13
Pennsylvania: Western 52 0 52
Puerto Rico 44 0 44
Rhode Island 5 0 5
South Carolina 21 0 21
South Dakota 4 0 4
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-A- -B- -C- -D-
State and Original Adjustments Adjusted
District Total Total
Tennessee: Eastern 10 0 10
Tennessee: Middle 18 0 18
Tennessee: Western 20 0 20
Texas: Eastern 24 0 24
Texas: Northern 211 4 207
Texas: Western 97 1 96
Texas: Southern 122 2 120
Utah 22 0 22
Vermont 4 0 4
Virgin Islands 3 0 3
Virginia: Eastern 47 0 47
Virginia: Western 16 0 16
Washington: Eastern 17 0 17
Washington: Western 43 0 43
West Virginia: Northern 3 0 3
West Virginia: Southern 3 0 3
Wisconsin: Eastern 6 0 6
Wisconsin: Western 11 1 10
Wyoming 6 0 6
Totals 5,550 2,639 2,911
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Table II: Problems with the Statements of Financial Affairs
-A- -B- -C- -D- -E- -F-
State and Judicial District Adjusted Old SFA No SFA No Access Total
Total to SFA
Alabama: Middle 2 0 0 0 2
Alabama: Northern 31 0 4 16 11
Alabama: Southern 12 1 0 0 11
Alaska 4 0 0 0 4
Arkansas: Eastern 16 2 1 0 13
Arkansas: Western 10 0 0 0 10
Arizona 68 1 20 0 47
California: Central 112 1 21 1 89
California: Eastern 33 0 4 1 28
California: Northern 31 0 4 20 7
California: Southern 14 0 3 0 11
Colorado 37 0 8 0 29
Connecticut 20 1 6 0 13
Delaware 144 0 3 0 141
District of Columbia 7 0 2 0 5
Florida: Middle 87 3 8 0 76
Florida: Northern 11 0 0 0 11
Florida: Southern 67 0 12 55 0
Georgia: Middle 15 1 3 10 1
Georgia: Northern 89 9 24 0 56
Georgia: Southern 13 0 2 0 11
Hawaii 8 0 0 0 8
Idaho 7 2 0 0 5
Illinois: Central 4 0 1 3 0
Illinois: Northern 88 3 13 1 71
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-A- -B- -C- -D- -E- -F-
State and Judicial District Adjusted Old SFA No SFA No Access Total
Total to SFA
Illinois: Southern 8 0 0 0 8
Indiana: Northern 12 1 2 0 9
Indiana: Southern 28 0 2 0 26
Iowa: Northern 2 0 0 0 2
Iowa: Southern 9 0 0 0 9
Kansas 13 0 2 0 11
Kentucky: Eastern 7 0 0 0 7
Kentucky: Western 20 0 3 0 17
Louisiana: Middle 10 0 0 0 10
Louisiana: Eastern 20 0 2 0 18
Louisiana: Western 9 0 0 0 9
Maine 8 0 5 0 3
Maryland 43 9 4 0 30
Massachusetts 35 2 10 0 23
Michigan: Eastern437  105 0 7 97 1
Michigan: Western 10 2 0 0 8
Minnesota 79 0 1 0 78
Mississippi: Northern 3 0 1 0 2
Mississippi: Southern 10 0 2 8 0
Missouri: Eastern 25 0 10 0 15
Missouri: Western 15 0 0 0 15
437. We could not access the SFAs for any cases in the Eastern District of Michigan. But,
in In re Alternative Fuels, L.C., No. 04-21822 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 4,2004), we had access
to the proof of claim filed by the Michigan Department of Environmental Quality. See infra
note 439. Because we counted the Alternative Fuels case in Table III, we had to account for it
as part of our database. Hence, we adjusted the Total in Column F for the Eastern District of
Michigan to reflect inclusion of the Alternative Fuels case in the database of 2,167 debtors.
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-A- -B- -C- -D- -E- -F-
State and Judicial District Adjusted Old SFA No SFA No Access Total
Total to SFA
Montana 8 0 1 0 7
Nebraska 8 0 0 0 8
Nevada 39 1 10 0 28
New Hampshire 4 0 1 0 3
New Mexico 15 0 1 0 14
New Jersey 98 4 14 0 80
New York: Eastern 91 2 19 0 70
New York: Western 24 0 3 0 21
New York: Northern 8 1 0 0 7
New York: Southern 191 5 37 0 149
North Carolina: Eastern 30 0 0 0 30
North Carolina: Middle 6 0 4 0 2
North Carolina: Western 22 0 1 0 21
North Dakota 3 0 0 0 3
Ohio: Northern 22 0 0 0 22
Ohio: Southern 21 1 1 0 19
Oklahoma: Eastern 1 0 0 0 1
Oklahoma: Northern 4 0 1 0 3
Oklahoma: Western 9 1 1 0 7
Oregon 14 0 3 0 11
Pennsylvania: Eastern 78 2 29 0 47
Pennsylvania: Middle 13 0 4 2 7
Pennsylvania: Western 52 1 7 1 43
Puerto Rico 44 1 7 1 35
534
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-A- -B- -C- -D- -E- -F-
State and Judicial District Adjusted Old SFA No SFA No Access Total
Total to SFA
Rhode Island 5 0 2 0 3
South Carolina 21 0 2 0 19
South Dakota 4 0 0 0 4
Tennessee: Eastern 10 0 1 9 0
Tennessee: Middle 18 0 3 12 3
Tennessee: Western 20 0 4 0 16
Texas: Eastern 24 0 3 0 21
Texas: Northern 207 0 12 0 195
Texas: Western 96 2 6 0 88
Texas: Southern 120 10 19 0 91
Utah 22 2 7 0 13
Vermont 4 0 0 0 4
Virgin Islands 3 0 0 3 0
Virginia: Eastern 47 1 9 0 37
Virginia: Western 16 0 6 10 0
Washington: Eastern 17 1 2 0 14
Washington: Western 43 1 5 0 37
West Virginia: Northern 3 0 0 0 3
West Virginia: Southern 3 0 0 0 3
Wisconsin: Eastern 6 1 1 0 4
Wisconsin: Western 10 0 1 0 9
Wyoming 6 1 1 0 4
Totals 2,911 76 418 250 2,167
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Table III: Cases with Environmental Issues
-A- -B- -C- -D- -E-
State and District Total Misread Resolved New
Q. 17 or Settled Total
Alabama: Middle 1 0 0 1
Alabama: Northern 1 0 0 1
Arizona 1 0 0 1
California: Central 2 0 0 2
California: Southern 1 0 0 1
Colorado 1 0 1438 0
Connecticut 1 0 0 1
Delaware 21 0 3 18
Florida: Middle 2 0 2 0
Hawaii 1 0 0 1
Illinois: Northern 3 0 0 3
Indiana: Northern 1 0 1 0
Indiana: Southern 1 0 0 1
Louisiana: Eastern 1 0 1 0
Louisiana: Western 1 0 1 0
438. We included In re BDS International, LLC, No. 04-36281 (D. Colo. Dec. 3, 2004), in
this category, even though the debtor did not specifically state that it had completed remediation
of a diesel and glycol spill pre-petition. Supra note 212.
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-A- -B- -C- -D- -E-
State and District Total Misread Resolved New
Q. 17 or Settled Total
Michigan: Eastern 439  1 0 0 1
Minnesota 1 0 0 1
Missouri: Eastern 3 0 0 3
New Jersey 6 1 0 5
Nevada 4 2 1 1
New York: Eastern 7 1 0 6
New York: Western 1 0 0 1
New York: Northern 2 0 0 2
New York: Southern 6 0 1 5
North Carolina: Eastern 1 0 0 1
Ohio: Northern 1 0 1 0
Ohio: Southern 1 0 0 1
Pennsylvania: Eastern 2 0 1 1
Puerto Rico 1 0 0 1
Rhode Island 1 0 0 1
Texas: Northern 6 1 0 5
Texas: Southern 2 0 1 1
Virginia: Eastern 3 1 0 2
439. In the Eastern District of Michigan, PACER provided access to a limited number of
documents. But our review of the cases revealed a significant environmental liability in In re
Alternative Fuels, L. C., No. 04-21822 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 4, 2004). The MDEQ filed a
proof of claim amounting to almost $6.3 million based on state court judgments resulting from
the firm's environmental violations. See Statement of Claim at paras. 1-6, In re Alternative
Fuels, L.C., No. 04-21822 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. Oct. 31, 2005) (Docket No. 62). The MDEQ's
claim was the only document in the Alternative Fuels case that was accessible on PACER. The
docket indicates that the case was dismissed without confirmation of a plan. Docket, In re
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-A- -B- -C- -D- -E-
State and District Total Misread Resolved New
Q. 17 or Settled Total
Washington: Western 1 0 0 1
West Virginia: Northern 1 0 0 1
Wisconsin: Eastern 1 0 0 1
Totals 91 6 14 71
Alternative Fuels, L.C., No.04-21882 (Bankr. E.D. Mich. May 4, 2004).
